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Abstract
This work examines how Marxism, a theory born in Europe, came to 
conceptualize Asia. It traces the ways in which Marxists theorised and engaged with 
nationalism in the colonies, and specifically, with Indian nationalism. It assesses the 
implications and consequences of this for Marxist theory.
The first part of this work follows the process by which Asia came to be 
incorporated into Marxist theory. The manner of this incorporation was such that 
nationalism was declared to be the central theoretical and political issue in the colonies. 
The question of 'the East’ came to be treated, within Marxism, as 'the national and 
colonial question'.
The second part examines how Marxists in India theorised and engaged with 
Indian nationalism. In seeking to understand Indian nationalism in Marxist terms, 
Indian communists also sought to define their own tasks and role, as communists, in 
relation to the nationalist movement. They sought to define the relationship between 
class struggle and nationalist struggle, and between the goal of national liberation and 
their own goal of socialism. In this part we examine the different answers they gave to 
these questions.
Its 'engagement' with nationalism had certain consequences for Marxist theory. 
We conclude by suggesting that the manner of this engagement - one in which Marxists 
endorsed colonial nationalism, and then sought to harness class struggle to nationalist 
struggle, thereby failing at any point to develop a critique of the nation-state - resulted 
in Marxism itself becoming 'national'. Marxism, we conclude, is in its content, 
structure and intent a non-national, universal theory ; but it is also one which has come 
to identify the political project to which it is wedded with the nation. Marxism has 
become 'nationalist', in the sense that it has come to see in the nation-state the 
necessary form through which, and in which, other goals - such as democracy and 
socialism - are realised and embodied.
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1Introduction
Nationalism and Marxism have proved to be two of the most important and 
enduring ideologies of modem history. Both were bom in Europe. In our century, 
both moved to Asia. This work is about Marxism's move to Asia, and its encounter 
with nationalism there.
That this is a study of Marxism's engagement with nationalism reflects the 
historical fact that this encounter was an asymmetrical one. In Asia it was Marxism 
which sought to understand, theorise, influence and woo or capture nationalist 
movements. This was partly due to the fact that, in most cases, nationalist sentiment 
and nationalist parties were already established in Asian countries before Marxism 
arrived there. Marxists thus had to address the question of nationalism, if for no other 
reason that it was an important aspect of the political landscape in which they sought to 
act.
There were, however, other reasons ; the asymmetry of this encounter, as well as 
other important features of it, were also due to the nature of these these two ideologies, 
and the differences between them. A few words on this - introductory comments, 
rather than attempts at definitions - are in order.
Nationalism draws from a number of intellectual sources, most notably from the 
complex of ideas which constituted the Enlightenment and Romanticism. It does so 
somewhat indisriminately and inconsistently, with variations according to time, place 
and the preferences of nationalists. The generality of the phenomenon, as has often 
been remarked, is not matched by any corresponding depth of its ideas.
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It would be more accurate to speak of ’phenomena’ as well as 'phenomenon', for 
another feature of nationalism is the manner in which it combines the universal and the 
particular. Most nationalists have accepted that all nations, and not simply their own, 
are entitled to constitute themselves as sovereign political and territorial units. Some, 
most notably Mazzini, elevated the 'unique' qualities which each nation allegedly 
possessed and was able to contribute to the world into a defining feature of 
nationalism - nationalism as a truly universal philosophy and project. At the same time 
nationalism is, by its nature, sui generis - it is always Indian nationalism, or German 
nationalism, and so on, precisely because its object, the nation, is seen as the form and 
expression of an irreducible (cultural, linguistic or other) particularity. The 
universalism of nationalism lies in particularism, and is not merely achieved by 
particularistic means. It is only when each nation has formed a state that the universal 
message and mission of nationalism has been achieved.
By contrast with this, Marxism is more self-consciously related to its intellectual 
predecessors, and also to the historical and social circumstances of its own birth ; and it 
is a universal philosophy in a very different sense. In the eyes of its founder it was at 
once inheritor of the Enlightenment and critique of it, product of a certain stage in the 
development of bourgeois society and prophet and instrument of its doom.
From the outset, strong claims were made for the universal relevance, and 
applicability, of Marxism. Whatever else it was, it was also held to be a theory of 
history. As such, it was a theory of Man in history, and not just of Marx's times, nor 
just of European Man. Indeed, it was other things, such as an analysis and critique of 
bourgeois society, by virtue of its being a theory of history - a theory capable of 
identifying the differentia specified of different societies and different epochs in 
history, and of the mechanisms of change and transition between them.
Marxism was also conceived as a 'universal' theory in a second sense ; it might 
be more accurate to say, a 'general' theory. Here its universalism lay, not in its claims 
for itself as a theory, but in how it conceived its object. Marx believed (a belief shared
by Hegel and by many of Marx's predecessors and contemporaries) that with the 
advent of capitalism history was becoming one, was becoming world history. 
'Bourgeois society' was not, for Marx, an 'ideal type', which in the concrete displayed 
an infinite number of variations. In his theory the 'bourgeois' ‘ nature of society 
structured all other aspects of it. According to the taste of the interpreter, Marx argued 
that capitalist 'economic' relations determined all others, or else that the wage labour - 
capital relation, as a relation which was at once economic, legal, cultural and so on, 
shaped all other 'levels' of a society. Thus if the world was becoming bourgeois, it 
was also thereby becoming a single world. The struggle for socialism, therefore, was 
’universal’ in a number of senses. It was common to most people of the world ; it had 
a universal 'soul'; and it could only be achieved at the level of humankind.
This did not mean that Marx or his followers ignored or overlooked the existence 
of differences. Marx recognised that the creation of a single, bourgeois world was a 
tendency, not yet complete. He also recognised that there were important differences 
between societies which were bourgeois.
In the history of Marxism the latter differences - those between societies which 
are bourgeois or (as in Lenin's Marxism) between the different units of 'world 
capitalism' - have been conceived of, much of the time, as 'national'. That is, the move 
from the general to recognising and grasping the specific has been seen as (and has 
taken the form of) a move from 'bourgeois society' or 'world capitalism' to specific 
national economies, polities and cultures.
This has been particularly pronounced in the way in which Marxists have defined 
their political project. The vision of a socialist future, which until Stalin and 'socialism 
in one country' was seen to make sense only as a global phenomenon, was nonetheless 
from the outset seen as something which would be achieved through a series of 
revolutions in European nations. Prophesising the collapse of capitalism in the 
Communist Manifesto , Marx and Engels wrote :
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Though not in substance, yet in form, the struggle of the proletariat with 
the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle. The proletariat of each country 
must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie.1
In this passage Marx and Engels ’concede’ that since the class struggle occurs in 
a world also divided into nation-states, its 'form' will reflect that fact, whilst 
reasserting that the 'substance' of this struggle is universal, and that it can only be 
achieved on a European scale. Whv this universal struggle and goal should take a 
national form, however, is not explained. That the proletariat must first vanquish its 
'own' bourgeoisie simply restates what has to be explained, namely that class divisions 
and struggles necessarily take a national form. Pace Marx and Engels, there is no 'of 
course' about it.
As with the founders of Marxism, so with Marxism since. 'The nation', by-and- 
large, has figured within Marxism as a 'brute reality' of modem existence, a given 
datum which has been treated as being of sufficient importance to shape the way in 
which the struggle for socialism is conducted, but without this being explained, or 
even investigated. Benedict Anderson makes the same point well when he writes that it 
is not so much that Marxism has failed to theorise nationalism as that nationalism (and, 
we would add, the phenomenon of nationhood) "has proved to be an uncomfortable 
anomaly for Marxist theory and, for precisely that reason, has been largely elided, 
rather than confronted".2
Marx, and Marxists since, believed that socialist revolution was on the political 
agenda in much of Europe, although this would initially take a national form. In what, 
after Marx, came to be characterised as the 'backward' and 'oppressed' countries - 
most of them in the non-Westem world - national liberation was found to be the next 
historical phase in the evolution of these countries, and was found to be the main 
political project there. As Marxism proceeded to realise its claim to being a universal 
theory, by extending its scope to include what in communist terminology was 
frequently referred to as 'the East'3, it did so by declaring that the 'specificity' of the
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Eastern countries lay not simply in in their 'nation-ness'(their division into nations), 
but also in their nationalism .
This had a number of important consequences, the first of them being that 
Marxism in West and East followed different trajectories, predicting and pursuing 
socialist revolution in the former, and national liberation in the latter. Furthermore, 
because the chief 'particularity' of the East was seen to be the centrality of its struggles 
for national liberation, Marxism's involvement in the East took the form, first and 
foremost, of an engagement with the nationalisms of the East. To amend Anderson's 
observation, what was still an anomaly within Marxist theory, something unexplained, 
came nevertheless also to be endorsed , and engaged with. By contrast, nationalists 
engaged with Marxism where it became a movement to be reckoned with ; or because 
of the support they recieved from the Soviet Union ; or because they found some of its 
ideas persuasive, or useful. This varied according to circumstance ; it was not a 
sustained engagement. The relationship between the two was asymmetrical because 
Marxism was never a central question for nationalists, as nationalism in the East came 
to be for Marxists.
A third consequence was that Marxism's engagement with nationalism in the East 
took the form of engagements with so many nationalism^. This would no doubt have 
occurred in any case, precisely because Marxists identified the 'concrete' application of 
Marxism to 'specific' situations as proceeding from a recognition (and identification) of 
national particularities. But this was given an added impetus, and took a specific form, 
from the identification of nationalism as the chief particularity of the East. Nationalism 
by its nature being sui generis , Marxism's involvement with nationalism in the East 
took the form of an engagement with Chinese nationalism, Indian nationalism, and so 
on.
This 'evolution' of Marxism - how it came to extend its theoretical and political 
scope to the East, and how and why the 'colonial question' came to be seen as a 
'national question' - forms the subject of Part One of this study. Part Two focuses
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upon how Marxists sought to understand, theorise and deal with a particular colonial 
nationalism. It examines the encounter of Marxism with Indian nationalism - the forms 
this took, and some of the implications and consequences of this for Marxist theory.
Chapter 1 looks at how the non-Westem world first appears within Marxism. It 
examines Karl Marx's writings on Asia. Chapter 2 looks at Lenin's development of 
Marxist theory, and in particular at the place the East comes to occupy within Marxism 
in Lenin's theory of imperialism. Chapter 3 traces the process by which, and the 
grounds on which, the Communist International came to be characterise the 'colonial 
question' as a national question.
Chapter 4 looks at the writings and activities of M.N. Roy, a prominent Indian 
Marxist, in the nineteen-twenties. It traces how the general framework within which 
the East was to be approached, established by the Comintern, first came to be 
developed specifically for India ; and also at how, in the process, Roy sought to amend 
that framework.
Roy's analyses of Indian nationalism and his interventions in Indian politics 
occurred from abroad. In Chapter 5 we look at the theory and practice of the first 
communists and communist organisations in India. In defining and creating a role for 
themselves, these individuals and organisations tried to define the relation between the 
socialist goal and the nationalist one, and between the class struggle and nationalist 
struggle. How this was done - and thus what the term 'communist' came to mean in 
India- is assessed in this chapter.
Chapter 5 concludes with the Communist International's 'left turn' in 1928, 
following which communists came to denounce non-communist nationalist 
organisations, and to declare that national liberation could be achieved only by the 
exploited clashes of colonial society, under the leadership of a communist party. At the 
same time, however, the engagement between Marxism and nationalism was 
continuing, in another quarter. Chapter 6 examines the thought of Jawaharlal Nehru in
the period 1927-1937, during which period Nehru sought to synthesize Marxism and 
nationalism. The nature of this attempt, the intellectual content and historical meaning 
of 'Nehruvian socialism', and what these reveal about Marxism and its relation to 
nationalism are issues taken up here.
With Chapter 7 our attention reverts to the communist movement in India. In the 
aftermath of the Seventh Congress of the Communist International Indian communists 
resumed seeking to define their relation to the nationalist struggle and nationalist 
organisations, other than by appropriating the former and denouncing the latter. This 
chapter analyses the politics of the 'united anti-imperialist front', the presumptions 
which informed it and the consequences of the pursuit of this strategy.
7
That this work comes to focus upon India, out of a wide range of possibilities, 
reflects the interests and areas of knowledge of the author. But there is perhaps a 
special interest and value in a study of Marxism's engagement with a colonial 
nationalism which ended in 'failure' for Marxism. Some of its successes - particularly 
the case of China - have been extensively written about. But success of one sort often 
obscures other failures which are contained within it. An examination of what is quite 
evidently one of Marxism's failures might have something to add to our understanding 
of Marxism's relationship to Asia and to Asian nationalism, apart from what it reveals 
about Marxism in India and in relation to Indian nationalism.
Our study comes to an end in 1941. It would perhaps have been desirable to trace 
Marxism's involvement with Indian nationalism upto 1947, the year when India 
became an independent nation. To cover the years 1941-1947, however, would have 
resulted in a work of unreasonable length, and would have delayed its completion. In 
any case, Indian nationalism did not cease to exist in 1947, and nor did Marxism's 
involvement with it. As we suggest in the conclusion to this work, Marxism in India - 
and not only in India - is deeply engaged with, indeed 'enmeshed' in, nationalism.
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This work comes to focus upon Marxism in India, but it is rM a history of the 
communist movement in India. A number of studies of the communist movement in 
colonial India, or of aspects of it, already exist.4 This work is not an addition to then- 
number. It overlaps with such existing studies at certain points, and of course makes 
use of them. However the framework within which the material is approached, and the 
questions asked of it, are quite different.
We are concerned with Marxism primarily as a body of theory, which in the 
period studied was not simply limited to the Communist Party of India, and in fact was 
always something more than it. This also means that our focus is throughout on 
theories and concepts, as revealed in the writings of important individuals, in party 
programmes and documents, and so on. We do not examine the day-to-day activities of 
communists, the 'nitty gritty' of building and consolidating unions, establishing 
peasant organisations, etc. Similarly, we are not concerned with classes, institutions 
and struggles as such, but rather with how Marxists approached and analysed them. 
We do not attempt to assess the empirical accuracy of their characterisations of the 
Indian bourgeoisie and so on, though we do consider the political efficacy of strategies 
based upon these analyses.
Of course, a history of ideas cannot be written without reference to the material 
circumstances which produce, and are produced by, the ideas of men and women. No 
attempt is made to do so. Where the theoretical positions we study were constantly 
interacting with and were directly influenced by relations between parties, institutions 
and the like, we make use of the historians sources and methods, as in Chapters 5 and 
7. Nonetheless, the distinction remains: this is a work in the history of ideas, rather 
than history as such.
In introducing a study of an aspect of a major theoretical and political tradition, it 
is as well to indicate where one stands in relation to that tradition. This is a work about 
Marxism, and it is also a work within Marxism. Nationalism, it has often been 
observed - by Marxists as well as others - is one of Marxism's great theoretical and
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political failures. We do not attempt to 'redress' that failure by providing a new and 
better Marxist theory of nationalism. But in tracing, with reference to a specific case, 
what form this failure took, and some of the reasons for it, we do hope to indicate what 
sort of rethinking is required before Marxists can begin to redress it.
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Chapter 1
Marx and India
Lenin once wrote that Marx "continued and completed the three main ideological 
currents of the nineteenth century...classical German philosophy, classical English 
political economy, and French socialism".* Whatever other merits this well-known 
characterisation may have, it does accurately, if unselfconsciously, point to the fact that 
Marx's theory had its foundations in a long tradition of European thought.
Marx was a European thinker not primarily in the sense that he payed more 
attention to Europe than to Asia, or because he shared in some of the cultural 
prejudices of his times, but in a more fundamental sense. It was as heir to a long 
European intellectual tradition and critic of it, as the man who 'laid bare' the 'anatomy' 
of the new bourgeois society bom in Europe and America and who also foretold its 
doom, that Marx was a deeply European thinker.
However Marx and Engels, in developing their theory, also claimed a universal 
relevance for it, and proclaimed the universal nature of the political project to which it 
was wedded. As a philosophy and as a theory of history, Marxism claimed its 
relevance to Man and to human history, not just European Man and European history. 
Marx did not postulate the existence of some universal and trans-historical human 
'essence', nor did he suggest that categories and concepts derived from his study of 
European history were adequate to understanding non-European societies.^ But he did 
suggest, and strong claims to that effect have been made by his followers, that his
theory was universal in its scope and message, because it laid bare the 'secret' of social 
development in its materialist conception of history.
This chapter examines how a profoundly European theory, which nonetheless 
claimed universal validity, first came to include Asia within its purview. It looks at 
Marx's writings on Asia, and particularly India, the Asian country about which Marx 
knew and wrote most.
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Asian Exceptionalism
Prior to 1853 Marx and Engels seldom referred to the non-Westem world, and 
where they did so it was usually only to repeat a few phrases from Hegel. However in 
1853, when the English parliament began to debate the question of whether or not to 
renew the charter of the East India Company, Marx and Engels began to read more 
seriously about the East, and especially India. Marx read or reread Richard Jones and 
James and John Stuart Mill, read Campbell's Modern India , the Rev. C. Foster's A 
Historical Geography of Arabia , Stamford Raffles' History of Java , Wilks' Historical 
Sketches of South India , the Voyages of Francois Bernier (who for a period was 
personal physician to the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb), some of the works of the 
pioneering orientalist William Jones, and British parliamentary reports on India. 3
In a letter to Engels in June 1853 Marx wrote, "Bernier correctly discovers the 
basic form of all phenomena in the East - he refers to Turkey, Persia, Hindustan - to be 
the absence of private property in land. This is the real key even to the Oriental 
heaven". By the absence of private property Marx understood (following Bernier) that 
the King owned the land. In the same letter Marx wrote, "the King is the one and only
proprietor of all the land in the kingdom...
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In his reply Engels concurred that "The absence of property in land is indeed the 
key to the whole of the East", and went on to offer an explanation as to why private 
landed property never developed in the Orient:
I think it is mainly due to the climate, taken in connection with the nature of 
the soil...Artificial irrigation is here the first condition of agriculture and 
this is a matter either for the communes, the provinces or the central 
government.^
Marx, who was regularly writing for the New York Daily Tribune at this time^, 
took up this theme in one of his articles for that paper, "The British Rule in India". He 
wrote :
Climate and territorial conditions, especially the vast tracts of desert, 
extending from the Sahara, through Arabia, Persia, India and Tartary, to 
the most elevated Asiatic highlands, constituted artificial irrigation by 
canals and waterworks the basis of Oriental agriculture...The prime 
necessity of an economical and common use of water, which, in the 
Occident drove private enterprises to voluntary association, as in Flanders 
and Italy, necessitated in the Orient where civilization was too low and the 
territorial extent to vast to call into life voluntary association, the 
interference of the centralizing power of Government. Hence an 
economical function devolved upon all Asiatic governments, the function 
of providing public works7
Marx recognised that the need for irrigation was not in itself sufficient 
explanation for the rise of the Oriental state and for its ownership of land, as elsewhere 
this need had been met by Voluntary association'. This did not occur in Asia because 
'civilisation was too low' - Marx's significant addition to Engels observations, and one 
linked to his discovery of the village community. The same article refers to state 
provided irrigation and the "domestic services of agricultural and manufacturing 
pursuits" as the "two circumstances...that have brought about, since the remotest 
times, a social system of particular features - the so-called village system..."(p. 87).^
This addition was important, for it pointed to the social foundations of the 
political phenomenon of the Oriental state. The village system, Marx wrote, "had
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always been the solid foundation of Oriental despotism”. Herein too lay the secret to 
the 'timelessness' of Asia - despotisms rose and fell, but their social foundation, the 
village community, remained unchanged. Echoing a famous passage from a British 
parliamentary report, which described the Indian village as unchanging, Marx wrote, 
"However changing the political aspect of India's past must appear, its social condition 
has remained unaltered since its remotest antiquity, until the first decennium of the 
nineteenth century"(p. 86).^
The key elements in Marx's view of Asiatic society which emerge from the 
correspondence and articles of 1853 are as follows.
The village community, based upon a unity of agriculture and manufacture that 
made it self-sufficient, was the social basis of Asiatic society. The state arose as a 
response to the need for irrigation, a need the villages could not meet, individually or 
in association. Because of the 'directly economical’ function it performed, the state 
came to own the land, and to appropriate the social surplus on the basis of this 
proprietary right. The low level of development of the villages and the state's 
appropriation of the surplus combined to make Asiatic society stagnant - they 
prevented the development of classes, and the growth of towns that were anything 
more than appendages to the royal court ^
Marx's views on Asian society were to be developed further in 1857, in a section 
of the Grundrisse subtitled "Formen die der Kapitalistischen Produktion 
vorhergehen". The "Formen" is concerned with the historicity of capitalism : in Marx's 
words, "What we are concerned with here is this : the relationship of labour to 
capital...presupposes a historic process which dissolves the different forms, in which 
the labourer is an owner and the owner labours". ^  The "Formen" investigated the 
ways in which this 'historic process' had or had not occurred, and Asian society was 
one of the four forms of pre-capitalist society studied in this context.
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In the "Formen" Marx characterised Asian society not in terms of state 
ownership of land, but in terms of communal ownership. His argument in the 
Grundrisse was more complex and sophisticated than that which he had developed a 
few years earlier in his NYDT articles. Marx argued that in Asiatic society, as indeed 
in all societies where labour and the instrument of labour had not been separated, the 
community was the prerequisite for the appropriation of nature through labour. Thus 
the community was the real owner of the land. However the unity of numerous such 
communities could be symbolized by the state, usually a monarchical state. Where this 
state was genuinely (and not only symbolically) necessary to the unity and survival of 
the community, as was the case in Asia, where it provided the irrigation which was the 
precondition to agricultural production, it came to appear as the real owner of land:
the all embracing unity which stands above all these small common bodies 
may appear as the higher or sole proprietor, the real communities only as 
heriditarv possessors. Since the unity is the real owner, and the real 
precondition of common ownership, it is perfectly possible for it to appear 
as something separate and superior to the numerous real, particular 
communities...The despot here appears as the father of all the numerous 
lesser communities thus realising the common unity of all. It therefore 
follows that the surplus product...belongs to this highest unity. Oriental 
despotism therefore appears to lead to a legal absence of property. In fact, 
however, its foundation is tribal or common property, in most cases 
created through a combination of manufacture and agriculture within the 
small community which thus becomes entirely self-sustaining and contains 
within itself all conditions of production and surplus production.^
Here Marx describes the individual as the occupant or possessor of the land, the 
community as the real owner, and the state as a body which appears to own the land, 
but in fact has a claim to the social surplus. Of the four forms of society originally 
based upon communal property which Marx discusses in the "Formen" (the other three 
being the ancient, Germanic and Slavonic, the latter mentioned rather than discussed), 
"The Asiatic form", he concludes, "necessarily survives longest and most 
stubbornly". 13 The self-sufficiency of its village units and state appropriation of the 
surplus make it unchanging. There is no significant exchange within or between
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villages (although there may be exchange between the state and other societies), and 
nor do classes develop.
Thus Marx's model of Asian society, first developed in 1853, was modified in 
1857, in the Grundrisse . In the 1859 "Preface " to his A Contribution to the Critique 
Political Economy , a work which developed directly out of the notes which are the 
Grundrisse , Marx felt that Asian society was important and distinctive enough to merit 
mention as one of the major epochs in human history. He wrote :
In broad outlines, the Asiatic, ancient, feudal and modem bourgeois modes 
of production may be designated as epochs marking progress in the 
economic development of society.^
The inclusion of the "Asiatic mode of production' alongside the other three and 
better known of his 'epochs' indicated clearly Marx's belief that Asian societies and 
Asian history were yery different to those of Europe, and could not be understood in 
terms of the categories which he used distinguish and characterise different periods in 
European history. And while the Asiatic mode appears as the first and therefore least 
developed in Marx's list of 'epochs'marking progress in the economic development of 
society', it is nonetheless clearly distinguished from 'primitive communism'.^ Marx 
saw Asian society as backward and lacking in dynamism, but he also recognised that it 
was socially complex and developed ; this was precisely one of a number of peculiar 
characteristics of Asian society which led Marx to invent a new category for it
Marx did not use the term 'Asiatic mode of production' again, but nor did he 
alter in his view that Asian societies were very different from the societies of pre­
capitalist Europe.In Capital I he echoed the themes of the NYDT articles and the 
"Formen", describing the village community as a self-sustaining unity of agriculture 
and handicrafts based on ownership in common of the land, the state as the body 
appropriating the social surplus, and the structure as a whole as one where "the 
economic elements of society remain untouched by the stormclouds of the political
sky". 16
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Marx returned to a study of Asia late in his life, reading about and taking notes 
on Indian history^, and also in the course of his studies on the original communal 
constitution. 18 These notes reveal a better appreciation of the complexity of systems of 
land tenure in India than that displayed in Marx’s earlier writings. It is possible that 
had Marx, at this point, tried to systematise his views on Asia, he would have been 
less likely to describe the village as a community based upon common ownership of 
land ; less likely, in fact, to make broad generalisations on such subjects. He was also 
less confident as regards the transformational power (and 'progressive' impact) of the 
bourgeois mode of production on pre-capitalist communities, as his letter(s) to 
Zasulich demonstrate. But these late studies also reveal Marx's continued refusal to 
treat Asia as a mere 'variant' on the pattem of European history. He took issue with 
Kovalevsky for suggesting that the existence of benefice and sale of office in Mughal 
India made it a feudal society, and called Phear a 'donkey' for describing the Bengali 
village as feudal. 19
From this brief survey of Marx's comments on the social structure of pre-British 
India we can see that Marx saw Indian society (and by his extrapolation, Asian society) 
as fundamentally different from European societies of the past and present. He sought, 
albeit very briefly and without the systematic study he gave to capitalism and(less so) 
to pre-capitalist Europe, to identify the 'pecularities' of Asia, and thus indicate this 
'difference'. It is possible to identify four features which Marx saw as defining or 
constitutive elements of Asiatic society.
First, Marx saw the village community, resting upon ownership in common of 
land and a rigid division of labour which created and sustained a 'unity of agriculture 
and manufactures', as the basic social unit of Asian society. The village community 
was economically self-sufficient, isolated and more-or-less unaffected by the rise and 
decline of empires.
Second, Asian society was characterised by 'Oriental despotism'. By this Marx 
did not mean total state control and supervision of the villages nor, following Hegel,
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the 'generalised slavery' of the populace. For Marx the term 'Oriental despotism' 
referred to the existence of a centralised government which provided the irrigation 
necessary to agricultural production, and appropriated the social surplus on the basis of 
its performance of this function.
It was the combination of these two elements - the self-sustaining village and the 
irrigation providing and surplus appropriating state - which was central to Marx's 
concept of the Asiatic mode of production, and which was unique to him. As Perry 
Anderson writes, "The hydraulic state 'above' and the autarchic village 'below' were 
linked into a single formula, in which there was a conceptual equipoise between the 
two".20 Following from this 'combination' - and this was the third feature of Asiatic 
society - it was marked by the absence of classes. The normal route for the break-up of 
communal ownership of land, and the rise of classes - a development in the division of 
labour and increased exchange, resulting from the production of a social surplus - was 
blocked off by the self-sufficiency of the village on the one hand, and state 
appropriation of the surplus on the other. 'Exploitation', of a sort, existed, because 
there was a social surplus appropriated by non-producers, but it was effected by and 
through the state rather than classes.
Marx was of course aware of the Indian caste system, and he regarded it with 
great distaste, because it subjugated man to nature and tradition. But he did not point to 
its role as a source of inequality within the village ; indeed, he seemed unaware of this 
aspect of it, referring to the Indian villages as inoffensive and more-or-less egalitarian 
communities. In this respect Hegel, from whom Marx borrowed much in developing 
his views on the Orient, was better informed and more perceptive.
Fourth and finally, and following from these first three features of Asian society, 
it was seen by Marx as unchanging. Communal ownership of land, village autarchy, 
the appropriation of the surplus by the state, the absence of production of goods for 
exchange except in cities which were mere appendages of the state (royal camps) - all 
these combined to produce a mode of production that had no classes, no 'laws of
19
development', and no internal contradictions propelling it forwards. "Indian society", 
Marx wrote, "has no history at all, at least no known history". It was the British who, 
in his view, effected "the greatest, and, to speak the truth, the only social revolution 
ever heard of in India"(p. 88).
If such a coherent concept of Oriental society or the Asiatic mode of production 
can be reconstructed from Marx's various writings on the subject, as we suggest it 
can, it is nevertheless necessary to note that Marx did not always adhere to this model. 
In particular, the 'conceptual equipoise' between the autarchic village and the state 
underwent a frequent slippage.
On more than one occasion Marx stressed the importance of the village 
community in Asia but neglected to mention the Oriental state, as in Theories of Surplus 
Value I I I , where he wrote, "The original unity between the worker and he conditions 
of production...has two main forms : the Asiatic communal system (primitive 
communism) and small-scale agriculture based on the family...".21 Once the highly 
developed and ubiquitous Oriental state was forgotten (one of the 'peculiar' features of 
Asian society which Marx sought to explain with his theory of Asian society was 
precisely how such a high degree of political development and flux could coincide with 
social simplicity and stagnation), the inevitable result was to assign the Orient to a 
distant and universal prehistory, which Europe emerged from but Asia did not. The 
result, as here, was to identify Asiatic society with primitive communism.
Conversely, Marx sometimes relapsed into the pre-Grundrisse position of 
describing the monarchical state as the owner of all land, most notably in a passage in 
Capital III :
Should the direct producers not be confronted by a private landowner, but 
rather, as in Asia, under direct subordination to a state which stands over 
them as their landlord and simultaneously as sovereign, then rent and taxes 
coincide... Sovereignty here consists in the ownership of land concentrated 
on a national sc a le d
Some of these inconsistencies can be explained if Marx’s comments are read in 
context. For example, the tendency to ignore the importance of the state in Asian
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society frequently occured where Marx was contrasting pre-capitalist societies with the 
bourgeois mode of production. In such instances Marx often overlooked not only the 
differences between Oriental society and primitive communism, but also between these 
and European feudalism. 23 This did not of course indicate that Marx was unable to 
distinguish between these different types of society, but rather that on occasion Marx 
'bracketed' certain differences in order to highlight the difference between 1^1 pre­
capitalist societies and a mode of production characterised by generalised commodity 
production.
Nonetheless, all of Marx's departures from his model of Asian society cannot be 
explained away, and his inconsistencies should be acknowledged. In summation we 
could say that Marx was consistent in regarding Asia as 'exceptional', but less 
consistent when it came to specifying what constituted Asian exceptionalism.
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From the above sketch the debt that Marx's views on the Orient owe to a long 
European tradition will immediately be apparent. Contrasting the political systems of 
the East with those of the West goes back to Aristotle, was revived and elaborated 
during the Renaissance, and was of course a common feature of Enlightenment 
thought. It was taken up by some of the English political economists, who added to 
this model a contrast between two fundamentally different types of economy . And it 
was to culminate, in one sense, in Hegel, in whose thought Asia was assigned its place 
in world historical development - as the beginning of history, in contrast to Europe, 
which was its end.
Thus almost all the elements which in Marx's view characterised Asian society 
are prefigured in the writings of others. The description of the Indian village as 
islolated, self-sufficient and so on is to be found in Hegel, and in the writings and
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reports of scores of British administrators of India - Munro, Metcalfe, Elphinstone and 
others. The importance of the Asiatic state in providing irrigation works is a point 
made by J.S. Mill and Adam Smith. Descriptions of Asian towns as mere adjuncts to 
royal courts, lacking the permanence and civic autonomy of towns in feudal Europe, 
are present in the accounts of Bernier and Richard Jones. The notion that the East was 
'timeless' and unchanging is to be found not only in Hegel, but also in Montesqieu and 
Jones.24
Marx's views on India and Asia, then, are very much indebted to a European 
tradition of 'Orientalism'. Nevertheless, there is something distinctive and original 
about Marx's views. For if all the elements Marx sees as characteristic of (and peculiar 
to) Asia are prefigured in the writings of others, the manner in which these elements 
are combined is such that Marx's distinctive mark, the 'Marxian method' if you like, 
has left its imprint on the final model. The 'despotism' that so intrigued Europeans is 
explained not in terms of the servility of Asians (Aristotle) or the failure of 'Spirit' to 
attain subjectivity in Asia (Hegel), but with reference to its social foundation in the 
village, and its functional role in providing irrigation. Similarly, Asia's alleged 
historical immutability is explained in terms of the combination of social foundation 
(village) and political superstructure ; the form of their articulation, unique to Asia, is 
advanced as the reason why the Orient has failed to undergo any social transformation.
It was precisely Marx's recognition, indeed insistence, on Asian exceptionalism 
which led some later Marxists to find his views on Asia unacceptable. In the latter half 
of the nineteen-twenties the concept of the Asiatic mode of production was the subject 
of a heated debate in the Soviet Union, centreing around its empirical validity 
(primarily with reference to China, since most of the participants in the debate were 
Sinologists), but overdetermined by political considerations and the tendency of the 
period to transform Marxism into a dogma asserting that historical development was 
universal and unilinear. The debate concluded with the concept, and its suggestion that
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Asian history and society might differ from that of Europe, being 'purged' from 
Marxist discourse, and with its proponents being similarly purged.^
A revival of the concept of the Asiatic mode of production in Marxist discussions 
in the last two decades has been closely connected with the very reasons which earlier 
led to the suppression of it. Those seeking to develop a less dogmatic and more open 
Marxism have used the concept to demonstrate that Marx himself did not believe (as 
the later Stalinist orthodoxy had it) that history everywhere followed the same stages in 
the same order. They have similarly found in this concept a grounds on which to argue 
that Marx did not regard feudalism as ubiquitous in history, and to suggest that the 
indiscriminate application of the concept of feudalism to Asia, Africa and so on have 
not contributed to an understanding of the history of these regions, and moreover have 
rendered the category itself so broad as to be meaningless.^
There is a certain irony in the fact that the revival in fortunes of the concept of the 
Asiatic mode of production should be connected with efforts to 'improve' Marxist 
historiography. For in Marx's writings this concept not only recognises Asian 
exceptionalism, the concept itself is 'exceptional'. That is, Marx's views on Asian 
society are in some ways decidedly un-Marxist.
In his general theory Marx suggests that the state comes into being with the 
development of class divisions in a society, and that it serves to consolidate and secure 
the interests of the dominant classes. Thus the Marxist classics refer to the state as a 
'special armed force', an 'engine of class despotism', and so on. But in Marx's own 
formulation, this is not true of Asia. Here the state does not function to preserve the 
dominance of pre-existing ruling classes ; instead, economic and social privilege derive 
from service to the state. Further, because it provides irrigation, the Asian state is a 
necessary precondition to production. In Marx’s account of the Asian state it is not a 
'superstructure', arising out of an economic base ; it is present in the base itself. 
Another defining characteristic of Asian society, for Marx, is its historical 
immutability- defying what is generally understood as a fundamental Marxist
proposition, that societies develop and are transformed through the progressive 
unfolding of their internal contradictions.
Thus in developing his model of a specifically 'Oriental' mode of production, 
Marx contradicted some of the defining and distinctive concepts of his general theory 
of modes of production and social change. Marx recognised and sought to explain the 
'peculiarities' of the East, as he saw them ; but he did not reconcile these with, or 
discuss their implications for, his general theory. As Avineri comments, "Marx's basic 
failure to incorporate his insightful understanding of non-European society into the 
universal framework of his method of historical explanation is plainly visible".^
Why are the contradictions between his understanding of Asian society and his 
general theory simply registered by Marx, with their theoretical implications left 
unpursued? Posing this question brings us to Marx's views on colonialism, for a 
major part of the answer lies here.
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Capitalism and Colonialism
Marx anticipated that capitalist Europe would destroy the 'peculiarities' of the 
East. The bourgeois mode of production was impelled, by its very nature, to extend its 
sway over the entire world, dissolving pre-capitalist modes of production everywhere. 
The Communist Manifesto declared that the bourgeoisie had drawn "even the most 
barbarian nations into civilization...has made barbarian and semi-barbarian countries 
dependent on the civilized ones...the East on the West", and was thereby creating a 
"world after its own image".28 The distinctive features of the East, Marx thought, 
were in the process of being effaced in his own lifetime ; they therefore had little 
theoretical or political importance. Real historical processes were bringing Asia 'into 
line' with his general theory.
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In the Communist Manifesto these observations were made in the course of a 
discussion - indeed, a tribute - to the restlessness, dynamism and transformational 
powers of the bourgeois mode of production. In his NYDT articles Marx made the 
same point with specific reference to the effects of capitalism and British colonialism 
on India:
England has broken down the entire framework of Indian society, without 
any symptoms of reconstitution yet appearing. The loss of his old world, 
with no gain of a new one, imparts a particular kind of melancholy to the 
present misery of the Hindoo, and separates Hindostan, ruled by Britain, 
from all its ancient traditions, and from the whole of its past history, (pp. 
84- 85).
British free trade, assisted by 'British steam and science', had destroyed the self- 
sufficiency and isolation of the village, the basis and the framework of Indian society :
English interference having placed the spinner in Lancashire and the 
weaver in Bengal, or sweeping away both Hindoo spinner and weaver, 
dissolved these small semi-barbarian, semi-civilized communities, by 
blowing up their economical basis.(p. 88).
Marx also pointed to the corrosive effects of contact with the West on traditional 
Chinese society. However in China he saw this process as a slower and less pervasive 
one. For the full destructive impact of the bourgeios mode of production to be felt its 
extension needed to be accompanied by political control, thus facilatating the incursion 
of bourgeois society in the East. That is, capitalist expansion needed to take a colonial 
form. In Capital III Marx ascribed what he saw as the greater resistance offered by 
traditional Chinese society to "the corrosive effects of commerce" to the absence of 
European political dominance in China :
In India the English lost no time in exercising their direct political and 
economic power as rulers and landlords to disrupt these small economic 
communities. English commerce exerted a revolutionary influence on these 
communities...And even so, the work of dissolution proceeds very 
gradually. And still more so in China, where it is not reinforced by direct
political power.29
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The effects of capitalism and colonialism were not, however, only destructive. In 
"The Future Results of British Rule in India" Marx wrote,
England has to fulfil a double mission in India : one destructive, the other
regenerating - the annihilation of old Asiatic society, and the laying of the
material foundations of Western society in Asia.(p. 125).
The two processes went hand in hand, even if the first was more visible - "The 
work of regeneration hardly transpires through a heap of ruins. Nevertheless it has 
begun" (p. 126). Marx did not suggest that the British sought the regeneration of 
Indian society ; on the contrary they were motivated "only by the vilest interests"(p. 
89), as "The aristocracy wanted to conquer it, the moneyocracy to plunder it, and the 
millocracy to undersell it"(p. 126-27).30 Nevertheless, such a regeneration, such a 
"laying of the material foundations of Western society in Asia", was proving to be an 
unintended consequence of British rule, and in this way the British were serving as the 
"unconscious tool of history"(p. 89).
For the British gave India a political unity "more consolidated, and extending 
farther than it ever did under the great Moguls", a unity which Marx described as "the 
first condition of its regeneration"(p. 126). The land settlements introduced by the 
British - the Permanent Settlement in Bengal and the ryotwari settlement in Madras - 
were introduced to facilitate and maximise the East India Company’s collection of land 
revenue, but they had the effect of introducing private property in land, hitherto "the 
great desideratum of Asiatic society"(p. 126).
One result of the transformation of India from a source of revenue and plunder 
into a market for British manufactured goods in 1813 (with the abolition of the East 
India Company's monoploy of trade with India) was the devastation of the Indian 
village. Its cottage industries could not compete with cheap manufactured goods. But 
another result, in Marx's view, was that the accompanying introduction of new forms 
of technology and communication established the material and technological conditions 
for the rebirth of Indian society. He wrote :
26
I know the English millocracy intended to endow India with railways with 
the exclusive view of extracting at diminished expenses, the cotton and 
other raw materials for their manufactures. But when you have once 
introduced machinery into the locomotion of a country, which possesses 
iron and coals, you are unable to withhold it from its fabrication. You 
cannot maintain a net of railways over an immense country without 
introducing all those industrial processes necessary to meet the immediate 
and current wants of railway locomotion, and out of which there must 
grow the application of machinery to those branches of industry not 
immediately connected with railways. The railway system will therefore 
become, in India , truly the forerunner of modem, industry.(pp. 128- 
29)31
Marx recognised that none of these symptoms of regeneration of themselves 
improved the lot of the Indian people, an improvement which was conditional upon 
"not only the development of the productive powers, but of their appropriation by the 
people"(p. 129). Thus symptoms of India's regeneration offered only a basis, a 
'potential' for improving the economic and social conditions of the Indian population. 
This potential would be realised if one of two things occurred:
The Indians will not reap the fruits of the new elements of society scattered 
among them by the British bourgeoisie, till in Great Britain itself the now 
ruling classes shall have been supplanted by the industrial proletariat, or till 
the Hindoos themselves shall have grown strong enough to throw off the 
English yoke altogether.(pp. 129-30).
The noted historian of medieval India, Irfan Habib, concludes a recent article on 
"Marx's Perception of India" by paying tribute to this passage - "In 1853, to set 
colonial emancipation, not just colonial reform, as an objective of the European 
socialist movement; and, still more, to look forward to a national liberation attained 
through their struggle by the Indian people, as an event that might even precede the 
emancipation of the European working class - such insight and vision could belong to 
Marx alone".32
The above passage from "The Future Results of British Rule in India" is indeed 
remarkable, given it was written thirty-two years before the founding of the Indian
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National Congress, and some seventy-five years before full national independence 
became a mass demand in India. But let us also note that this was one of very few 
occasions in which Marx linked the colonial question to the national question - in 
which he raised the possibility of a colonial country gaining national independence.^ 
The occasional stray reference (such as this one) aside, the only instance where Marx 
seriously and consistently linked the colonial and national questions was in the case of 
Ireland. And the Irish case, of course, was different - Ireland was European, it had 
been settled by the English and, though oppressed and exploited, it was (formally at 
least) not a colony but part of the Union.
Even so, let us acknowledge Marx's prescience. Can one not say that his 
prophecy has been fulfilled ? Yet...a closer examination reveals some inconsistencies.
Marx, to recapitulate, suggests that British rule is simultaneously destroying the 
existing mode of production in India, and establishing capitalism in its stead. He sees 
three factors as particularly important to the regeneration of Indian society : the 
introduction of private property in land, the flooding of the Indian market by British 
machine goods, and the introduction into India of technology corresponding to the age 
of capital - British railways, steam and telegraph. Marx raises the possibility that this 
process of regeneration may culminate in 'the Hindoos' fighting for and gaining 
national liberation.
But the introduction of private property in land bore no relation to, say, the 
historical process which in England saw landed property become private property in its 
capitalist form. Marx himself recognised this. In one of his NYDT articles he wrote of 
the Permanent settlement and the ryotwari settlement, "But a curious sort of English 
landlord was the zemindar, receiving only one-tenth of the rent, while he had to make 
over nine-tenths of it to the Government. A curious sort of French peasant was the 
ryot, without any permanent title to the soil, and with the taxation changing every year 
in proportion to his harvest".34 Similarly in Capital III he described the land 
settlements effected by the British as "futile and really absurd (in practice, infamous)
experiments", which in Bengal created a "caricature of large-scale landed estates", and 
in Madras "a caricature of small parcelled property".35 Thus, as Marx on occasion 
recognised, even if the British had introduced private property in land to India, they 
had not introduced forms of property corresponding to or conducive to capitalist 
development.
Similar considerations apply to Marx's analysis of the revolutionary effects of 
British textiles on Indian industry. Marx persuasively argued for the devastating 
consequences of the availability of cheap mass-produced cottons for village industry. 
But it did not logically follow (and certainly did not follow historically) that such 
destruction entailed the transformation of village production (for consumption in the 
village) into commodity production. Marx did not adduce any evidence to suggest that 
the destruction of village handicrafts was or would be being followed by the 
establishment of the factory system in India ; but he implied such a transformation, and 
it was necessary for him to do so to sustain his argument that India was being 
'regenerated'. Again, at points Marx himself acknowledged that the decline of village 
industries did not include within itself, as some sort of dialectical antithesis, the 
development of capitalist industry.36
Finally, what of English steam, telegraph and railways? These figure very 
prominently in Marx's sketch of the regeneration of Indian society. Indeed; too 
prominently. For in Marx's analysis of the development of capitalism in Europe 
technological advances (introduction of machinery etc.) are seen as dependent upon, 
and interacting with, changes in social relations - an increased division of labour, etc. 
In the case of India, however, technology is made to function as an explanation, a 
cause , of changes in social relations. It is not the development of wage-labour and 
capital but rather railways which will prove 'the forerunner of modem industry' in 
India.
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For Marx, capitalism was never simply the factory or machinery ; it was, above 
all else, the wage-labour / capital relation, which was a social relation. The emphasis
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he placed on the role of externally introduced new technology in facilitating capitalist 
development in India would not have been misplaced (particularly in the course of 
discussing a country which, in his view, lacked the internal resources to develop in 
such a way) if at the same time changes in social relations capable of utilising this 
technology for the purpose of capitalist development could be located. But they are 
not. Instead, technology takes their place as cause and proof of the development of 
capitalism. Marx's account of the regeneration of India conflicts with his general 
analysis of capitalism, even though he seems to have been unaware of this.
There is, then, a gap between Marx's prophecy and his account of the means by 
which it is to be fulfilled. That the destruction of traditional Indian society and the 
beginnings of capitalist development and regeneration are two sides of the same 
process is asserted rather than established ; or, more accurately, is not convincingly 
established.
Wherein lies the source of this gap, this inadequacy? Part of the answer, we 
suggest, lies in the fact that Marx 'transfers' an argument he applied to the wage-labour 
/ capital relation to his analysis of the effects of British mle on India.
In his account of the internal mechanisms for change in bourgeois society Marx 
suggests that the bourgeoisie, in the same measure that it extends its sway and 
develops its strength, also develops the strength and increases the numbers of its 
nemesis, the proletariat. Similarly the British in India, though "actuated by the vilest 
interests", are "the unconscious tools of history in bringing about the revolution". 
They will revolutionize Indian society, and this may ultimately result in their own 
overthrow. In both cases Marx employs the same dialectic, or rather discovers the 
same historical dialectic to be at work ; a historical process will develop its opposite, 
resulting in its overthrow and supersession.
This helps explain not only the content of Marx's analysis of India, but also the 
tone of his remarks. This dialectic contains a delicious irony, and Marx revels in it. It
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allows him to combine an exposure and powerful condemnation of the horrors of 
primitive accumulation, or of the hypocrisy of John Bull in India, with the almost 
Olympian detachment of the observor who knows that the 'Cunning of Reason' (in 
Marx's case, the cunning of history) contains a certain 'law of retribution'.
Powerful and persuasive when used to explain the overthrow of capitalism, 
when extended to India this argument proves inapt. The meeting of two modes of 
production (the Asiatic and bourgeois) is not analogous to the meeting of two classes 
within the same mode of production. In the latter case the two classes are structurally 
united in their opposition ; in the former the relationship between the two elements is 
'contingent' rather than structural. 37
The inaptness of Marx's analogy reveals itself at a crucial point, where his 
argument breaks down. In the case of capitalism, the means for its overthrow are 
specified. It is not 'objective forces', or some 'dialectic of history' which Marx 
imposes upon social phenomena, but a subjective, conscious force - the proletariat. It 
is the combination of objective historical processes and subjectivity which will 
combine to overthrow capitalism. Schematically, we can present Marx's account as 
follows. The development of the bourgeoisie and of capitalism mean simultaneously 
the development of the proletariat; the periodic crises of bourgeois society and its 
many other contradictions, with their attendant miseries, create in this class of 
proletarians the desire and the need for revolution ; the socialization of production, and 
the growing numbers, strength and self-confidence of the proletariat create the means, 
the capacity to make revolution.
In the case of his account of British colonialism in India the dissolution of the old 
society is clearly - indeed vividly, if impressionistically - sketched. But the basis upon 
which regeneration will occur is not convincingly outlined. The reason is that here 
Marx does not locate a social force internal to India which will become the bearer of 
capitalist relations, and thus perhaps eventually the moving force behind a national 
revolution in India. Here the dialectic does not operate through the agency of a social
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force, but rather is artificially imposed ; the destruction of the old Indian society is, 
almost by definition, also symptomatic of a regeneration.
There are in fact two passages where Marx does mention new social groups in 
India, and refers to them in a positive way. Both occur in "The Future Results of 
British Rule in India". One- "The native army, organized and trained by the British 
drill-sergeant, was the sine qua non of Indian self-emancipation, and of India ceasing 
to be the prey of the first foreign intruder"(p. 126). And the other - "From the Indian 
natives, reluctantly and sparingly educated at Calcutta, under English superintendence 
a fresh class is springing up, endowed with the requirements for government and 
imbued with European science"(p. 126).
There is at least a suggestion here that social groups have been created which are 
products of the impact of Western culture, and which are therefore also possible 
sources of 'regeneration' along Western lines. But neither of these, it should be noted, 
is a class , is the product of an emergent Indian capitalism ; and in any case the thought 
is not developed.
Two important episodes in Asian resistance to capitalism and Western 
colonialism which occurred in Marx's lifetime - the Indian 'Mutiny' of 1857-59, and 
the Taiping Rebellion in China - did not excite his hopes for a regeneration of Asian 
society. Marx did indeed attribute the sources of the Taiping revolt to the destructive 
effects of contact with the West on traditional Chinese society. But far from discerning 
signs of regeneration in this revolt, Marx described the Taipings as a rabble, seeking 
the destruction of China "without any seeds for a renaissance".^
Initially dismissive of even the disruptive potential of the Indian Mutiny:>^ , Marx 
was forced to modify his opinion as the revolt gained momentum, until he eventually 
came to describe it as "a national revolt".40 He also wrote of this uprising against the 
British, "There is something in human history like retribution ; and it is a rule of 
historical retribution that its instrument be forged not by the offended, but by the
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offender himself."41 However this act of retribution was not in his view also a 
symptom of regeneration. Despite his at times obvious sympathy for the rebels, and 
despite his exposures of British atrocities and hypocrisy in quelling the Mutiny, Marx 
was not sympathetic to the revolt as a whole. He saw it, not as the first act of a 
regenerated India, but as an eruption of the 'old' India.4^
Conclusion
India appears as a two-fold object in Marx's writings. On the one hand it appears 
as 'Oriental society' or the 'Asiatic mode of production', a social order very different 
from that of the bourgeois societies of Europe, and also from Europe in pre-capitalist 
times. On the other hand it appears as a society in the throes of a transformation, as 
one in the process of becoming a 'mirror' of the West. Separating but also forming the 
bridge between these two India's, and thus severing ’the Hindoo' from his 'ancient 
traditions', is  the intrusion of bourgeois society into India, through the mechanism of 
British colonialism.
With this intrusion the alien and 'fabulous' Asia whose peculiarities Marx sought 
to explain becomes recognisable and almost familiar. Asia, Marx suggests, is 
becoming Western. British India has been launched on the road to becoming British. A 
radical reformulation of his categories and concepts is not necessary for this Asia to 
brought within the purview of Marx’s theory ; it is Asia which is being 'reformulated' 
under the impact of the West, and which thus becomes recognisable and explicable in 
Marxist terms.
In both these guises Asia appears in Marx's writings as passive , as lacking any 
capacity for self-activity. As Oriental society this passivity is a principle of its being, 
for Marx describes such societies as unchanging and stagnant. As the object of 
Western conquest it is precisely that - an object , which Europe acts upon and 
transforms. The only point at which Marx considered that the East might have an 
impact on the West was in the context of his hope (particularly pronounced during the
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eighteen-fifties) that commercial crises connected with the colonial markets might 
precipitate a social revolution in Europe.^ And here it was not the self-activity of the 
East but the operations of the capitalist world market which, he anticipated, might have 
reverbrations in Europe.
Because Marx saw the destruction being wreaked by Western bourgeois society 
in Asia as simultaneously being a process of regeneration, he did expect that at some 
future point Asia would progress from being the object of Western domination to 
becoming an active historical subject. The seeds of Western society and capitalism 
having been planted in India, Marx at one point even suggested that their fruit may be a 
national uprising against the British.
However this suggestion, we have argued, is not only not developed by Marx, it 
is not sustainable in terms of his more general argument. The suggestion that the 
ultimate symptom of regeneration may be national liberation cannot be sustained 
because the evidence for an inevitable regeneration is itself shaky. Marx does not 
locate, as he must to make his argument plausible, new social relations in India. 
Specifically, he does not point to classes in Indian socity which have arisen out of the 
'elements of the new society' scattered by the British and which can therefore be the 
bearers and instruments for social regeneration. Instead, Marx treats technology as 
evidence for and cause of capitalist development; more generally, 'British rule' comes 
to function as a metaphor for the development of capitalism in Asia. That is, the 
incursion of bourgeois society into Asia comes to be equated with the establishment of 
capitalism in Asia.
A question arises. Was it because Marx could not see or point to new classes 
in India that he made technology function as a substitute for them, in order to be able to 
maintain his central contention, that bourgeois society was being implanted in the East 
? Alternatively, was it because he effected such a substitution that he failed to find, or 
even look for, the sort of evidence which his argument required in order to be 
convincing ?
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By their nature questions such as this one do not permit of definite answers, and 
none will be attempted here. What is important to note, for our purposes, is that the 
concepts and metaphors which dominate Marx's analysis are those of the capitalist 
West transforming the East after its own image ; that Marx fails convincingly to argue 
and sustain this analysis ; and thus that when he suggests that this regeneration of the 
East may take a nationalist form this rests upon shaky foundations, because the case 
for 'regeneration' has not been established, and also because the 'model' informing 
this suggestion is borrowed from the quite different case of the proletariat's struggle 
against capitalism.
In conclusion we might note that even if Marx's writings had been theoretically 
unproblematic, their political implications were highly problematic. Regarded from an 
evolutionary viewpoint the transformation of Asia along bourgeois lines might be a 
welcome development, and it was so welcomed by Marx. But this still left Asia a full 
historical 'stage' behind Europe, where proletarian revolution was on the agenda. 
Viewed from a more narrowly political perspective, and within a correspondingly 
shorter time frame, this was a possible reason for concern. Marx expressed such 
anxiety in a letter to Engels in 1858 :
The specific task of bourgeois society is the establishment of a world market, at 
least in outline, and of production based upon this world market. As the world is 
round, this seems to have been completed by the colonization of California and 
Australia and the opening up of China and Japan. The difficult question for us is 
this : on the Continent the revolution is imminent and will immediately assume a 
socialist character. Is it not bound to be crushed in this little comer, considering 
that in a far greater territory the movement of bourgeois society is still in the 
ascendant?^
In the years after Marx's death the manner in which the East was incorporated 
into Marxist theory came to differ greatly from his own. How this was done, and the 
more reassuring political conclusions which were drawn from this, are taken up in the 
chapter to follow.
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Lenin's Theory of 'Imperialism': The Colonial Question as a National
Question
In 1889, six years after Marx's death, the Second International was founded. 
Within a few years, it had become an important force, not only within the European 
working class movement, but also, to some extent, as an 'actor' on the world stage.1
In these years the number of militant and politically conscious workers greatly 
increased; they were organised into trade unions and social-democratic parties ; and, in 
Europe, the number of nations so affected increased. The task of establishing Marxism 
as the dominant trend within those sections of the European working class which were 
organised in social- democratic parties was largely accomplished. Julius Braunthal 
sums up these developments :
In the twenty five year history of the Second International, the Socialist 
movement became established as a force. In 1914, on the eve of the First 
World War, membership of Socialist parties, and of trade unions closely 
connected with them, ran into hundreds of thousands, while in 
parliamentary elections they numbered their votes, in some countries, by 
the million.^
These years also saw the rapid industrialization of hitherto relatively backward 
parts of Europe, and, relatedly, an extraordinary scramble for colonies. The number of 
colonial powers increased ; the number and extent of their colonial possessions 
expanded enormously. Most of Africa, a large part of Asia, and many Pacific islands 
were annexed. The process of the carving up of China advanced rapidly.
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Thus a growing socialist movement was confronted by the non-Westem world, 
in the form of the 'colonial question'. The extent and pace of the process of conquest 
forced its attention on, and demanded a response from, this movement
The London Congress of the Second International, held in 1896, adopted a 
political resolution which referred to the colonial issue, declaring the Congress's view 
that "colonial extension is only another name for the extension of the area of capitalist 
exploitation in the exclusive interest of the capitalist class''.^
At the Paris Congress of the International, in 1900, the colonial question was 
listed as a separate item on the agenda. A resolution was passed calling upon the 
proletariat to "fight the colonial expansion of the bourgeoisie", and urging the socialist 
parties of European nations to seek to establish socialist organisations in their 
country's colonies. Little was done in this direction, but in 1903 the International's 
executive body, the International Socialist Bureau, issued a May Day appeal which 
condemned the 'capitalist expeditions' of European countries and of the United States 
in Africa, China and the Philippines.4
At the Amsterdam Congress of 1904, as at the Paris Congress before it, the 
colonial issue was listed as a separate item on the agenda. The Congress was 
addressed by the veteran Indian nationalist Dadabhai Naoroji, and at one point in the 
proceedings Plekhanov and Sen Katayama, leaders of socialist parties in an Asian 
country and a European country at war, symbolically shook hands. Such displays did 
not, however, obscure the differences of opinion which were emerging within the 
socialist movement on the issue of colonialism. The resolution adopted by the 
Amsterdam Congress condemned colonialism and even declared "complete 
emancipation of the colonies" to be the ultimate goal of the socialist movement; but 
this was qualified by the clause that for the moment it was necessary "to claim for the 
natives that liberty and autonomy compatible with their state of development".^ This 
ambigious statement was possibly the product of an attempt to accomodate differing 
views on the subject, for the remarks of the two rapporteurs on the colonial question
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were at odds with each other. The British socialist H.M. Hyndman had condemned 
colonialism in emphatic terms. By contrast the Dutch socialist van Kol had suggested 
that blanket condemnations of colonialism were inappropriate, as even a socialist 
Europe of the future would be compelled to pursue a colonial policy.^
The differences of opinion apparent at the Amsterdam Congress erupted into a 
major dispute at the Stuttgart Congress of the International in 1907. The committee 
established to produce a draft resolution on the colonial question proposed, by 
majority decision, a resolution which whilst condemning 'present, capitalistic 
colonization' also declared that:
The Congress...does not condemn in principle and for all time, every 
colonial policy ; under a socialist regime, colonization can be a work of 
civilization.^
This clause was opposed by a minority in the committee, and the matter was 
debated at a plenary session of the Congress. Here a number of delegates, headed by 
van Kol (the chair of the aforesaid committee), made it clear that they saw the 
prosperity of the European working class as being dependent upon the existence of 
colonial markets, and were thus unwilling to countenance the prospect of a socialist 
Europe abandoning its colonies. A number of delegates also made their contempt for 
non-Westem peoples evident. Van Kol's remarks (in response to Kautsky's speech in 
opposition to the above-quoted clause) are unpleasant enough to be worth quotation, as 
is the reaction of a section of the audience :
If we send a machine to the Negroes of central Africa, do you know what 
they will do? Very probably they will execute a war dance around our 
European product (hilarity ) and it is probable that the number of their 
innumerable gods will be increased by one {further hilarity )...It could even 
be possible that they skin us alive or else that they eat us and then (rubbing 
his stomach ) I strongly fear, as my corporal development somewhat 
exceeds that of Kautsky, that I would be given the preference by my Negro 
friends (hilarity ). If we Europeans went to Africa with our European 
machines, we would be the victims of our expedition. We must, on the 
contrary, have arms in our hand in order eventually to defend ourselves,
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even if Kautsky calls this imperialism (Very good' from some of the
benches ).8
The resolution of the committee was narrowly defeated (127 to 108) on the floor 
of the Congress, which voted to excise the offending passage.9 Significantly, the 
resolution was supported by a majority of the German delegation, representatives of 
the largest socialist party in the world and citizens of a late but energetic arrival to the 
race for colonies.
Thus the colonial question was a matter for debate and even controversy in the 
Second International, as it was not in the First International. However, what were 
being debated and decided were the attitudes European socialists should adopt toward 
the process of colonization and toward the colonial countries. For many, the non- 
Westem world was still, as in Marx's time, an object. It was of great importance, of 
course, because it had now become an object of Western competition and conquest; as 
such, it had also become a possible trigger for war, an issue central to the 
International's concerns in this period. But it was an object nevertheless, upon which 
the West was acting, and which therefore required a response from European 
socialists.
This meant that for the Second International, as for Marx, the national and the 
colonial questions remained two distinct issues. The national question pertained to 
those nationalities which were seen to be on the move, were seen as active historical 
subjects - Poland, the Balkan nations, generally, the oppressed nationalities of Europe. 
The colonial question was the question of the East - of those nations being subjugated 
by the West. In the Second International 'the East' received more attention than it had 
hitherto received within Marxism, but it continued to be treated as an object of 
Western activity. The fact that this 'activity' had increased in scale and importance was 
the cause of greater consideration of the East - and thus ’the East’, in the form of the 
colonial question, continued to be an essentially European question. The capacity of 
the non-Westem world to set and pursue its own projects was throughout, implicitly,
denied ; and thus the possibility of the fusing of the national and colonial questions 
within Marxism - of colonial nationalism being considered - was foreclosed.
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Lenin Before Imperialism
This can be seen in the early writings even of V J. Lenin, the Marxist who was 
to do most to bring the colonial and semi-colonial countries within the theoretical and 
political ambit of Marxism.
Prior to 1900, the East hardly figures at all in Lenin's writings. This was a 
function of lack of interest and knowledge and perhaps, as Donald Lowe has 
suggested, of Lenin's concern to assert the ’Westemness’ of Russia against the
Populists. *0
Significantly, Lenin's earliest articles which do touch more seriously on Asian 
nations are written in response to contemporary events, events involving a clash 
between an Asian nation and Russia.
Neither "The War in China" (1900) nor "The Fall of Port Arthur" (1905) are 
about Asia as such. Rather, they are about the appropriate attitude and response the 
Russian working class should adopt to events involving the tsarist government - the 
European intervention to crush the Boxer Rebellion and the Russo-Japanese war. 
Lenin poses the question, "What attitude should the socialists adopt towards this war? 
In whose interests is it being fought?"11
The structure of the argument is the same in both cases. The war is being fought 
by, but not for, the Russian people ; it raises certain dangers, such as the danger of 
national chauvinism infecting the Russian proletariat; these must be avoided, and the 
Russian proletariat must continue to oppose the autocracy ; indeed, these events must 
be seen as further evidence of the need to struggle against tsarism. Thus both articles
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end by focusing attention on the Tsarist government - one calling for its overthrow, 
the other 'announcing' its impending collapse. ^
Here, Lenin treats the East as an essentially European problem. The 'wrong' 
attitude towards it could be disastrous, could corrupt and mislead the European 
working class. It was in these terms that Lenin interpreted the debate at the Stuttgart 
Congress - "it revealed a negative feature in the European labour movement, one that 
can do no little harm to the proletarian cause, and for that reason should receive serious 
attention.".13(emphasis added). Conversely, the 'right' attitude would promote the 
development of a democratic and socialist class consciousness amongst the European 
working class, would act as a spur to militant struggles against the real enemies.
At this stage, then, the East figures in Lenin's writings as the occasion for 
developing his 'negative internationalism'. 'Internationalism' because Lenin urges his 
readers to side against their own country ; 'negative' because they are being warned 
against errors, not being urged to side 'with' their nations opponent. For what China 
and Japan are fighting for is of only incidental importance ; the crucial question is what 
Russia is fighting for, and the task is to demonstrate that this battle is not in the 
interests of the Russian working class, that it in fact runs directly counter to its 
interests. Thus although these articles are written in response to events at least partly 
resulting from Eastern 'initiatives' or actions, this is not registered in any significant 
way in the articles themselves.
In later writings, however, it is precisely this point - the 'awakening' of the East - 
which is acknowledged and raised to a level of importance. "Inflammable Material in 
World Politics" (1908) is not about Asia specifically, but about the development of "a 
new and incomparably higher stage in the international proletarian struggle"14, 
characterised by increasing polarization and conflict between progressive and 
reactionary forces in the world. Developments in Asian countries, however, have 
contributed to this 'new and higher stage', and are an important aspect of it - events in 
Persia, Turkey, China and India are referred to.1^
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These events are characterised as an 'awakening' in "The Awakening of Asia" 
(1913):
World capitalism and the 1905 movement in Russia have finally aroused 
Asia. Hundreds of millions of the downtrodden and benighted have 
awakened from mediaeval stagnation to a new life and are rising to fight for 
elementary human rights and democracy.16
This awakening which Lenin points to is constantly linked to a new phase in the 
revolutionary struggle ; Lenin stresses its significance bevond Asia. Thus in 'The 
Historical Destiny of the Doctrine of Karl Marx" (1913), where Lenin surveys the fate 
of Marx's theory since its inception, he divides this history into three periods - the 
period up to the Paris Commune, the long period of the stabilization of capitalism and 
of muted class struggle until 1905, and the new period since. The latter is characterised 
by heightened struggle, which began in Russia and Asia. "The Russian revolution was 
followed by revolutions in Turkey, Persia and China. It is in this era of storms and 
their 'repercussions’ in Europe that we are now living."17
Whereas once the 'repercussions' of events in Asia were discussed without the 
fact that events in Asia had come to influence developments in Europe being registered 
or commented upon, it is now precisely the latter point which is at the centre of 
analysis. The awakening of Asia has repercussions in Europe. Events in Asia are not 
only characteristic of a new period of world history, they help define this new period ; 
they are not merely symptoms of polarization and an intensification of the class 
struggle on the world stage, they are an important cause of this intensification.
If Asia has now been raised to a new level of importance, it is not as a result of 
Lenin rethinking his views of the history of Asia. The very image of an 'awakening' 
presupposes a prior state of slumber and stagnation. That, in fact, is precisely the 
assumption from which Lenin operates. Asia's 'own' history was one of 'medieval 
stagnation’, of 'deep slumber'. Its 'awakening' is a metaphor for the fact that "the East 
has definitely taken the Western path"18, and that too as a result of factors external to
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itself, not generated by its own history - the Russian revolution of 1905 and 'world 
capitalism'.
In other words, the Orientalist baggage has not been entirely discarded. 
Nevertheless, an important change - a 'breakthrough' - has occurred in Marxism's 
relationship with the East. For, whatever the reasons, Asia is now being regarded, by 
Lenin, as an active historical subject. It has not simply 'entered history'; it has forced 
its entry into history, by its own actions and its own struggles. In doing so, it has not 
only ended its own stagnation and established a claim to having a history - it has 
immediately become a part of world history. Lenin attaches a global significance to 
events in Asia ; in his assessment of revolutionary possibilities and the balance of 
forces on a world scale, the East figures as a prominent factor.
This opens the door to examining events in Asia 'in themselves'. If Asia is an 
active historical subject, whose actions have a global and not only Asian significance, 
then these 'actions' are worthy of investigation. In "Democracy and Narodism in 
China" (1912) "Regenerated China" (1912) and "Struggle of the Parties in China" 
(1913), Lenin attempts such an investigation for the Chinese revolution of 1911.
Lenin describes the Chinese revolution as a victory of the Chinese bourgeoisie 
and peasantry over reactionary, essentially pre-capitalist, forces. Sun Yat-sen, despite 
his Narodnik illusions of utilising China's backwardness to bypass capitalism, is a 
representative of 'revolutionary bourgeois democracy'. He is a representative of "a 
class that is rising, not declining". While the bourgeoisie in Europe, having played out 
its historically progressive role, is now an enemy of progress everywhere, in Asia 
"there is still a bourgeoisie capable of championing sincere, militant, consistent 
democracy, a worthy comrade of France's great men of the Enlightenment". ^  Aligned 
with this bourgeoisie, in the absence of a proletariat211, is the peasantry. Together these 
two classes made the revolution ; its survival depends on the extent to which the 
former draws the latter into active political struggle.21 Arrayed against them are
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bureaucrats, landowners and the 'reactionary bourgeoisie', the latter led by Yuan Shih-
kai.22
As an analysis of social forces and ideologies in China, all this is quite 
superficial, even glib. Lenin, as he was later to admit, wrote with only a slight 
acquaintance of Chinese affairs.23 What is significant is that the exercise is attempted 
at all, and that the 'differentiated' nature of Chinese society is registered. Whereas 
Marx wrote of a future regeneration of India, through British rail and telegraph, some 
sixty years later Lenin finds the source of China's regeneration in the victory of two 
classes - a revolutionary bourgeoisie and a peasantry - in the class struggle.
By the eve of the First World War, then, we can see the distance which had been 
traversed by Marxists in their treatment of Asia. From being seen as an object for 
exploitation and transformation by the West, as in Marx's day, the East had become a 
historical subject, setting its own projects, which had an impact on the world scene. It 
was a subject, moreover, which had its own particular class structure and struggles - 
which was amenable to analysis by means of these Marxist categories.
It is clear, however, that this development did not represent some internal 
'evolution' of Marxism, whereby, in Lenin's writings, Marxism was gradually and 
smoothly led to a 'rethinking' of Asia. It was, in fact, a patchy and incomplete 
development. Instead of an evolution in Lenin's thought, events in Asia forced 
themselves upon Lenin's attention, demanding a response. That is precisely what these 
writings constitute - a response, an attempt to grasp events and developments of 
obvious importance. The observations and generalizations of these writings are of a 
practical rather than a theoretical nature. No new concepts are developed ; instead, 
certain facts are registered, and their implications considered.
Whv has Asia awakened? Why do events in Asia reverbrate in Europe ? What is 
the relationship between East and W est, and what are the effects of this on each ? 
These questions are not answered, except in the most gestural way. These writings
create an 'opening', create the possibility of a fresh analysis which will incorporate 
Asia into Marxism - but they do not constitute or undertake such an analysis. We might 
say - the geographical scope of Marxism has been extended, but without any 
corresponding theoretical broadening.
This latter task is begun with Lenin's theory of 'imperialism'.
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Lenin's Theory of ’Imperialism'
With the onset of the Great War, the flow of Lenin's occasional writings on the 
East dries up altogether. From 1914 to the October Revolution, there is not a single 
piece by Lenin devoted primarily to the colonial question, or to a particular Asian 
nation. Lenin's main preoccupations in this period are the war, the collapse of the 
International, imperialism, the right of nations to self-determination, the ' state and 
revolution’ and, of course, the Russian revolution itself.
However, if Asia no longer receives independent attention, it also no longer 
receives accidental and episodic attention ; it is incorporated into the dominant concerns 
and concepts of this period. For in Lenin's theory of imperialism, Asia's connection 
with Europe ceases to be accidental and episodic, a matter of 'events' (the Russo- 
Japanese war, etc); it comes to be seen as structural and necessary . The conquest and 
competition for colonies which provoked increasing interest in the colonial question in 
the Second International comes to be 'theorised'.
This was not, of course, unique to Lenin, nor did it begin with him. The late 
nineteenth century scramble for colonies saw a trend, in the early twentieth century, to 
try and grasp this phenomena theoretically ; to discover, in a number of seemingly 
interconnected events and processes, an underlying logic or structure. Thus within the 
European socialist movement the patchy and occasional debate on the 'colonial
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question' came to be assimilated to a broader, and more sophisticated, debate on 
imperialism.
Imperialism was the subject of a major debate and controversy for the German 
Social-Democratic Party, at its Congress at Chemnitz in 1912. It was one of the major 
items on the agenda for the never-held Vienna Congress of the International in 1914, 
with Juares, Haase, Vliegen and Keir Hardie commissioned to prepare papers on the 
subject.24
Apart from debate in the forums of the socialist movement, a number of 
influential works on the question of imperialism were published. Hobson, a non- 
Marxist, published his Imperialism : A Study in 1902. Rudolph Hilferding's Finance 
Capital was published in 1910, although most of it had been written in 1905. Rosa 
Luxemburg's The Accumulation of Capital was published,to a storm of criticism 
and debate, in 1913, and Bukharin's Imperialism and World Economy was written 
two years later, although it was not published until 1917. Kautsky did not contribute a 
book length study to the subject,but was an influential participant in the debate through 
the pages of Neue Zeit .2^
It was Lenin's conception of imperialism, however, which came to dominate the 
international communist movement which emerged out of the war and the ignominious 
collapse of the Second International. Lenin's theory was also the most systematic and 
determinist, and thus, as we shall see, most emphatically stressed the structural link 
between East and West.
Lenin's borrowings from Hobson, Hilferding and Bukharin, and the general 
structure of his theory, are too well known to merit discussion here. What is 
important, for our purposes, is the way in which the relationship between the capitalist 
West and the non-Western world is conceived of in Lenin's Imperialism: The Highest 
Stage of Capitalism.
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"Even the capitalist colonial policy of previous stages of capitalism", Lenin 
writes, "is essentially different from the colonial policy of finance capital".26 For, "To 
the numerous 'old' motives of colonial policy, finance capital has added the struggle 
for the sources of raw materials, for the export of capital, for spheres of influence... 
[for] economic territory in general".27
According to Lenin, the motives or compulsions of colonial policy have 
changed. The form of the relationship between West and East is still that of conquest 
and colonialism, but its nature has become more complex. In the era of monopoly 
capital, where finance and industrial capital have coalesced, with the former dominant, 
colonies are important at every stage in the reproduction of capitalism. Not only, or 
primarily, as markets - but as sources of raw materials, and as fields for the self­
expansion of capital, as investment outlets.2**
Linked to this changed and increased importance of colonies to monopoly 
capitalism is the 'generalisation' of colonial policy. Whereas colonialism had earlier 
been the privilege of a few great nations, seeking assured outlets for their 
manufactured goods, it is now the desire and aim of all the advanced capitalist nations, 
as well as some of the less advanced ones. In the era of monopoly finance capital, 
colonies are necessary not for particular capitalist powers (eg. Britain), but for 
(monopoly) capitalism in general.
It is not, however, capitalism 'in general' which subjugates colonies, except in 
the most abstract sense. The conquest of colonies is undertaken by particular national 
capitals, through their states, in competition with one another. This is another feature 
of imperialism. The end of 'competitive capitalism' does not mean the end of 
competition ; under monopoly capitalism, competition occurs between larger units or 
fractions of capital, and is increasingly transferred to the international stage. Because 
the resources which can be mobilized are so much greater, and the stakes so high, 
competition is in fact fiercer.
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Imperialism is thus characterised by intense competition, by a 'striving for 
domination'. Colonies are not the only object of competition, but the crucial 
importance of colonies to monopoly finance capital means that they are a key object. 
With the dominance of monopoly-finance capital, "Particularly intensified become the 
yoke of national oppression and the striving for annexations...".^ The division of the 
world amongst the great capitalist powers is followed by its redivision, reflecting the 
changing strength of the protagonists in the course of competition.
Thus in Lenin's theory the East is an integral and necessary part of the 'highest 
stage of capitalism’ - one of the features of this stage, essential to its existence and 
reproduction. The East is pan of the structure of imperialism, and that structure 
necessarily includes competition and conflict over the East. This is the nub of Lenin's 
difference with Kautsky.30 For Lenin it is not a question of colonial policy , despite 
the continued use of the term - no other policy is possible, for colonies and struggle 
over colonies are inevitable. Imperialism is not a policy, but a stage of capitalism.
Significantly, the name of this new stage is 'imperialism', and not 'monopoly 
finance capital'. For although a change in the form of capital is the chief feature and 
key to the new stage of capitalism, that stage itself is ail the phenomena Lenin 
discusses - concentration of capital, monopoly, competition for colonies, militarism 
and so on - in their interconnections. Precisely because this is a new stage in capitalism 
(and not just a new form of capital), it is a totality of phenomena.
The importance of and competition over colonies is only one aspect of this 
whole, less central than it has been in our presentation. The point, however, is that the 
East is now part of a 'whole'. It no longer occupies an unexplored, almost accidental 
relationship with the West - to be commented upon when it is the scene of 'events', 
such as wars, rebellions and so on. Lenin's theory of imperialism incorporates the East 
into Marxist theory by arguing its incorporation into a new stage of capitalism.
The form of this incorporation of the East is in some ways similar to that of 
Marx’s. It is not that Marxist concepts are extended and reformulated to include the 
East, in its specificity. Rather, the East is brought into the orbit of capitalism , and 
thereby comes within the ambit of Marxism.
However, whereas for Marx the East would become the mirror image of the 
capitalist West, and hence be incorporated within Marxism, in Lenin the East is 
brought into the orbit of capitalism,but does not necessarily become capitalist.^1 
Indeed, in the imperialist epoch the East is integrated into capitalism precisely as a 
backward area, a 'hinterland' of capitalism.32
The significance of the theory of imperialism is therefore not only that it 
'incorporates' the East into capitalism, but that it does so without treating it as a 
fledgling West. In Lenin's theory it is not just the East which has changed, by being 
colonized and incorporated into capitalism ; capitalism has also changed, has become 
imperialism. Capitalism is no longer synonymous with European capitalist countries ; 
it is a global structure, and a complex one, which includes non-capitalist regions of the 
globe.
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The other important sense in which Lenin differs from Marx is in his 
recognition of the East as an active historical subject. Imperialism , as a text, does not 
investigate the response of the East to its relationship to the West, to imperialism. 
However, the earlier 'discovery' of the self-activity of the East is not forgotten ; in 
other writings and debates in this period (1914-17), it is indeed raised to a new level. 
Not only has the East been incorporated into capitalism and thereby Marxism, the form 
and meaning of its self-activity have, as a result of this, assumed new significance for 
Marxism and capitalism.
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The 'Right of Nations to Self-Determination'
Lenin's advocacy of the slogan of 'the right of nations to self-determination' 
long predated his study of imperialism. A resolution proclaiming such a right had been 
adopted by the 1896 London Congress of the International. Although couched in 
general terms, it was clearly directed primarily to the European arena - Poland, Alsace- 
Lorraine and so on. Poland was again central to the debate at the 1903 Congress of the 
R.S.D.L.P., where such a resolution was adopted over the opposition of the Polish 
delegation, supporters of Rosa Luxemburg. Here, however, the resolution was clearly 
passed also with an eye towards the oppressed Asian nationalities of the Russian
Empire.33
Lenin was to elaborate his views on this question in a debate with opponents of 
his slogan, most prominent among them Rosa Luxemburg, who presented of an 
opposing view in a series of articles in Przeglad Sozialdemokratyczny in 1908-09. 
Luxemburg pointed to the centralising nature of capitalist development, and to the fact 
that, in Marxist terms, this was progressive, and to be welcomed ; and pointed to the 
international unity of the working class, which in her view could only be undermined 
by a slogan of national self-determination.^4
Against this, Lenin pointed to the uneven nature of capitalist development on a 
global scale, and the centrifugal tendencies unleashed by such development. Thus in a 
passage in The Right of Nations to Self-Determination (1914), written as a polemic 
against Luxemburg, Lenin echoes the themes of earlier writings, of the 'awakening' of 
the East:
In most Western countries it [the national question] was settled long 
ago...In Eastern Europe and Asia the period of bourgeois - democratic 
revolutions did not begin until 1905. The revolutions in Russia, Persia, 
Turkey and China, the Balkan wars - such is the chain of world events of 
our period in our 'Orient'. And only a blind man could fail to see in this 
chain of events the awakening of a whole series of bourgeois democratic
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national movements which strive to create nationally independent and 
nationally uniform states.35
The uneven nature of capitalist development means that what in most of Europe 
'was settled long ago' is only now on the agenda for the Balkans and the Orient. Thus 
to fail to recognise the continued importance of the right of self-determination for 
Eastern Europe and Asia - as Luxemburg does - is "the height of absurdity".^6
Lenin also constantly returns to the political implications and significance of the 
national question. To counterpose working class internationalism ('workers have no 
country') to 'bourgeois' or 'petty-bourgeois' nationalism is only to proclaim the unity 
of the working class or of progressive forces. To actively build it requires the 
elimination of all possible sources of distrust between workers of different countries, 
which means recognising the right of oppressed nations to self-determination. Lenin 
writes :
If the proletariat of any one nation gives the slightest support to the 
privileges of its 'own' national bourgeoisie, that will inevitably rouse 
distrust among the proletariat of another nation ; it will weaken the 
international class solidarity of the workers and divide them, to the delight 
of the bourgeoisie. Repudiation of the right to self-determination or to 
secession inevitably means, in practice, support for the privileges of the 
dominant nation.^7
Simply to disassociate oneself from ones bourgeoisie is not enough - socialists 
of dominant nations must actively struggle for the right to self-determination, as only 
this "removes mistrust among the proletarians of the oppressor and oppressed nations, 
makes for a united international struggle for the socialist revolution".^
With the development of the theory of imperialism, and with the outbreak of war 
and his analysis of it as an imperialist war, the slogan of the 'right of nations to self- 
determination'becomes all the more important to Lenin. During a war waged for 
annexations and for the redivisions of the world, to proclaim the right of nations to 
self-determination becomes a counter or alternative to the war - and becomes a slogan
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for seeking to build working class unity, in a period when workers are slaughtering 
each other on the battlefield.
It also, however, undergoes a change. The demand for 'the right of nations to 
self-determination’ has a specific content and meaning, and even greater importance, 
in the imperialist era :
the focal point in the Social-Democratic programme must be that division of 
nations into oppressor and oppressed which forms the essence of 
imperialism.. .It is from this division that qm  definition of the ’right of 
nations to self-determination’ must follow...39
It is not therefore simply a matter of uneven development, of the East setting out 
to do what the West once did. Lenin retains that presumption, namely that 'the East has 
entered the Western path’, and that one important aspect and consequence of this is 
'the awakening of bourgeois-democratic national movements' in the Orient. But he 
adds to this, or rather assimilates this to, another proposition, stemming from the 
theory of imperialism. In this case, national struggles in the East are seen as products 
of and responses to the specifically imperialist nature of capitalism in its present epoch, 
which has divided the world into oppressor and oppressed nations. Here, the struggle 
for nationhood in oppressed countries is a response to this - is generated hx and 
against imperialism.
To raise the slogan of the right of nations to self-determination, then, is not only 
a matter of building working class unity across and against the divisive effects of 
national oppression under capitalism ; nor is it a question of welcoming the arrival of 
capitalism in hitherto pre-capitalist parts of the world, and supporting their 'bourgeois- 
democratic' struggles ; it is a crucial aspect of the struggle against imperialism,the 
highest stage of capitalism, itself.
What Lenin's theory of imperialism does is to suggest that national struggles 
which are, in part, generated by the development of capitalism, and whose content and 
goals are bourgeois democratic, are nevertheless in an important sense anti-capitalist.
For if imperialism means a structural relationship of oppressor and oppressed, any 
break in that structure is a blow, not only against a particular imperialist power, but 
against imperialism.
With the theory of imperialism, both the causes and the political significance of 
national struggles in the East come to be seen in a new light. Once the 'focal point' 
from which the question of national self-determination is viewed becomes 'the division 
of nations into oppressor and oppressed which forms the essence of imperialism', the 
slogan 'the right of nations to self-determination' undergoes a significant change of 
meaning. The self-activity of the East, part of capitalism in the imperialist era, but 
thereby also a subjugated part, is seen as necessarily taking the form of national 
struggle:
National wars waged by colonies and semi-colonies in the imperialist era 
are not only probable but inevitable ...The national liberation movements 
there are already very strong, or are growing and maturing. Every war is 
the continuation of politics by other means. The continuation of national 
liberation politics in the colonies will inevitably take the form of national 
wars against imperialism.4^
Thus in the imperialist era, where the Eastern nations are integrated into the 
capitalist system in its imperialist stage - as backward and oppressed nations- the 
specific form of their awakening, of their self-activity, is the struggle for national 
liberation. As a struggle which is necessarily against imperialism, it is progressive - 
"National wars against the imperialist powers are not only possible and probable; they 
are inevitable, progressive and revolutionary ...',44
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Conclusion
It is in our century that the universalistic claims of Marxism have found political 
expression ; that Marxism has not just claimed to be relevant to the non-Western 
world, but has sought to become so. The important role which Lenin played in this
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process is widely recognized. As Helene Carrere dEncausse and Stuart Schram put it, 
"This encounter between Marxism and the non-European world required a mediation, 
which was carried out by Lenin...who first opened wide the door to the implantation 
of Marxism in Asia".42
Before Marxism could be implanted in Asia, however, Asia had to be 
'implanted' in Marxism ; before a Marxist politics could be developed in and for the 
East, the place and function of the East in relation to the project of proletarian 
revolution had to be defined. In the history of Marxism it was not Marx's theory, but 
Lenin’s, which proved to be decisive on this score.
In Marx's writings, as we have seen, the Orient is brought within the ambit of 
Marxism as an embryonic West, a West-in-formation. In Lenin's thought the East is 
included within Marxism through the theory of imperialism, which suggests that the 
East has been incorporated into a new stage of capitalism. The nature of this stage is 
such, according to Lenin, that the East becomes part of capitalism without necessarily 
itself becoming fully capitalist.
Lenin includes the East within Marxist theory without insisting that the price of 
this inclusion be a denial of its specificity. At the same time, this 'specificity' is no 
longer conceived of in Orientalist terms. It is true that Lenin has little to say on the 
history of the Orient before the imperialist era, andthat his few remarks on the subject 
do not display any careful consideration of the issue. Indeed, they are full of 
Orientalist metaphors and images. Lenin describes the East as 'stagnant',’slumbering', 
and so on. Elsewhere, as when Lenin characterises Russia as 'Asiatic', the term 
functions as a metaphor for backwardness and brutality. However in a more basic 
sense, Lenin's theory shatters the foundations of the Orientalist paradigm. For in 
describing how imperialism brings backward parts of the globe under the sway of 
capitalism, Lenin does not confine himself to the East. Eastern Europe, for instance, is 
seen by Lenin as being subject to the same process.42 Conversely, Lenin is clear on 
the fact that Japan belongs to the ranks of the imperialist powers. The distinction now
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no longer rests upon an essentializing of the 'Orient' and the ’Occident’; the distinction 
is between imperialist powers and the colonized, the relatively advanced and the 
relatively backward, the oppressor nations and the oppressed.
In Lenin's thought it is the very backwardness and subjugation of the East and of 
other parts* of the world which marks, not their exclusion from the modem world, but 
the manner and form of their incorporation into it. For Lenin it follows that if this is the 
manner of the East's entry into world history, its transformation from a passive object 
into an active subject will take the form of struggles for national liberation ; struggles 
which are anti-imperialist and progressive, and which are therefore to be welcomed 
and actively supported by Marxists.
With Lenin the importance of the East to the socialist revolution, and the 
relevance of Marxism to the East, became very direct and immediate. The 'national 
question’ and the 'colonial question', entirely separate issues for Marx,were not only 
brought together with Lenin, they were virtually fused into the one question. The 
political implications of this were obviously far-reaching. Far from being a potential 
source of anxiety, as it was for Marx, the colonial question, in the form of the national 
question, was now regarded as an ally of the proletarian revolution.
Lenin's theory, then, is something of a tour de force. With the theory of 
imperialism, the position the East occupied in Marxist theory and in relation to the 
socialist project was radically rethought. This of course raised new questions and 
difficulties, some of which are considered in the chapter to follow. At this point two 
features of Lenin's theory can be noted.
It has often been noticed that Lenin assumes that nationalist movements in the 
colonies will be 'bourgeois-democratic', never considering the possibility that even 
the nationalism of an oppressed country may be in some sense 'reactionary'. The 
reason, we suggest, is that alongside the 'new' understanding of Eastern nationalism, 
where it appears as the antithesis of imperialism (in a relation of structural opposition
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to it), is retained the 'evolutionary' view of Eastern nationalism, where the East 
appears as a historical 'stage' behind the West, and where therefore there is a 'rising 
bourgeoisie', 'still capable of championing democracy' and so on.
The two perspectives are not contradictory, but it is important to recognise, as 
Lenin did not, that these are two perspectives, which do not necessarily always go 
together. The assumption that Eastern nationalism is necessarily bourgeois democratic 
follows only from the evolutionary perspective - for inasmuch as it is a response to 
imperialism, there is no reason to make any assumptions as to the political content of 
the nationalism of an oppressed country. Indeed this is one of the potential strengths of 
the latter perspective. As subsequent historical experience has amply demonstrated, to 
the surprise and frequent embarassment of Marxists (but not only Marxists), national 
movements which are in some sense 'anti-imperialist' are not always liberal and 
democratic.
A second aspect of Lenin's theory is that in fusing the national and the colonial 
questions it not only renders the colonial question unproblematic, it also makes the 
national question seemingly unproblematic. That is, by making the central issue the 
distinction between oppressor and oppressed nationalism, Lenin does not consider 
other possible questions - such as whether nationalism, even if of the progressive 
variety, necessarily compromises or precludes the raising of socialist demands ; 
whether the nation as a unit of social organisation is compatible with socialism ; and so 
on. Lenin would probably have considered such questions 'abstract' and 'pedantic', as 
compared to the revolutionary virtue of being 'concrete'. Indeed, when such questions 
were raised this was precisely Lenin's response.
Marx, it is true, also did not address himself to such questions. His and Engels 
writings on national questions were shaped, in Hobsbawm's words, by "the firm 
principle that nations and movements of national liberation were not to be regarded as 
ends in themselves, but only in relation to the process, interests and strategy of world 
revolution
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In this respect Lenin's writings constituted an advance. For Lenin provided a 
theoretical basis, rather than an ad hoc and pragmatic one, on which to judge whether 
particular national struggles contribute to world revolution. The very systematization 
implied by 'theorising', however, also indicates that questions which were simply 
absent from Marx's writings were expressly excluded from Lenin's. By making the 
central issue the distinction between oppressor and oppressed nations, and 
distinguishing between 'progressive' and 'reactionary' nationalisms on this basis, 
Lenin's theory effectively excluded the possibility of considering the nation and 
nationalism in themselves as problems within Marxism.
Henceforward the 'national question' would be treated, within the communist 
movement, as one the answer to which hinged upon distinguishing between oppressor 
and oppressed nations. Whatever few earlier efforts there had been to consider the 
cultural, linguistic and historical dimensions of nationhood - such as those of Otto 
Bauer and some of the Zionist socialists - were declared to lie outside the Marxist 
canon. Within that section of the workers' movement which emerged out of the great 
schism of 1914 as the 'communist' movement these issues were dealt with, to the 
extent they were treated at all, in Stalin's 1913 essay, "Marxism and the National 
Question". This dull exercise in definition-mongering came to be treated as the first and 
last word on the more 'abstract' aspects of the national question.
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The Communist International: 'The National and Colonial
Question'
In mid-1924, speaking at the Fifth Congress of the Communist International, 
Nikolai Bukharin distinguished between the Third International and what he saw as its 
discredited predecessor in the following terms :
One of the most important differences between the Second and Third 
Internationals is the conception of imperialism... this conception is the most 
important point which separates us from the Second International... We 
have in this conception a connecting link between the revolution of the 
industrial proletariat and colonial rebellions, which in the trend of history 
are nothing but component parts of the world revolution.!
Almost two years earlier Zinoviev, in delivering the Executive Committee report 
to the Fourth Congress of the Comintern, observed that national liberation movements 
in a number of the oppressed colonial and semi-colonial nations were making great 
progress. He went on to declare :
I think that among the communists no one today will contest the assertion 
that this struggle, although it is neither Socialist nor Communist, is 
nevertheless objectively considered a struggle against the capitalist regime.
The great movements which we have been watching in India and in the 
colonial and semi-colonial countries are by no means communistic, but 
dispassionately considered, they rate as an important factor in the fight 
against capitalism. 2 (emphasis added).
Marxism had indeed travelled a great distance since the time of Marx. In Marx's 
theory, as we saw, no connection is effected between the national question and what 
would later come to be termed the 'colonial question'. In the Third International,
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however, there was no such ambiguity or reticence. Instead, nationalist struggles in the 
colonies are confidently proclaimed to be progressive ; even though not 'communistic', 
they are 'component parts' of the 'world revolution'.
The bridge between Marx's position and this position - as the quotation from 
Bukharin indicates - was Lenin's theory of imperialism. In the Third International this 
theory, and political conclusions directly drawn from it, had become enshrined as 
'fundamental principles' of Marxism. Thus Zinoviev, describing national liberation 
struggles in the colonies as anti-capitalist, is able to confidently add that "no one today 
will contest this assertion".
However Lenin's theory of imperialism was developed to explain, above all else, 
the First World War, and thus to provide a foundation for a correct communist 
response to that war. As we have seen, although it incorporated the colonies into 
Marxism far more thoroughly than Marx' s theory had done, its focus was not the 
'colonial question'.
The decisive 'moment' in the extension of the 'field of application' of the theory 
of imperialism - an extension which saw it become the theoretical basis of the 
communist position on the colonial question - was the Second Congress of the 
Comintern. At the Second Congress, two theses were adopted on the 'national and 
colonial question' - the main theses, drafted by Lenin, and a set of 'supplementary 
theses' drafted by M.N. Roy, the Indian revolutionary attending the Congress as a 
delegate of the newly formed Communist Party of Mexico.3
The unusual step of adopting two sets of theses was the outcome of a vigorous 
dispute between Lenin and Roy in the Commission which had been appointed by the 
Congress to prepare theses on the colonial question. Encouraged by Lenin to present 
his views in the form of theses, Roy found his theses amended quite substantially in 
the Colonial Commission. They were nevertheless recommended for adoption (in their 
amended form) to the Congress by Lenin, as 'Supplementary Theses'.^
The importance of the Roy-Lenin debate is generally recognised. However, in 
the academic literature on the subject, it is usually treated as a dispute over strategic and 
tactical issues, stemming from differing (empirical) evaluations of the strength of the 
bourgeoisie and the proletariat in the colonial countries. Thus Overstreet and 
Windmiller, in their standard history of communism in India, write :
...Lenin and Roy disagreed on both strategy and tactics... Lenin wanted 
Communists to work with bourgeois nationalist organizations because they 
were anti-imperialist and because he believed there were no proletarian 
organizations of any consequence at the time. Roy insisted that there were 
important proletarian parties in the colonies and that Communists should 
work with them in preference to bourgeois organizations.^
In Allen S. Whiting's account, Lenin's theses are seen as advocating a 'united 
front' strategy for the achievement of national independence in the colonies, a position 
which 'orthodox radicals' like Roy found unacceptable.6 Similarly North and Eudin 
see the dispute as turning upon "to what degree and for how long should the 
Communist Party, as the vanguard of the proletariat, ally itself - 'from above' - with 
the anti-imperialist and non-Communist national and petty bourgeoisie, and how much 
of its energies should be devoted to enhancing the power of the proletariat and the 
peasantry - 'from below' " ?
Below we offer a somewhat different account of the Roy-Lenin debate, one in 
which the differences over strategy are seen as the outcome, rather than the premise, of 
the dispute. This analysis, we believe, tallies more closely to the textual evidence, and 
helps to situate this debate and its outcome within the evolution of a Marxist 
perspective on nationalism in the colonial countries.
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The Roy-Lenin Debate
Lenin's draft theses are derived directly, as he makes clear, from his theory of 
imperialism, and the distinction it draws between oppressor and oppressed
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nations."The most important, the fundamental idea of our Theses", he declared in 
delivering the report of the Colonial Commission to the Congress, "is the difference 
between the oppressor and oppressed nations".^ Thus his Theses insist that in 
determining their attitude to the national question in the colonial countries communists 
must distinguish "between the oppressed, dependent and subject nations and the 
oppressing, exploiting and sovereign nations..." (thesis 2)P  Basing himself on this 
distinction, Lenin arrives at the following conclusion - "Communist parties must assist 
the bourgeois-democratic liberation movement in these [i.e., subject, oppressed] 
countries..." (thesis 11a).
Such liberation movements, as we saw in the last chapter, are for Lenin both 
'inevitable and progressive'. They are inevitable because the political struggle in 
subjugated nations is a struggle against that subjugation, a struggle for national 
liberation ; they are progressive because such struggles undermine imperialism. 
Although progressive, however, such struggles usually aim at little more than the 
founding of an independent bourgeois nation-state. Thus communists should support 
such movements whilst firmly recognising that they are nQl communist. Indeed, Lenin 
explicitly stresses the "need for a determined struggle against attempts to give a 
communist colouring to bourgeois-democratic liberation trends in the backward 
countries" (thesis lie).
Couched in the form of a warning against painting bourgeois-democratic 
liberation movements as more than they are, this thesis only serves to emphasise that in 
the colonies even non-communist, bourgeois movements, are, for Lenin, in one sense 
'revolutionary' - in that they undermine imperialism. Therefore "a policy must be 
pursued that will achieve the closest alliance, with Soviet Russia, of all the national and 
colonial liberation movements" (thesis 6).
There is a theoretical imperative and a theoretical logic to this position - that of 
the theory of imperialism. In that theory, the East is 'de-essentialised', no longer 
operates as an essentialist Other to the West, as it did for Marx ; but the form this takes
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is that it is contextualized. The East enters history, and Marxist theory, as the colonial 
question ; its defining feature is its subjugation, and therefore the form of its historical 
subjectivity is a struggle against that subjugation, for national liberation. Even though 
the content of that struggle may be bourgeois-democratic', in its specific - colonial - 
context, this struggle is 'revolutionary'.
The consciousness constituting or informing that subjectivity is nationalism. 
Nationalism is not, in the abstract, progressive. Lenin has harsh words to say on the 
subject:
the more backward the country, the stronger is the hold of small-scale 
agricultural production, patriarchalism and isolation, which inevitably lend 
particular strength and tenacity to the deepest of petty-bourgeois prejudices, 
i.e., to national egoism and national narrow-mindedness (thesis 12).
A similar operation is effected on nationalism, however, as is effected on the 
bourgeois democratic liberation struggle. Nationalism is not to be regarded as 
progressive in itself -it is egoistic and narrow-minded - but for all that, it has historical 
roots, and therefore must be taken seriously and treated carefully. Immediately after the 
passage quoted above is the following passage :
It is...the duty of the class-conscious communist proletariat of all countries 
to regard with particular caution and attention the survivals of national 
sentiments in the countries and among nationalities which have been 
oppressed the longest; it is equally necessary to make certain concessions 
with a view to more rapidly overcoming this distrust and these prejudices 
(thesis 12).10
More than that - nationalism not only has historical roots, it has a historical 
'justification'. Even if in the abstract it is to be condemned, in the colonial context it is 
progressive, and communists should not only respect it, they must utilise it. As Lenin 
had put it in 1919, in his address to the second All-Russia Congress of Communist 
Organisations of the Peoples of the East,
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You will have to base yourselves on the bourgeois nationalism which is 
awakening, and must awaken, among these peoples [of the East], and which 
has its historical justification .^(emphasis added).
This is not a case of cynical realpolitik, of painting potential allies in positive 
colours. As demonstrated, this position has a serious theoretical foundation, in the 
distinction between oppressor, and oppressed, nations and nationalism. Moreover, 
such an appraisal of nationalist movements must also be seen in its historical context.
By 1920, Lenin was looking to the East for the 'spark' which might reignite the 
revolutionary process in the West. Far from being evidence of cynicism, however, this 
only indicated how closely Lenin's colonial theses were tied up with his hope for 
world revolution. His 'sympathetic' appraisal of bourgeois nationalism in the East 
stemmed not only from his hope that such nationalism, in weakening imperialism, 
would facilitate revolution in the W est; but also from the belief that revolution in the 
West would not leave the East untouched. Revolutions in the West, Lenin believed, 
would greatly accelerate the revolutionary process in the East, by example and, more 
so, by active assistance. The 'national' revolution in the East would rapidly proceed to 
the Soviet stage, and eventually to communism, bypassing the capitalist staged-
As long as world revolution seemed imminent, such a perspective and approach 
ran little risk of opportunistic misuse. It was not until this prospect began to recede, 
and the new Soviet state found itself alone and beleaguered, that the potential dangers 
of such a position become manifest.^
Had Lenin been alive when these contradictions and dangers became clearly 
manifest - as they did in the case of Comintern policy in China from the mid-twenties - 
one can assert with some confidence that Lenin would have revised his views. But by 
then Lenin was dead, and Stalin in the ascendant.
In any case, even at the Second Congress, neither the project of independence, 
nor nationalism, are regarded by Lenin as the only projects or forms of consciousness 
existing in or appropriate to the East. Thus his draft theses insist that support for
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bourgeois-democratic liberation movements must be accompanied by attempts to 
organize proletarian parties which will be informed by class consciousness - "The 
Communist International must enter into a temporary alliance with bourgeois 
democracy in the colonial and backward countries, but should not merge with it, and 
should under all circumstances uphold the independence of the proletarian movement 
even if it is in its most embryonic form" (theses lie). Another struggle, that against 
'feudalism', must also be waged, with the active support of communists.^
Lenin, then, explicitly recognises the need for forms of struggle other than that 
for nationhood. Nevertheless, it is the latter which is at the centre of his draft theses. 
The national liberation struggle is bourgeois in content, but nevertheless is progressive. 
For although bourgeois in content, it is not just a struggle in the interests of the 
bourgeoisie - it is the pressing task for aU progressive classes in the colonies, it is the 
primary political project in the East.
This is the nub of Roy's dispute with Lenin. In Roy's draft theses, the break-up 
of Europe's colonial empire, described as the 'fountainhead' of European capitalism, is 
seen as a necessary prerequisite to the overthrow of capitalism (theses 2, 3 and 4 ) .^  
Here too, national liberation is 'progressive' -it- is important to note that for Roy, as for 
Lenin, ’the nation' is an unproblematic concept, and one with a 'positive' content (in 
the colonies). However, the pursuit of this goal, in itself, is not. Comintern support for 
"the revolutionary movement in the subject colonies", Roy writes, "is not tantamount 
to the former's upholding the doctrine of nationalism" (thesis 5).
Nationalism - the pursuit of nationhood in itself, which for Roy is the goal of the 
bourgeois nationalist movement - is characterised by him as an alternative to, a 
diversion from, the development of a higher form of consciousness. To support the 
bourgeois movement in the colonies "would amount to helping the growth of the 
national spirit which would surely obstruct the awakening of class consciousness in the 
masses" (thesis 10).
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Thus national liberation is seen as desirable, but nationalism is not. This 
distinction, on the face of it untenable, is made possible by relating it to the existence of 
two movements, seeking and embodying two different projects and forms of 
consciousness. The goal of a sovereign nation-state is the goal of the bourgeois- 
democratic nationalist movement, "limited to the small middle class". But this 
movement is not the only one - "There are to be found in the dependent countries two 
distinct movements which every day grow farther and farther apart from each other. 
One is the bourgeois democratic nationalist movement, with a programme of political 
independence, and the other is the mass action of the ignorant and poor peasants and 
workers" (thesis 7). And if the nationalist movement strives only for independence, 
"the masses of workers and poor peasants are revolting even though in many cases 
unconsciously, against the system which permits such brutal exploitation" (thesis 10).
The latter are not motivated by nationalism - "it would be a mistake to assume 
that the bourgeois nationalist movement expresses the sentiments and aspirations of the 
general population", for "the masses are not with the bourgeois nationalist leaders - 
they are moving towards revolution independently of the bourgeois nationalist 
movement" (thesis 7). The masses are motivated instead by economic need and class 
interest, and they struggle, even if unconsciously, against exploitation as such, and not 
simply national exploitation.
Thus for Roy more than one political project exists in the colonies. Alongside the 
nationalist project - and increasingly at odds with it - is one which 'incorporates' the 
desirable and progressive step of independence, not as a goal in itself, but rather as a 
'moment' or aspect of its broader goal; a movement inspired, not by nationalism, but 
by class interests. In the Colonial Commission, where both draft theses were debated, 
Roy made his differences with Lenin clear, in calling for the deletion of Lenin's thesis 
advocating communist support for bourgeois-democratic liberation movements :
The popular masses of India are not fired with a national spirit. They are 
exclusively interested in problems of an economic and social nature... as 
far as the broad popular masses are concerned, the revolutionary movement
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in India has nothing in common with the national-liberation movement.. In 
India the Communist International should assist the creation and 
development of the communist movement alone, and the Communist Party 
of India should occupy itself exclusively with organising the broad popular 
masses to fight for their own class interests.^
This distinction between, on the one hand, a bourgeois movement aiming at 
national independence, and on the other a movement of workers and peasants with a 
broad 'social' goal to which independence is only incidental, is not closely argued, or 
free of ambiguities. The 'bourgeois-democratic nationalist movement' not only does 
not include the masses, it apparently does not include the bourgeoisie. In Roy's theses 
the social basis of this movement is variously the 'educated middle class' or, simply, 
the 'middle class'. Indeed, only once is there a reference to a native bourgeoisie (thesis 
6), and given that Roy proclaims that revolution in the colonies will have the effect of 
"preventing the rise of a native capitalism in place of the vanquished foreign capitalism" 
(thesis 10), it would appear that neither native capitalism nor a colonial bourgeoisie yet 
exist. 17
Conversely, in the case of the 'revolutionary movement', its class composition is 
relatively precise - workers and poor peasants - but its goal or content, the meaning of 
'revolution', is not clear. Roy makes it evident that he is not suggesting that a 
communist revolution is immediately possible in the colonies. * 8 The revolutionary 
movement, therefore, is defined, if at all, in relation to the nationalist movement - as 
something seeking that in excess of that aimed for by the bourgeois movement. Being 
motivated by something other than nationalism, the revolutionary movement will 
achieve more than simply national independence. Its 'form' is also that of an excess, an 
overstepping - the bourgeois movement "endeavour [s] to control" the mass 
movement, and sometimes succeeds, but only temporarily, as the latter tends to 
overstep these limits (thesis 7).
Despite these ambiguities, the differences between Roy and Lenin are apparent. 
Whereas for Lenin nationalism is the main project in the East, Roy points to two - more
or less antithetical - projects in the colonies. They are not antithetical because one is 
progressive and the other is not - the goal of the nationalist movement is, after all, in a 
sense a 'subset ' of the goal of the revolutionary movement. They are antithetical 
because they are motivated by different interests and informed by different forms of 
consciousness. Since they co-exist in time and place, they are also competitors.
With two projects and two movements in the East, support for the bourgeois- 
democratic movement, on the basis that it undermines imperialism, is not automatic. A 
choice is involved. Against Lenin's proposed support for bourgeois-democratic 
liberation movements, Roy urges support for "revolutionary mass action through the 
medium of a communist party of the proletarians" (thesis 10).
Thus a 'strategic' dispute over whom to support arises from, and is argued in 
terms of, a more fundamental difference. That is one over whether the East's 
incorporation into capitalism and world history as the colonial question (through 
imperialism) implies that struggle for national independence is the main form of 
subjectivity of the East; or whether there exist, in the East as in the West, various - and 
competing - political projects.
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The Colonial Question as a National Question
The two draft theses were debated in the Colonial Commission,where Roy urged 
amendment to Lenin's theses. In the event, it was Roy's theses which were 
dramatically altered by the Commission, in line with the suggestions and objections of 
Lenin. ^
The alterations to Roy's draft theses took the form, primarily, of excisions. The 
passages excised were precisely those which rejected nationalism, identifying it 
exclusively with the movement of the middle class, and counterposing to it an 
'economic', non-nationalist consciousness of the revolutionary movement. The
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sentence quoted earlier, rejecting any suggestion that Comintern support for the 
revolutionary inovement in the colonies was 'tantamount to the former's upholding the 
doctrine of nationalism', was cut. So were the first few sentences of thesis 7, which 
identified the revolutionary movement as 'essentially an economic struggle', at odds 
with the nationalist struggle of the middle class. Also excised was the claim in the same 
thesis that the nationalism of the bourgeois movement did not express the 'sentiments 
and aspirations' of the general population. Thesis 10, which argued the existence of 
two antithetical movements, embodying different forms of consciousness, was cut 
altogether, as was thesis 11.
The effect of these cuts was not to efface Roy's assertion of the existence of two 
movements in the colonies, but to undermine and alter the basis upon which this 
distinction was made.
Roy, as we have seen, couched his argument in terms of two 'equations'. On the 
one hand, there was a bourgeois democratic movement, inspired by nationalism, 
seeking nationhood ; on the other hand, a revolutionary movement, inspired by class 
interests and consciousness, seeking something in excess of mere independence. 
Elimination of negative references to nationalism, of exclusive identification of 
nationalism with the bourgeois movement, and of identification of the revolutionary 
movement with purely 'economic' motives, had the effect of implicitly introducing 
nationalism into both sides of the equation. It was no longer presented as a 
'diversionary' consciousness, and was no longer described as the preserve of the 
middle class alone.
In their amended form, Roy's theses were recommended for adoption by the 
Congress, as 'Supplementary Theses' to those drafted by Lenin. Yielding to the 
changes, Roy presented and defended his theses on the floor of Congress. He 
continued to argue that there were two movements, and that the mass movement should 
be supported in preference to that of the middle class.^O However in doing so, he also 
revealed how much ground he had conceded :
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Naturally a revolution by these masses would not at the first stage be a 
communist revolution, naturally revolutionary nationalism will play a role 
in the first stage. But in any event this revolutionary nationalism too will 
lead to the collapse of European imperialism, which is of enormous 
significance to the European proletariat.^
Nationalism is now a motivating factor in the 'mass', 'revolutionary' movement, 
and not only in the middle class movement. The recognition of this is somewhat 
reluctant -nationalism will play only a 'role', and though hardly respectable in itself, 
'in any event', it 'too' will hasten the downfall of imperialism - but it is made.
Lenin's draft theses were also modified, albeit far less drastically. The major 
change was to substitute the term 'national revolutionary' for the term 'bourgeois - 
democratic' in the final theses. Lenin explained why in his speech to the Congress, and 
we may be excused for a lengthy quotation :
...objections were raised [in the Commission] that, if we say 'bourgeois- 
democratic', we lose the distinction between the reformist and the 
revolutionary movement which has become quite clear in the backward 
countries and the colonies recently... A certain understanding has emerged 
between the bourgeoisie of the exploiting countries and that of the colonies, 
so that very often, even perhaps in most cases, the bourgeoisie of the 
oppressed countries, although they also support national movements, 
nevertheless fight against all revolutionary movements and revolutionary 
classes with a certain degree of agreement with the imperialist bourgeoisie, 
that is to say together with it. This was completely proven in the 
Commission, and we believed that the only correct thing would be to take 
this difference into consideration and to replace the words 'bourgeois 
democratic' almost everywhere with the expression 'national 
revolutionary'. The point about this is that as communists we will only 
support the bourgeois freedom movements in the colonial countries if these 
movements are really revolutionary and if their representatives are not 
opposed to us training and organising the peasantry in a revolutionary
w a y .2 2
This is not a capitulation to Roy, for the distinction is not between a bourgeois 
movement which is 'only' nationalist and a mass movement which is revolutionary.
Rather, Lenin introduces a distinction between two types of (still) bourgeois- 
democratic movements. One cooperates with imperialism to an extent, against the 
revolutionary classes ; the other is genuinely 'revolutionary', for it is consistently 
nationalist,and allows secondary forms of struggle and consciousness to be organised 
and promoted.
Lenin recognises that there are different types of nationalist movements and 
parties in the East, some of which are willing to compromise pursuit of the nationalist 
goal by reaching an 'understanding' with imperialism. Further, just as in his draft 
theses he recognised the existence of struggles other than the purely nationalist 
struggle, so Lenin is now willing to judge the 'militancy' and supportability of 
nationalist movements in the colonial countries by the extent to which they allow such 
struggles to flourish. The question, however, is still under what conditions to support 
bourgeois nationalism - the gap, even with Roy's theses as amended, is not 
significantly bridged. Nevertheless, inasmuch as it allows that some nationalist 
movements may u q i be deserving of the support of communists - and provides some 
criteria by which this may be judged - the amendment is a significant one.
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New Questions
Most commentators on the Roy-Lenin debate have observed that although the 
Comintern adopted Roy's theses as 'Supplementary Theses', these contradicted rather 
than supplemented Lenin's views. We have suggested further that the amendments to 
Roy's draft theses changed the nature of the dispute. With Roy conceding that national 
liberation was the primary project in the colonies, and that it could not be detached 
from nationalism as the consciousness informing it, the colonial question had become a 
national question within Marxism. Henceforward all other issues and struggles in the 
colonies would be examined and assessed in terms of their relation to the national 
struggle.
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The colonial question did not figure prominently at the Third Congress in 1921, 
but at the Fourth Congress in 1922 there was extensive discussion of the colonial 
question, and lengthy 'Theses on the Eastern Question' were adopted.
These "Theses" were more detailed than those drafted by Lenin and adopted two 
years earlier, and they made frequent reference to the experience gained in those two 
years. There was, however, considerable continuity between the two documents. The 
'Theses on the Eastern Question' described the "demand for national and economic 
independence advanced by national movements in the colonies" as "express[ing] the 
need of bourgeois development in these countries", but added that "The objective tasks 
of the colonial revolution go beyond the limits of bourgeois democracy if only because 
a decisive victory for this revolution is incompatible with the rule of world 
capitalism".^ These Theses also answered a question left unanswered by Lenin in his 
earlier writings, namely whether the impact of imperialism in the colonies was to 
promote or to retard capitalist development there. That a certain level of capitalist 
development had occurred in the colonies was acknowledged, but it was declared that 
there were limits to this process -"The progress of indigenous productive forces in the 
colonies...comes into irreconcilable conflict with the interests of world imperialism, for 
the essence of imperialism consists in exploiting the different stages of development of 
the productive forces in the different areas of world economy to gain monopoly super­
profits".^
A difficulty not anticipated by Lenin in 1920 was dealt with. Radek formulated 
this difficulty succinctly:
Our theses stated that the exploited East must and will fight against 
international capitalism, and that for this reason we ought to assist it. Now, 
we find at the head of the oriental national movements neither Communists 
nor even bourgeois revolutionaries, but for the most part representatives of 
the decayed feudal cliques belonging to the military and bureaucratic 
classes. This fact brings our aid to the Eastern peoples into contradiction 
with the question of our attitude towards the ruling elements".^
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Radek could have added that even newly installed nationalist governments in the 
East which were in some sense 'bourgeois-democratic', or at least committed to 
'modernization', such as the Kemalist regime in Turkey, were engaged in persecuting 
communists. The theses adopted by the Fourth Congress addressed this 'contradiction' 
as follows :
Taking full cognizance of the fact that those who represent the national will 
to state independence may, because of the variety of historical 
circumstances, be themselves of the most varied kind, the Communist 
International supports every national revolutionary movement against 
imperialism.26 (emphasis added).
At the same time these Theses declared that nationalist movements which were 
not forward-looking would fail, as the success of any nationalist movement depended 
upon "the extent to which such a nationalist movement is able to break with the 
reactionary feudal elements and to win over the broad working masses to its 
cause...".22 Communists in the colonies were assigned the task of reinforcing 
progressive elements in the national movement, a task best achieved by organising and 
mobilizing the working class and peasantry .
The colonial question also figured prominently at the Fifth Congress of the 
Comintern, held in mid-1924. Manuilsky delivered the main report on 'the national and 
colonial question'. He reiterated the themes of previous Congresses, calling upon 
communists to support bourgeois-led nationalist movements, whilst being wary of 
losing their independent identity in such movements. The position put forward by Roy- 
that though national liberation movements should be supported, this should be done 
recognising that they were no longer being led by the bourgeoisie, since that class was 
ready to 'make deals' with imperialism - was not accepted. The Congress called upon 
the Comintern to seek to "win the revolutionary movements of liberation...as allies of 
the revolutionary proletariat of the capitalist countries", for which purpose "further 
development of direct links between the [Comintern] Executive and the national 
liberation movements of the East" was declared to be necessary.2**
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The Sixth Congress of the Comintern, held in 1928, declared that world 
capitalism was stricken by a deep crisis, and that the resulting polarization of forces 
was 'inexorably' leading to a 'revolutionary crisis'. Basing itself upon this analysis, 
the Congress declared the necessity for adopting more aggressive tactics. 
Acccordingly, communists were instructed to sharpen their struggle against social 
democracy, and to "shift the emphasis decisively to the united front from below".29 
This trend towards 'leftist' positions was reflected also in the ’Theses on the 
Revolutionary Movement in the Colonial and Semi-Colonial Countries' which were 
adopted by the Congress. These declared that "the national bourgeoisie are not 
significant as a force in the struggle against imperialism", and that it was therefore 
necessary for communist parties in the colonies to direct their efforts to 'unmasking' 
the nationalist pretensions of parties such as, in India, the Indian National Congress.30
The implication of these Theses was that national liberation in the colonies would 
be achieved under the leadership of communists, others allegedly having abdicated 
from the struggle. This conclusion, however, was not drawn explicitly, and the 
'leftism' of the 'Theses on the Revolutionary Movement' was qualified in a number of 
important areas.31 Such qualifications and such caution were soon to be abandoned. 
The Tenth Plenum of the ECCI, meeting in July 1929, declared social democracy to be 
the left-wing of fascism, and described the native bourgeoisie of the colonies as 
outrightly 'counter-revolutionary'.32 The Comintern now began to promote a strategy 
predicated upon the belief that national liberation in the colonies would be achieved not 
by nationalists, or even nationalists in alliance with communists, but rather under the 
exclusive leadership of communist parties. With that went the belief that such a 
'nationalist' revolution would more-or-less coalesce with the establishment of a soviet 
dictatorship in the colonies.
In 1935 the Seventh Congress of the Comintern endorsed yet another change of 
analysis and strategy. The positions adopted at the Sixth Congress were abandoned 
(though not repudiated) and the creation of a 'united front' was declared to be the
immediate and most important task of communists in Europe. In the East the 'united 
anti-imperialist front' was urged upon communists, a strategy predicated on the view 
that the national bourgeoisie and nationalist organisations in the East were potential or 
real opponents of imperialism, and therefore that it was necessary for communist 
parties to seek close alliance with them.33
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Conclusion
The Second Congress of the Comintern was a decisive event for Marxist 
treatments of the colonial question. Amidst all the subsequent twists and turns in 
Comintern policy on the colonial question which followed, two 'principles' established 
at the Second Congress remained constant and mostly unchallenged. The first was that 
the colonial question came to be regarded, above all else, as a national question. 
Second, it was accepted at all future Congresses of the Comintern, with the partial 
exception of the Sixth Congress, that in pursuit of the goal of national independence 
communist parties would have to support and even ally themselves with non­
communist movements and organizations.
To characterise the outcome of the Roy-Lenin debate in this way is not to suggest 
that theoretical questions had been 'resolved', and that all that was left was to 'apply' 
these. Rather, certain premises had been established. These premises opened a whole 
new range of questions, some of which, as we have seen, were to be addressed by 
future Congresses of the Comintern.
A series of questions arose for communist parties in the colonies. The Second 
Congress had declared that national liberation was the main project in the colonies. It 
had instructed communists - those committed to achieving socialism through class 
struggle - to support this goal. It had not, however, defined the relationship between 
these two forms of mobilization and these two goals. Communists in the colonial 
countries had first to determine whether the nationalist movements in their country
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were 'national revolutionary'. If so, they had to decide whether this meant that then- 
own role was a purely supportive and, therefore, secondary one. If on the other hand 
existing nationalist movements were found to be in some way inadequate to their task, 
what implications did this have for the type of support extended and the form of 
alliance sought, if it was to be sought at all ? In both instances, what implications did 
the form of the nationalist struggle in class terms have for its content? That is, if 
national liberation could be achieved by bourgeois-democratic parties, did it follow that 
the independent nation which emerged would be a bourgeois state ? If the working 
class and communists had a more important role to play, did that imply that national 
liberation would take the form of a 'democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants' ?
In short, what was the relationship between class struggle and nationalist 
struggle in the colonies ? How was the pursuit of national independence connected to 
the pursuit of socialism ?
How these and other questions were taken up for, and in, one particular colonial 
country - India - forms the subject of the following chapters.
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M.N. Roy and Indian Nationalism: Marxism as 
Science, Pedagogy and Organisation
Following his prominent role at the Second Congress, Roy was, by his account, 
made a co-opted member of the powerful 'Small Bureau' of the ECC1, as well as a 
member of the newly formed Central Asiatic Bureau of the Comintern. 1 In 1922 he 
was made a candidate member of the ECCI, and in 1924 a full member, as well as a 
candidate member of the ECCI Presidium.^ For the first half of 1927 Roy was in 
China, in the important role of Comintern emissary, at a crucial period in the history of 
the Chinese revolution.^
At the same time, from abroad, with the authority of his prominent role in the 
Comintern behind him (as well as its resources), Roy was to play a pivotal role in the 
arrival and development of Marxism in India. In October 1920, with six others, Roy 
founded a 'Communist Party of India' - in Tashkent. Although this party never had 
any existence in India, and was little more than a name even abroad, its very name was 
significant, symbolizing the arrival of Marxism in India. In its name and in his own, 
Roy was soon corresponding with, advising and occasionally financing his socialist 
contacts in India, as well as addressing and advising the nationalist movement. 
Through his activities and writings - particularly the Marxist fortnightly which he 
established and edited, The Vanguard of Indian Independence 4- Roy presented a 
Marxist analysis of Indian politics, and prescriptions based upon this. These drew 
from the decisions of the Second Comintern Congress, and also sought to answer 
some of the questions that Congress had left unanswered, or had newly posed.
Roy in Transition
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In 1921, soon after the Second Congress of the Comintern, Roy began to 
prepare "a detailed report about the structure of the national economy and the class 
relations of contemporary India".^ The report was intended, by Roy's later account, to 
continue his debate with Lenin, and "to convince Lenin of the correctness of my 
view".6 In fact, as we shall see, Roy was not so much continuing a debate which he 
had all but conceded, but rather seeking to reinterpret the conclusions which could be 
drawn from it. With encouragement from Lenin, Roy elaborated this report into a 
book, India in Transition , published in Berlin in 19227
The 'transition' which the title refers to is the transition to capitalism, which 
forms the major theme of the book. Whereas in his draft theses Roy made little 
reference to a native capitalism in the colonies, the rapid development of capitalism in 
India is a central thesis of India in Transition , supported by a wealth of - by Roy's 
own later admission - often exaggerated and dubious statistics.^
The British, Roy argues, in an argument familiar to many Indian nationalists of 
the late nineteenth and twentieth century, held back the development of capitalism in 
India, a development which would have otherwise 'naturally' occurred. The influx of 
British manufactures, and the economic policies of the British government, retarded 
this natural evolution. Indian society changed, as India was brought under the sway of 
capitalist exploitation, but capitalist production did not develop.^ Although this state of 
affairs lasted for a full century and a half, it was but a 'temporary' aberration. For "the 
hand of history cannot be held back forever..." (p.63) and in the last decades of 
the nineteenth century the symptoms of capitalist development became unmistakeable. 
Roy points to the interrelated development of industry, large urban centres,and an 
Indian bourgeoisie. The latter, a product of capitalist development, facilitated that 
development:
British capital accomplished the destructive part of the industrial revolution
in India, but prevented the constructive phase of it till, under its own
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regime, the native bourgeoisie rose to build the modem India on the mins 
of the old ...(p.l 12).
Developing gradually in the last decades of the nineteenth century, the native 
bourgeoisie expanded rapidly in size and importance during World War One :
The war opened up a new era for the Indian bourgeoisie... The 
overwhelming competition of the imperial capital was suddenly removed 
and Indian capital was presented with a free field of development (p.31).
Gaining in strength and influence, this bourgeoisie chafed at the restrictions and 
limits posed to its growth by British rule. Nationalist sentiment and a nationalist 
movement began to develop - "The political nationalism of modem India expresses the 
political ideology and aspiration of a youthful bourgeoisie which has risen in spite of 
innumerable obstacles"(p.l56). This desire for an independent nation represents the 
bourgeoisie's desire for conditions propitious to a free and untrammelled growth of 
capitalism in India, and thus for conditions conducive to its own development - "The 
opportunity to develop as an economically powerful class was what the Indian 
bourgeoisie was striving after : their political movement was a struggle to conquer this 
right" (p.40).
Motivated by nationalism, this youthful and weak bourgeoisie, engaged in a 
struggle against an immensely superior adversary, must enlist the support of the 
masses. But if the Indian bourgeoisie and the masses share a common interest in the 
overthrow of the British, they are also divided - "these two factors [bourgeoisie and 
masses] are divided by class interest and this class differentiation is growing and is 
bound to grow wider in proportion to the further development of the bourgeoisie" 
(p.43).
How will this situation of commonality / contradiction come to be resolved, 
historically? Hitherto, Roy, in constantly invoking the spectre of history and its iron 
laws, has had in mind European history. The laws of history have already manifested
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themselves in Europe, where capitalist development and the birth of a bourgeoisie at 
once marked and promoted historical progress ; so too in India.
At this point, however, difference is invoked. The Indian bourgeoisie is not, in 
fact, the same as the seventeenth and eighteenth century European bourgeoisie, because 
of the very different context in which it has developed and acts :
The Indian national movement is not a struggle of the commercial-industrial 
middle-class against decrepit feudalism. The Indian bourgeoisie is not 
engaged in a class-struggle. The basis of the national movement is the 
rivalry of a weak and suppressed bourgeoisie against its immensely 
stronger imperialist prototype controlling the state power. To its great 
misfortune, the Indian middle-class was long ago deprived of its historic 
role of freeing the productive classes from the fetters of feudal bondage"
(p. 204).11
This specificity or peculiarity of the Indian bourgeoisie means, according to Roy, 
that the antagonism between the Indian bourgeoisie and British rule is not of the same 
order as that which existed between the European bourgeoisie and the feudal ruling 
classes - "The present fight of the Indian bourgeoisie cannot be, therefore, unrelenting. 
Its growth and prosperity are not necessarily conditional upon the total destruction of 
its present enemy" (p. 204). 12
There is, then, a possibility of compromise. Driven to fight imperialism in order 
to create the conditions for its own 'growth and prosperity', the bourgeoisie is 
compelled to seek to involve the proletariat and peasantry in the nationalist struggle. As 
they develop in confidence and organisation, however, the masses tend to overstep the 
bounds of a bourgeois national struggle. They begin to pursue national independence 
through class organisations and with class demands. At this point the bourgeoisie has 
an option - for if its relations with the masses are characterised by commonality as well 
as contradiction, its relation with imperialism is also not one of pure contradiction. 
Compromise with the British is possible.
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Which path will it choose? The answer lies, according to Roy, in the change in 
British policy during and since World War One. With the outbreak of that war, the 
British government made a number of concessions to the Indian bourgeoisie, seeking 
to enlist its support in the war effort. The most important of these was the appointment 
of the Indian Industrial Commission in 1916, with a brief to find the best ways 
(including forms of government assistance) to facilitate the industrial development of 
India ; and the imposition of a 3.5% duty on cotton imports to India, a long-standing 
demand of middle-class nationalists.
At the end of the war, with the Indian bourgeoisie at the head of a growing 
revolutionary movement, this policy was further extended, as a "means for divorcing 
the political ambition of the bourgeoisie from the spontaneous revolutionary upheaval 
among the masses", by "making clear to the bourgeoisie that it was no longer 
impossible for it to realize its ambitions under British rule" (p. 37 and p. 40). The 
Industrial Commission Report in 1918 met some of the bourgeoisie's demands for 
protection and assistance, while the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, enacted in the 
Government of India Act 1919, took a small step in the direction of representative 
government.
This strategy of wooing the Indian bourgeoisie, whilst successful during the 
war, was largely unsuccessful after it. The gains it made during the war whetted the 
appetite of the Indian bourgeoisie ; a new access of strength led to a flexing of muscles. 
Nevertheless, this change in British policy means that in moments of crisis for the 
Indian bourgeoisie - as class differentiation within the nationalist movement develops 
and the mass movement oversteps the limits imposed by the bourgeoisie - 
reconciliation with the British will seem the lesser evil.
India in Transition ends by predicting such a compromise :
It has been demonstrated on various occasions during the last three years,
that the mass movement cannot always be kept within the limit set
according to the convenience of the bourgeoisie... The inevitable
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consequence of ...[this] is the eventual divorce of the mass movement from 
bourgeois leadership. In that case, bourgeois nationalism will end in a 
compromise with Imperial supremacy, and the liberation of India will be 
left to the political movement of the workers and peasants, consciously 
organized and fighting on the grounds of class-struggle, (p. 240).
The ideas developed in India in Transition were to form the basis of Roy's 
'Report on the Eastern Question' to the Fourth Congress of the Comintern, at the end 
of 1922.13 in that report Roy distinguished between three kinds of colonial countries - 
those "where primitive conditions still prevail", and where there is neither a 
bourgeoisie nor a proletariat; those where some capitalist development had taken place, 
but "where feudalism is still the backbone of society" ; and those where "a native 
capitalism has grown, leading to the rise of a bourgeoisie with a developed class 
consciousness, and its counterpart, the proletariat...".^
In those colonial countries in which bourgeois nationalist movements had arisen 
or were developing, they were to be regarded - in line with the 'Theses' of Second 
Congress - as 'objectively revolutionary', and therefore deserving of support. It had to 
be kept in mind, however, that the colonial bourgeoisie was engaged in a struggle 
against another bourgeoisie. Roy writes (echoing India in Tranisition ), "Instead of 
being a class war, it is an internecine war, so to say, and as such contains the elements 
of compromise".^
According to Roy's report this fact, not so apparent two years earlier, at the time 
of the Second Congress, has since emerged more clearly. Roy cites the examples of 
India and Egypt, where the revolutionary nationalist movement "has been brought to a 
standstill by the timidity, the hesitation of the bourgeoisie...".^
One must therefore recognise that the national liberation struggle in the latter 
types of colonies "is not going to be successful under the leadership of the 
bourgeoisie" ; "there comes a time when these people are bound to betray the 
movement and become a counter-revolutionary force". ^  Hence the communist parties 
which have been established in the East, though admittedly at present no more than
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'nuclei', are vitally important after all. For "they are based on the objectively most 
revolutionary factor, viz the peasants and workers", and "they will assume the 
leadership of the national revolutionary struggle when it is deserted and betrayed by the
bourgeoisie ".18
The views expressed in Roy's 'Report' found some reflection in the 'Theses on
the Eastern Question' adopted by the Fourth Comintern Congress, which declared that
a
leadership of the anti-imperialist struggle "is no longer solely in the h^nds of feudal 
elements and the national bourgeoisie who is preparing to compromise with 
imperialism". 19 However, as we saw in the previous chapter, the Congress's Theses 
also departed from the spirit of Roy's 'Report', by extending communist support to all 
nationalist movements in the colonies, and by assigning communist parties in the 
colonies a more modest role than that urged by Roy.^O The first Congress of the 
Comintern to recognise an ebb in the revolutionary tide in Europe could not adopt such 
a relatively 'leftist' posture on the colonial question, preferring to urge the formation of 
a 'United Anti-Imperialist Front' in the colonies, as the counterpart to the United Front 
slogan which it raised for Europe.
In some respects the analysis developed in India in Transition , and contained in 
Roy's 'Report' to the Fourth Congress, was similar to that which Roy put forward in 
his 'Draft Theses' to the Second Congress. In both cases, the conclusion to be drawn 
was that the workers and peasants, and the communist party, would emerge as the 
prime historical actors in the East. The international communist movement was 
therefore urged to pay maximum attention to their development. The differences 
between the earlier and the later position were, however, considerable. By 1922, Roy 
was developing and defending his amended theses (i.e., his theses as substantially 
amended by Lenin and then adopted by the Second Congress). He now accepted 
national independence as the main political project in the East, and accepted that it was 
vital - rather than incidental - to workers and peasants in the colonies. The bourgeois- 
democratic nationalist movement also was not condemned out of hand - even if
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ultimately it would prove counter-revolutionary, it had to be supported and brought 
into alliance with revolutionary forces until its 'objectively revolutionary' potential had 
been exhausted.
Thus between 1920 and 1922 Roy advanced similar conclusions on the basis of 
a radically changed process of argument. In his draft theses the bourgeois nationalist 
movement was found to be unsupportable because it was nationalist; now it was 
condemned because it was declared to be inconsistently and irresolutely nationalist. 
The central role to be played by workers and peasants was now argued not on the 
grounds that they were only incidentally pursuing national independence, but rather 
because it was claimed that only they were capable of consistently and successfully 
struggling for national liberation.
What had happened, in India in Transition and in his 'Report' to the Fourth 
Congress, was that Roy had accepted the importance of the nationalist struggle in the 
colonies (as he was forcedto do at the Second Congress). He had even accepted its 
essentially 'bourgeois-democratic' nature. But he detached this project from the 
bourgeoisie and bourgeois forms of struggle. As he put it at the Comintern's Fifth 
Congress, in 1924, "The Communist International must support national-liberation 
movements, but for practical purposes it must find out what class is leading them".21 
This class, Roy declared at the Fifth Congress as at the Fourth, was in most cases the 
working class, in alliance with the peasantry. 'Bourgeois nationalism', Roy found, 
was a project which would be fulfilled by the 'objectively revolutionary' classes of 
India, which would combine the pursuit of national independence with class struggle 
around economic and social demands.
Corresponding to this change in the content of analysis was a change in the 
method of enquiry. In India in Transiton Roy wrote :
Whether nationalist pre-occupations - the historic necessity for political 
independence of the Indian people - will be sufficient for keeping the class 
struggle in the background indefinitely, is to be judged by the actual class
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differentiation in the present social organism and by the possibility of this 
differentiation growing wider, (p.129)
The relation between 'nationalist pre-occupations' and 'class struggles' - and 
therefore the questions of which classes are capable of leading the nationalist struggle 
to a successful conclusion, and what form that independence might take - were now 
something to be studied. It was not on a priori grounds that the bourgeoisie and 
bourgeois nationalism were denounced, by postulating two forms of subjectivity and 
deducing results from that (as in the draft thesis) - but rather on the basis of an 
empirical demonstration that they were inadequate to their historical task.
M.N Roy and Indian Nationalism
After India in Transition Roy began to comment more regularly on Indian 
politics, in the course of which he developed further and applied this analysis and this 
method of enquiry. In these writings^ Roy sought to trace the actual process of 
'differentiation' along class lines within the Indian nationalist movement, the 
consequent 'clarification' of class interests, and the tendency of the Indian bourgeoisie 
towards compromise with imperialism.
Thus, for example, in June 1922, after the Ahmedabad Congress of the Indian 
National Congress failed to respond to urgings to adopt a radical programme, Roy 
adjudged that "disintegration and readjustment are the outstanding features of the 
[nationalist] movement today".23 The period during which various classes could 
collaborate in anti-British struggles with the illusion that there were no divisions within 
the nationalist camp was fast coming to an end.^4
Some months after Gandhi suspended the Non-Cooperation movement due to the 
Chauri-Chaura incident, and this decision had been ratified by the Congress Working 
Committee's Bardoli Resolution of February 1922, Roy wrote that "A reshuffling of 
forces" and a "steady process of clarification" are "the most outstanding feature of our
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movement at the present moment".25 This process of class differentiation and 
clarification consisted of competition for the leadership of Congress between the lower 
middle-class, which initiated Non-Cooperation but, frightened by the release of mass 
energy and militancy it provoked, retreated into a do-nothing orthodoxy and militant 
rhetoric ; and the upper middle class, which sought to carry on the struggle by 
predominantly constitutional means, offering the British cooperation in return for 
concessions.-^^
Roy interpreted the rise of the Swaraj Party as a 'faction' within the Congress a 
demonstration of, and further step in, this process of class differentiation within the 
nationalist movement. The upper middle class, organising itself into the Swaraj Party, 
sought to stand candidates for the councils established by the Montagu-Chelmsford 
reforms, thereby steering the nationalist movement into a return to more peaceful and 
conciliatory means of 'struggle'. The lower middle class, however, having abandoned 
Non-Cooperation in fact, could not rest content with such a visible retreat - it sought to 
present at least a show of non-cooperation and militancy. "The whole controversy of 
Pro-change vs. No-change", editorialized \heVanguard , "was based upon this class
conflict".27
The Vanguard followed the rise in fortunes of the Swaraj Party, characterising 
this as the victory of the upper middle class within the nationalist movement.28 The 
Swaraj Party itself, however, was seen to 'differentiate', between a 'middle class' 
membership and a bourgeois leadership. This process, the Masses of India predicted 
in early 1926, would inevitably result in a split, thus marking "the completion in the 
process of class differentiation which has been the background of Indian politics ever 
since the hectic davs of 1920".29 (emphasis added).
The above is but a limited selection of the way in which a bewildering anray of 
often ill-defined classes flit on and off Roy's stage, in analyses which seek to trace and 
establish his contention that class differences within the nationalist movement are 
asserting themselves, and that the bourgeoisie is tending towards a compromise with
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the British. Such an analysis is superficially persuasive, for the symmetrical 
relationship it establishes between classes and class fractions and different policies and 
organisational forms conveys an impression of precision and exactitude. In passing we 
may note, however, that in this case such 'exactitude' is an indication of shallowness.
In tracing these developments and trends, Roy becomes increasingly sceptical in 
his assessment of the nationalist potential of the Indian bourgeoisie. This reaches its 
peak in his The Future o f Indian Politics , published in 1926, where Roy outlined 
what would later come to be described and denounced as the 'decolonisation theory', 
and would form an important part of the retrospective indictment of him following his 
expulsion from the Comintern.
The tendency towards compromise traced in earlier writings is here seen as 
having reached completion. Indian Politics begins with the statement, "Bourgeois 
Nationalism in India has ended in a complete compromise with imperialism, as was 
predicted years ago by those who judged the situation with Marxian realism".30
To the factors which tended towards compromise earlier -the Indian 
bourgeoisie's fear of mass action, and the willingness of the imperialists to grant 
concessions in order to split the nationalist movement - another has been added. This is 
an increasing convergence between the economic interests of imperialism and those of 
the Indian bourgeoisie - the creation of a structural link between the two, stronger even 
than class sympathy and a shared fear of the masses.
The old method of imperialist exploitation ceased to be viable, according to Roy, 
with the decline in India's massive export surplus, and (relatedly) the penetration of the 
Indian market by countries other than Britain. British manufactures could no longer be 
dumped on India and paid for out of the export surplus. The nature of the colonial 
relationship therefore began to change. The initial steps in this change were those 
discussed in India in Transition.. A turning point came in late 1922, with the Report of 
the Fiscal Commission, which recommended the abolition of the Excise duty on the
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Indian cotton industry, and recommended a policy of discriminating protection to 
promote the growth of Indian industry. The former recommendation was adopted, and 
the Tariff Board was established in mid-1923 to recommend protective duties.
These measures marked an attempt to promote, rather than hinder, the 
industrialization of India. As such they signified a reconstitution of the colonial 
relationship, one which would offer more efficacious means of imperialist exploitation. 
For industrialization would expand the Indian market, and would also open the 
possibility of super-profits from British investment in India :
Industrialization of a country with such enormous resources of raw 
material, cheap labour and potentially unlimited markets... will open up for 
British capital new fields guaranteeing the possibility of almost fabulous 
accumulation. British capital invested in India will at the same time extend 
the market for the production of home industries.^ 1
This new policy also had the effect of meeting the 'cardinal demands' of the 
Indian bourgeoisie. British rule no longer constituted a fetter to the growth of the 
Indian bourgeoise, and this lesson was quickly assimilated - "the bourgeoisie have 
been convinced that their economic development is possible within the framework of 
imperialism".^ With this convergence of interests, a compromise was effected, with 
the bourgeoisie joining the colonial masters in the exploitation of India's masses ; old 
foes became partners.
The positions which Roy held and advanced in the nineteen-twenties have 
commonly been seen as somewhat 'ultra-leftist', and, in comparison to Lenin at least, 
that judgement holds true. However the nature of Roy's leftism changed in the course 
of the decade. After the Second Congress his leftism lay, not in his rejection of 
nationalism, but in his contention that the Indian bourgeoisie could not lead a 
successful nationalist movement, and that such a movement could only be led to 
victory by workers and peasants. For a brief period it lay in the related contention - one 
abandoned by Roy around 1923, in response to developments in India as well as his
failure to persuade the Comintern of this view - that such a national revolution, because 
led by workers and peasants, would 'telescope' into a near-socialist revolution.33
Through such arguments, Roy 'solved' what was for him a serious problem 
arising out of the decisions of the Second Congress - the implication conceivably 
arising out of these decisions, that communist parties and the class struggle would have 
to play a supportive and secondary role in the colonies until the bourgeois national- 
democratic revolution had been completed. However Roy's analysis was not 
developed simply to answer an abstract problem ; he also sought to intervene in the 
politics he was interpreting. Roy’s analysis of Indian nationalism, sketched above, 
was itself intended as an intervention in Indian politics. This analysis also formed the 
basis for other interventions. Inasmuch as Roy now accepted that national liberation 
was the primary goal in the colonies, it followed that Marxism could not simply bypass 
or ignore the existing nationalist movement, whatever its inadequacies, nor treat it as a 
foe. It was necessary to engage with this movement, whose goal had been accepted as 
a historically necessary stage in the ultimate goal of Marxism.
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Marxism as Science and Pedagogy
Marxismus 'engagement' with the Indian nationalist movement initially occurs 
through Roy, and it takes the form of Marxism addressing the nationalist movement. 
This address consisted of manifestoes and programmes sent to the Indian National 
Congress (INC); private and open letters to figures in the nationalist movement; and a 
newspaper,77ze Vanguard , which offered nationalists and leftists an analysis of the 
nationalist movement.34 in all cases the aim is to advise, exhort and guide - to urge the 
adoption of a programme, or of a particular method of struggle, or organisational form, 
and so on. Roy says of his Political Letters , "The object of these letters was in some 
cases to point out the mistakes of the persons to whom they were addressed, in others 
to criticize some school of socio-political thought, in others again to indicate the broad
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outlines of our programme and tactics".3 5 The comment applies to most of his 
writings.
Roy seeks, then, to "open the eyes" of the nationalist movement,36 or at least 
those elements of it which are likely to be receptive. Or, as he puts it in his 'Preface' to 
The Future of Indian Politics :
The object of this book is to show a way to the revolutionary Nationalist 
forces ; to point out the causes of the decline of bourgeois Nationalism ; to 
expose the tendency of compromise underneath the verbal radicalism of the 
upper middle class ; to indicate the historic necessity for the fight for 
freedom, and to enunciate in general the programme and organisational 
form the fight is bound to assume in its coming phases.37
To 'open the eyes', 'show a way', 'point out', 'indicate' and 'enunciate' - this 
is the language of pedagogy. Roy analyses and criticizes the nationalist movement in 
order to teach it -to teach it strategy, programme and method. Thus one aspect of 
Marxism's engagement with the Indian nationalist movement is that it assumes the role 
of pedagogue to the nationalist movement.
Roy does not only offer the nationalist movement conclusions ; he offers them 
the method by which they were reached, namely, Marxism.
Thus in the "Introduction" to One Year of Non-Cooperation : From Ahmedabad 
to Gaya , Roy declares that Non-Cooperation is dead, as the reprinted articles in the 
collection had predicted. This is pointed out not in order to demonstrate 'individual 
wisdom', Roy adds, but rather, "only with the object of demonstrating the potentiality 
of a certain method of socio-political reasoning which we have always sought to 
introduce into the Indian movement".38 In introducing Political Letters , Roy writes 
that, "These letters will once more prove the potency of a certain method of reading 
history..." .39 Similarly the Vanguard* in proclaiming that the decisions of the Delhi 
Conference of the INC effectively spell the end of Non-Cooperation, emphasises its 
purpose - "What we want to impress upon the revolutionary elements of contemporary
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Indian society is the soundness of the social philosophy, economic theories and 
political principles we profess."40
This task is all the more necessary, Roy writes, because "the most outstanding 
feature of the the Indian national movement has been its lack of theoretical 
foundation".41 This is a major weakness, as "There must be a socio-political 
philosophy behind this great movement".42
Marxism is to be that philosophy. The nationalist movement is therefore to be 
taught, not only certain courses of action, strategies, programmes and so on - but what 
underlies all these, Marxism itself. This pedagogical task has a certain urgency, 
because the Non-Cooperation movement, and the INC, have hitherto been led by 
'subjectivism' or 'Gandhism'. The proponents of this theory or philosophy are guided 
by "metaphysical abstraction’^  and practise an increasingly ineffective "sentimental 
agitation"445 consisting of little more than "beautiful idealism and high rhetorics'^, 
based upon a programme full of "sentimental trimmings" and "abstract idealism".46
The greatest - and most damaging - shortcoming of subjectivism is that it does 
not understand history as an inescapable process, and therefore imagines itself free 
from the constraints of history. We have already encountered Roy's evolutionist - and 
triumphalist- conception of history as a relentless progress in a single direction, "a 
continual process of evolution determined by a uniform law".47 Propelling that 
evolution are economic development and the class forces it generates. The 'imperious 
law of economic determinism', a term frequently employed by Roy, consists in the fact 
"that human development all over the globe follows a uniform line, modified but 
secondarily by local conditions ; that social evolution and political awakening are 
determined by the stage of economic development of a particular people". 
Consequently, "Every political movement is fundamentally a socio-economic 
struggle", and "class antagonism [lies] behind all political movements".48
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The weakness of subjectivism lies in its failure to recognise this, a failure which 
had catastrophic results for the Non-Cooperation movement. For instead of 
recognising that this movement "should be directed in consonance with the dictates of 
imperious economic laws", its leaders "pretended to have created the situation and 
imagined personalities to be greater than objective forces".^ Failing to recognize this 
'imperious law', the leaders of Non-Cooperation "acted contrary to it", and "hence 
their defeat".50
Effective political action lies precisely in subordinating oneself to the economic 
laws which govern history :
The economic forces which are awakening themselves out of their age-long 
stagnation and apathy will assert themselves, and the leadership of the 
political movement must confirm (sic) to their imperious dictates... The 
greatness of the leader comes in where he can understand the forces behind 
him and can guide the movement in accordance with the natural trend of 
these forces.51
Thus effective political action must be based upon a recognition of history as an 
inexorable progress determined by economic forces generating class interests and 
conflicts; and upon a correct 'reading' of these economic forces, class interests and 
class conflicts. That is, effective political action, if it consists in subordinating oneself 
to economic forces and historical 'laws’, presupposes knowledge of those laws and 
forces.
Marxism provides that knowledge. It provides it because, unlike subjectivism 
and the like, it is a science - it is "the result of a scientific examination of the entire 
process of social evolution. The foundation of communism is positive social
science".52
Distilled from an examination of 'the entire process of social evolution', Marxism 
is, in effect - in very Hegelian fashion (unbeknownst, one suspects, to Roy) - the 
apprehension in consciousness of this evolution, of this movement of history.
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However, just as that historical movement is now seen in 'hard', materialist (and in 
Roy's case, reductionist) terms -not as the unfolding of Spirit, but of modes of 
production, technology and classes - so too the apprehension of that movement is a 
'hard' science , and not mere philosophy.
One aspect of Marxism's engagement with the Indian nationalist movement , 
then, is that it assumes the role of pedagogue to that movement. Another is that the 
assumption of this role rests upon a claim to being scientific. This claim, in turn, is 
linked with an evolutionist and economic determinist view of history. For it is only 
because history is governed by ironclad laws and regularities that scientific and 
predictive knowledge (i.e. knowledge of these laws) is possible.
If the nationalist movement accepts Marxism, or at least some of its analysis and 
prescriptions, the single most important practical lesson it will learn, according to Roy, 
is the importance of addressing itself to the material needs of the masses. For if 
political struggle consists of so many classes pursuing their material / economic 
interests, and if the involvement of the masses is a necessary element in any successful 
nationalist project, especially given the treacherous nature of the bourgeoisie, then the 
nationalist movement must seek to involve the masses by explicitely linking national 
liberation to their economic interests.
That the workers and peasants of India can only be drawn into nationalist 
struggle in a sustained fashion if national liberation promises to meet their economic 
needs is a claim we have encountered before. It is a theme which is hammered time and 
time again by Roy. As he states in his 'Manifesto' to the Ahmedabad Congress of the 
INC, for the masses, "It is the petty but imperative necessities of everyday life that egg 
them on to the fight".53 Or, as Evelyn Roy, his wife, was to put it, more crudely, 'the 
nationalism of the masses lies in their stomach".54
Thus Roy addresses the nationalist movement, urging it to address the economic 
needs of the masses. The specific form that this must take is the adoption of an
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economic programme behind which the masses can be rallied. In his very first address 
to the INC, his 'Manifesto' to the Ahmedabad Congress, Roy declared that "the 
formulation of a definite programme of economic and social reconstruction is the 
principal task of the 36th Congress".55
In his 'Manifesto' to the following Congress, at Gaya in December 1922, Roy 
offered the INC such a programme. His 'Programme of National Liberation and 
Reconstruction' sought to commit the INC to the pursuit of full independence, 
abolition of landlordism, reduction of peasant rents, nationalization of public utilities, a 
minimum wage and an eight hour day .56 This was neither meant to be a socialist 
programme nor was it presented as one. National liberation was at the heart of it, and it 
was addressed to a nationalist party - it was what theVanguard would later call a 
programme of "modified social democracy".57 The 'Action Programme' for realising 
this committed the INC to backing peasant and worker struggles around rents, land 
reforms, wages and working conditions.
Roy's Marxist pedagogy sought, then, to teach the nationalist movement that it 
was composed of so many classes, and that differences within the nationalist camp 
stemmed from this ; that workers and peasants had to constitute the backbone of the 
nationalist movement if it were to be successful; that they could only be enlisted in its 
ranks if their class-economic needs were addressed ; and that a programme 
incorporating these needs was therefore necessary. This advice was offered with the 
claim that it was not mere political opinion, but true knowledge, generated by a 
science, and that both the knowledge and the science were indispensable to the 
nationalist movement.
Neither of these features - Marxism as science and Marxism as pedagogy - were 
in any way unique to Roy's Marxism, and thus to Marxism as it first arrived in India. 
The claim that Marxism is a science has a distinguished lineage, going back to Engels, 
becoming systematically formulated in the Second International, and then, after a 
partial and temporary break under Lenin, becoming a fundamental tenet of the Third or
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Communist International's Marxism. For Marxism to adopt a pedagogic role is more 
unusual, but even here the difference between this and communists seeking to 'win 
over' Social-Democratic workers, partly on the basis of Marxism's superiority as a 
theory, might be seen as one only of degree. More generally, wherever Marxism has 
been the 'newcomer', encountering pre-existing ideologies and movements whose 
generating impulses or aims are not antithetical to it (and whose supporters might be 
wooed), it has - to varying degrees - adopted something of a pedagogical stance.
An obvious analogy which comes to mind is that of Plekhanov (also a 'founding 
father' of Marxism in his country) in his debate with the Populists. In Plekhanov one 
finds the same passionate denunciations of moralism and subjectivism, the same 
insistence that history is governed by "objective laws of development", and that 
Marxism provides scientific knowledge of these laws, a knowledge of "mathematical
exactness".^
The comparison immediately serves, however, to highlight a crucial difference. 
Even where he hopes to convert Populists to Marxism, Plekhanov does not entertain 
the prospect of subsuming the Populist project within the socialist one. The claims he 
makes regarding Marxism's 'scientific' appreciation of inexorable laws are made not 
only to demolish the theories, but also to refute the goals of the Populists ; to show 
their project to be a miasma. Realising only too well the tragic consequences of 
capitalist development in Russia, Plekhanov "tried to persuade both himself and his 
opponents that his choice was the only 'scientific' one, that, strictly speaking, he 
merely accepted the choice which had already been made by history itself''.59
Roy also counterposes Marxism to another theory or ideology. However he 
addresses a multi-class nationalist movement not with the expectation of converting it 
to revolutionary socialism, but in order to teach it, through Marxism, how to more 
effectively pursue its own goal. In the one case, Marxism, because science,'proves' 
the hopelessness of the Populist project; in the other, Marxism, because science, is 
indispensable to the nationalist project.^
Thus when Roy writes that he undertakes the "indispensably necessary" task of 
"demolish[ing] these ridiculous theories [Gandhism, subjectivism, moralism]", in 
order to prove to lower middle-class nationalists "that the ideals they cherish cannot be 
realised by the methods they follow" 61 ? it is in order (by implication) to offer them a 
theory which will achieve 'the ideals they cherish'.
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The Question of Organisation
Playing pedagogue to the nationalist movement was not, of course, the full extent 
of Roy's intervention in Indian politics. Indeed, if Marxism were to limit itself to this, 
it would mean that it had accepted a secondary role in the colonies - educating and 
organising the working class for the future struggle, but playing a supportive role (as 
theoretical adviser) to the nationalist movement in the present struggle. Alternatively, it 
could imply that Roy harboured the belief that a bourgeois nationalist movement could 
be transformed into a near-socialist one by pedagogic means alone, and that Marxism 
would come to play a leading role in India simply in this way.
In fact, neither was the case. Roy's theoretical efforts can be read, in part, as an 
effort directed precisely at denying the first possibility, which could conceivably follow 
from Lenin's theses on the colonial question at the Second Comintern Congress. The 
second possibility would have to rest upon a most un-Marxist disregard for the 
existence of different, and sometimes competing, class interests within the nationalist 
movement. It would, moreover, have been in direct contradiction with the content of 
Roy's pedagogy, which insisted upon the existence and significance of such interests 
and conflicts.
Roy was guilty of no such inconsistency. His addresses to the nationalist 
movement usually made it explicit that their message was in fact directed to a section of 
that movement, a section which by virtue of class position and interest was capable of 
accepting and acting upon it - that section which Roy characterized (this time with less
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consistency) either in political / subjective terms (’left Congressmen', 'revolutionary 
nationalists', ’sincere nationalists' etc.) or in economic / objective terms (the 'semi- 
proletarianized lower middle class' of the INC, or the 'lower middle class 
intellectuals', and so on). Even where he ostensibly sought to influence the INC as a 
whole, as when he submitted programmes before it, Roy had little expectation of their 
being adopted, valuing them instead for the effect that their popularization might have 
in rallying potentially receptive elements in the INC to a new, left-wing, party and 
politics.^
Thus Roy's pedagogy was only one aspect of his application of Marxism to 
Indian politics. Another was his attempt to persuade and guide his socialist and left- 
nationalist contacts in India into establishing political parties. Nor were these unrelated 
endeavours, the one pedagogic / theoretical, the other practical / political. Roy's 
pedagogy was at once the bearer of a message and the instrument for its realisation -in 
the form of a party.
For if Roy's addresses taught that all-round unity of the nationalist movement 
was impossible, since class interests would assert themselves, resulting in 
'differentiation' within its ranks, his appeals and programmes were also meant to 
promote that differentiation. They were meant to polarize the ranks of the existing 
nationalist movement, as some would find his message unacceptable, and others rally 
around it.
Simply to contribute to polarization within the ranks of the nationalist movement 
would, of course, be purely negative. Roy's aim was to contribute to differentiation 
within the nationalist movement and then reconstitute that part of it which was capable 
of national-revolutionary action. It would be reconstituted on a new basis - around a 
new programme and new methods of struggle. These would recognise the leading role 
which the working class and peasantry must play in the nationalist struggle ; inasmuch 
as this insight was derived from a new theory, such parties would be based upon that 
theory - Marxism.
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In 1923, Roy wrote :
the working class cannot be led in the anti-imperialist struggle with the 
programme of bourgeois nationalism, but on the other hand the anti­
imperialist struggle cannot be successful without the active participation of 
the working class. Therefore not only for its own economic emancipation, 
but even for the immediate object of national freedom, the organisation of 
an independent working-class party has become essential. 63
The central elements in Roy's analysis and pedagogy - the inevitability of 
'differentiation' within the nationalist movement, the bourgeoisie's inability to lead a 
successful nationalist struggle, and thus the need to mobilize the masses for it - lead 
directly to the question of organisation. A new programme and method of struggle are 
required, underpinned by a new theory - and these needs can only be satisfied in and 
through a political party .
All of this would be unremarkable if Roy were simply proposing the founding of 
a communist party ; for no Marxist could do otherwise. However Roy sought to give 
his emphasis on the necessary connection between the nationalist struggle and the class 
struggle organisational embodiment or expression ; and for this purpose, not a 
communist party, but a 'revolutionary nationalist' party was required.
In 1922, thtVanguard proposed the founding of a new party in India, a "political 
party of the masses based upon the principle of class interest and with a programme 
advocating mass action for carrying forward the struggle for national liberation".^ In 
late 1922 Roy proposed a name for this party. 'The People's Party' he suggested, 
should be a party primarily of workers and peasants, whose "political direction" 
should be controlled by communists, for whom it would provide a "legal apparatus", 
and through which they could prepare "to capture the leadership of the Congress".
A few weeks later, urging his socialist contacts to attend a special conference in 
Europe "of those who understand the necessity of a new mass party" 66 R0y made a 
similar proposal, for "A revolutionary mass party as a part of the Congress, but under
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the control and direction of our own party (communist party) which cannot but be 
illegal". 67
These proposals for a new party were ambigious on the question as to whether 
this was simply a proposal for a communist party under a different name (to avoid 
British repression), or for a party at once different from and broader than a communist 
party. Clarification came when, his own proposals not having been acted upon, Roy 
responded to the founding of a Labour-Swaraj Party in India. Welcoming the 
development, Roy also advised:
we must organise on a countrywide basis with our own party and 
programme though functioning inside the Congress like the rest... We 
must insist upon our minimum programme, as drafted for the Gaya 
Congress, be adopted by the new party with the least possible 
modifications. The idea is to have political control of the legal party in the 
hands of the Communist Party. As far as possible the office-bearers and 
' leaders of the legal party should be members of the Communist Party. 68
Here ambiguity was dispelled, and at the same time the connection between 
Roy's pedagogic efforts and his organisational efforts became clear. The programme 
Roy submitted to the Gaya Congress was in fact directed to a section of the INC, and 
was intended to serve as the catalyst for an outcome in organisational terms. It was to 
serve as the programmatic basis for an unnamed, legal, mass party. This was, 
however, a 'minimum programme', a programme which, as we have seen, 
iheVanguard described as one of 'modified social democracy'; a programme for 
national liberation and satisfaction of the 'immediate' demands of workers and 
peasants. Thus clearly the party being proposed by Roy differed from the communist 
party not only in being legal, but in being politically more 'moderate'.
At the same time, this was not a proposal for socialists to put their beliefs 'on 
hold' and become revolutionary nationalists, until national independence was achieved. 
Both ideologies and projects - the communist and the nationalist - were to be given an 
organisational expression or form ; but the former was to exercise control over the
latter. The 'mass legal party' must be controlled by the communist party. Very shortly 
afterwards, in response to fresh developments in India (the circulation of a plan to hold 
a conference in India to launch a working class party - though the conference never 
eventuated), Roy made a very similar suggestion, also suggesting a name for the 
proposed party - this time, the ’Workers’ and Peasants' Party of India'.69
A year later, in October 1924, Roy had reverted to calling for a "people's party 
or... republic party". 70 in this proposal, Roy set out in greater detail the reasons why 
such a party was needed. They followed directly from his general analysis and 
characterization of the Indian situation. "The peculiarity of India", Roy wrote, "does 
not lie in the imaginary spiritual character of its people but in the reactionary tendencies 
of its bourgeoisie". The 'material interests' of the bourgeoisie rendered it "historically 
incapable of... leading] the nationalist movement", and thus its leadership "must 
evolve out of the ranks of the workers and peasants" .71 At the same time, it had to be 
remembered "that the immediate object of the movement still remains the same, 
namely, national freedom". For, "Bourgeois revolution has its place in history. We 
cannot jump over a long period of history. All that we can do is shorten it.”7—
It was this combination of factors - the incapacity of bourgeois nationalism to 
realise independence, and the fact that bourgeois revolution was a historical stage and 
task which could not be 'skipped' - that necessitated a People's Party. The former was 
the reason why a party other than the INC was necessary ; the latter the reason why a 
communist party could not be this 'other' party. The necessity for a party other than 
and in addition to a communist party, and the nature of the differences (and the 
relationship between) the two, were further clarified by Roy in 1927, by which time 
both a Communist Party and Workers' and Peasants’ Parties (WPP's) had been 
established in India. He wrote :
the WPP is distinct from the CP in that its program is not a communist 
program, its program is the program of democratic revolution...73
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Related to this, the WPP was to be "a much broader organisation":
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The social elements ready to fight for this program are not all necessarily 
communists ; but organised in the WPP they will be under the influence of 
the proletariat and be led by the CP without subscribing to its programme 
of socialism.74
All of Roy's proposals, discussed above, were attempts to forge an instrument 
which could 'realise' Roy's analysis and pedagogy. The various solutions Roy 
provided, despite some differences in content (and occasional ambiguity or 
inconsistency within some suggestions), and differences in nomenclature, were very 
similar.
Marxism and the socialist project were to find their embodiment and the vehicle 
for their realisation in the Communist Party of India (CPI). What Roy variously and 
inconsistently called 'upper middle-class', 'petty-bourgeois' and 'bourgeois' 
nationalism was already organised in the form of the INC. Since socialist revolution 
was not yet on the agenda, and bourgeois nationalism was inadequate to the task of 
achieving national independence, an 'intermediary form' was required. This would not 
be prone to the weaknesses of bourgeois nationalism, because it would be based upon 
Marxism and 'genuinely' nationalist classes, but it would also not be committed to and 
striving towards the Marxist goal. Such a party , in comparison with the CPI, would 
be politically diluted and sociologically broader.
This 'intermediate form' would at the same time be a bridgehead for the capture 
of the INC, to which it would be affiliated. By strengthening the weight of workers 
and peasants in the nationalist movement, and by attracting the more revolutionary 
middle-class elements in the INC, such a party would gradually transform and 
ultimately capture the INC.
Because such a party was sociologically broader than a Marxist party, and based 
upon a diluted Marxism (Marxism at the service of nationalism), it was necessary that it 
be under the control of a properly Marxist party. The CPI thus had to control the 
revolutionary party, guaranteeing that it remained 'revolutionary' and did not organise
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the masses in order to deliver them into the hands of bourgeois nationalism, and 
seeking to ensure that pursuit of independence remained connected to the ultimate goal 
of socialism.
This position, neat and logically consistent - although once again at the price of 
an all too neat fit between classes, class interests and their political expressions - 
contained one element which did not necessarily follow ffom the others. If the WPP or 
People’s Party was better equipped to pursue the goal of national independence than 
bourgeois nationalism, because it recognised the importance of organising the masses 
and so on, then what need was there to capture the INC? Could not this party simply 
replace the INC?
The answer to this would depend, in large part, on how realistic the prospect of 
'bypassing' the INC was conceived to be, and relatedly, how worthwhile or necessary 
capturing it was seen to be. In 1926, at the height of his disillusionment and disgust 
with the Congress, Roy did in fact draw the conclusion that a revolutionary nationalist 
party was required to replace the INC.
In that year, in his correspondence with the Communist Party of India (which 
had been established in 1925), and in his The Future of Indian Politics , Roy made it 
clear - though not in so many words - that he saw the party he proposed as an 
alternative to an ineffectual and crumbling Congress. For the petty bourgeoisie, Roy 
concluded, was increasingly disaffected with the Congress, and was "gravitating 
towards the formation of a revolutionary political organisation to carry the fight for 
freedom further"
Left to themselves, these revolutionary petty bourgeois elements were incapable 
of 'finding their way to the masses'. Roy concluded :
The task of the proletariat in this situation is to meet the petty bourgeois
Nationalist revolutionaries half-way... the proletariat must enter, even take
the initiative of organising a broader Party76
Neither the INC nor the CPI could be this party. It would be composed of the 
disaffected revolutionary elements in the former, plus those it had excluded, and would 
be broader than the latter - would be a People's Party. As Roy explained,
Although the proletariat is destined to act as the lever of the struggle for 
national liberation, there are other social classes immensely more numerous 
than the proletariat whose importance in the fight for democratic national 
freedom cannot be minimised. The future of Indian politics will still be 
dominated by the interests of these classes -intellectuals, artisans, small 
traders and peasantry. How to organise these forces of national revolution 
in a democratic party is the immediate problem before the Indian 
revolutionaries... This will be done through the People's Party...77
The nature of the relationship between the CPI and the People's Party was not 
affected, however, by the fact that Roy was now proposing the latter as an alternative 
to the INC. The CPI would belong to the People's Party, and "The proletariat", Roy 
wrote, "led by its own party - the Communist Party - will exercise hegemony in this 
revolutionary struggle for democratic national freedom".78
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Conclusion
M.N. Roy's theoretical and practical efforts can legitimately be read as being 
directed at denying the proposition that, because the bourgeois-democratic nationalist 
revolution was the main political project in the colonies, it followed that Marxism and 
communist parties were destined to play a supportive and secondary role in the 
colonies until that historical project was fulfilled. Roy advanced two counter- 
propositions of his own. First, that in most colonies (and, in particular, in India), the 
bourgeoisie was incapable of leading the bourgeois-national revolution. Second, that 
the working class and peasantry, by virtue of their objective class circumstances, were 
both the most resolutely nationalist of classes in India, and those which had the 
strength and striking power to realise national independence.
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The combination of these two propositions led to the conclusion that it was the 
objectively revolutionary classes which would lead what was, still, an essentially 
bourgeois-democratic national revolution.
This should not, however, be read psychologically, as the story of an Asian 
Marxist unwilling to accept a subordinate role for the colonies in the world revolution, 
and for communists in the colonies. Roy was too orthodox a Marxist for such an 
explanation to be needed. The problem he addressed was one posed within, and by, 
Marxist theory, and his solution was consistent with that theory. Indeed, Roy was a 
painfully, self-consciously orthodox Marxist. He was a thinker concerned with relating 
concepts and propositions to each other in a coherent and consistent manner; relating 
these concepts to the reality they purported to describe was almost secondary, and here 
consistency was frequently foregone.
More important, it was not only Roy who was reluctant to accept the conclusion 
which could follow from accepting the historical and temporal priority of the 
bourgeois-national revolution in the colonies. Throughout the colonial countries 
communists sought to establish that they and the working class had a crucial role to 
play in the task at hand, even if this task was bourgeois revolution. In many cases, 
they did so in a manner similar to Roy - stressing that a successful nationalist 
revolution was impossible without the involvement of workers and peasants, and often 
also suggesting that the dominant classes were incapable of leading such a revolution. 
Variations on this theme became the position(s) of the Comintern. The party of world 
revolution was also unwilling to countenance a subordinate role for its constituents in 
the colonies. Thus, independently of Roy, Marxists everywhere arrived at roughly 
similar conclusions.
In doing so, they had much to draw upon within Marxism. The counterpart of 
the view that communists had, in practice, to bide their time until the bourgeois 
democratic revolution was completed, was the view that Marxism as a theory was a 
sociology of capitalism rather than a world historical theory with universal application.
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This evolutionary and determinist mould, however, had already been broken by the 
October Revolution. Lenin and the Bolsheviks had demonstrated the immediate 
relevance of communist politics even in a backward country. And the example and 
inspiration of the Russian Revolution loomed large for Roy, as it did for all other 
communists of this period.
For the colonies, this was not the only grounds upon which the primacy of the 
bourgeoisie in the bourgeois-national revolution could be disputed ; another lay in the 
theory of imperialism. It was through Lenin's theory of imperialism, as we have seen, 
that the problem of 'colonial nationalism' was constituted. Marxism accepted and 
endorsed the nationalist project in the colonies not only (or even primarily) on the 
grounds that this was a necessary historical stage the colonies had to pass through, but 
also on the basis that this was an anti-capitalist struggle, that successful nationalist 
revolution in the colonies would constitute a break in the imperialist chain. What was a 
bourgeois-democratic revolution within the colonies would prove something more than 
that 'outside' of them, in the context of capitalism as a world system. Once this was 
accepted, as it was at the Second Congress of the Comintern, the question of agency 
became highly problematic. Could the colonial bourgeoisie be expected to lead what 
was, at one level, an anti-capitalist struggle? If in 1920 the answer Lenin gave was a 
qualified and tentative 'yes', his own theory nevertheless also provided a basis on 
which to argue the opposite position.
It was this alternative position which Roy sought to develop, and which (usually 
in a 'weaker' form) was also to be developed in colonial countries other than India. 
Inasmuch as this position involved accepting that the nationalist struggle was an 
essentially bourgeois-democratic struggle, it led to pedagogy. As a movement directed 
at a bourgeois democratic goal, the nationalist movement included classes other than 
the working class ; therefore they and their organisations had to be wooed and won.
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On the other hand, inasmuch as it was also claimed that bourgeois nationalism 
could not fulfil its historic role, its organisational expressions were also inadequate to 
the task. Alternatives needed to be founded.
The first was the more 'conjunctural' of the two. Although Marxism was 
compelled to adopt a pedagogic stance towards nationalist movements in all colonial 
countries, in those where Marxism established a significant social / political base of its 
own - as in China - this stance was not as necessary and therefore less marked. The 
second, however, proved to be a central - and problematic - question in all colonial 
countries. In most colonial countries 'solutions' were sought through alliances (the 
CCP-Kuomintang alliance, among many others) and / or by seeking to establish 
hybrid organisations (the Saraket Rajat in Indonesia, the Workers' and Peasants' Party 
in India, and so on) as communists sought to forge an instrument capable of mobilizing 
the working class and peasantry (but other classes also) in pursuit of the anti­
imperialist (but also essentially bourgeois-democratic) goal of national independence.
Having argued that national liberation could not be achieved without class 
struggle, and that national independence was in the short as well as the long term 
interests of the working class, Roy also wrestled with the issue of how this 'necessary' 
relationship could be given an organisational form in India. One answer Roy provided 
was that an organisation had to be founded which would pursue the nationalist goal, 
but recognising the fact that the bourgeoisie was unreliable, and the working class the 
leading force, in this pursuit. This party would then make a bid to capture bourgeois 
nationalism, which was organized in the Congress. A second option outlined and 
explored by Roy was one where the Congress was dispensed with altogether. A 
'revolutionary nationalist' party was to be founded by communists, and was to weld 
together and lead all the genuinely nationalist classes into national revolution. In both 
cases the CPI was to control the revolutionary nationalist party.
A third possible option followed from a somewhat different conception of the 
relationship between the democratic-nationalist and the socialist projects ; a conception
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which was also once held, briefly, by Roy. In this view the nationalist struggle, once 
betrayed by the bourgeoisie and taken over by the working class, would 'telescope' 
with the socialist revolution. In a scenario drawing directly upon the example of the 
October Revolution, a nationalist struggle led by the working class and peasantry 
would not limit itself to democratic aims, and would soon pass over into a Soviet 
Republic. In this analysis, intermediate organisational forms were unnecessary. The 
CPI, as the natural leader of the Indian working class, would organise the nationalist 
struggle and assume leadership of it, supervising its rapid progress into socialism. At 
the time that this option came to be embraced and pursued, Roy had long since rejected 
it, and found himself in opposition to it.
Variants of all three of these options, which had been advocated or anticipated by 
Roy, came to be pursued by communists in India, as we shall see in the following 
chapter. They were to be tried during, but also after the period of Roy's influence over 
communists in India ; and they were tried out sometimes with his encouragement, but 
at other times in opposition to his urgings.
For the point is not Roy's importance in the history of Marxism, either as an 
organiser or as a thinker. Roy's influence in the development of Marxism in India (less 
so his influence in the Comintern) was real, and for that reason alone he would merit 
separate consideration in a study such as this one. However the period of his influence 
was confined to a few years - between 1920 and 1929 in the case of the Comintern, the 
latter being the year of his expulsion ; and between 1922 to about 1926 in India, 
around which time the Communist Party of Great Britain began to supplant him as 
chief adviser to Indian communists.
Nor, by any stretch of the imagination, can Roy be considered a major Marxist 
thinker. Any such judgement is precluded, amongst other things, by his reductionism, 
his schematicism and his characteristic juggling of concepts in pursuit of neat and 
superficially persuasive analyses and solutions ; and by his corresponding willingness 
to 'flatten' and 'fit' complex social phenomena into ready-made categories.
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It is this very feature of Roy's thought which, paradoxically, constitutes its 
enduring historical interest. The very schematicism and transparency of his thought 
allows one to trace, more clearly than would be possible with a thinker of greater 
subtlety, some of the issues confronting Marxism as it sought to engage with colonial 
nationalism after the Second Comintern Congress, basing itself on the premises 
'established' by that congress. By examining Roy's thought we have seen the attempt 
(by no means confined to Roy) to avoid certain conclusions which could follow from 
the Second Congress, and one form (by no means atypical) which this avoidance took. 
We have seen how the logic of this position led to the need to postulate, and to seek to 
effect, a necessary rather than contingent relationship between class struggle and the 
goal of national liberation ; we have further traced some of the implications and 
consequences of this, both pedagogic and organisational.
In short, whilst Roy influenced the development of Marxism in India, his greater 
interest lies in the fact that his thought illustrates and reveals the problems and 
questions which confronted Marxism as it addressed the question of nationalism in a 
colonial country; and reveals some of the answers and solutions which could be 
provided, within the framework of Marxism.
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1. M.N. Roy, Memoirs, Allied Publishers Pty Ltd., 1964, pp. 391, 392. A list of 
members of the Small Bureau compiled by Degras does not, however, include Roy 
- see G. Overstreet and M. Windmiller, Communism in India, University of 
California Press, 1959, p. 33(fn).
2. Overstreet and Windmiller, op. cit., p. 33.
3. The story of Roy's disastrous mission to China is told in his own Revolution and 
Counter-Revolution in China, Calcutta, 1946 ; and also in North and Eudin,
M T l . vsw o£ C < a V £ o f P r t o ,  ^6  3.
4. The Vanguard of Indian Independence began publication, from Berlin, in 1922. It 
continued to be published as a fortnightly, with some changes of name, until June 
1924. During this period it appeared briefly under the title, The Advance Guard, 
and also simply as The Vanguard. In 1923 it adopted, under its masthead, the 
subtitle, 'Central Organ of the Communist Party of India', before this was again 
omitted from 1924. From July 1924 it was published as a monthly, and from 
January 1925 this monthly appeared under the new title, The Masses o f India.. In 
citations, all issues to end-1924 shall be cited as Vanguard ; subsequent issues 
under the title, Masses of India..
5. Roy, Memoirs, p. 551.
6. ibid., p. 552. The report was intended, Roy wrote, to "back up my view of the 
nature and perspective of the Indian revolution"-p. 551.
7. "Having studied the report carefully and warning me against wishful interpretations 
of facts, Lenin advised me to elaborate it in the form of a book, which would give a 
realistic picture of the contemporary Indian society and open up the perspective of 
the Indian revolution"-!/?/*!, p. 552. The English edition of India in Transition was 
published in Berlin, from where it could be sent to India with least difficulty, but it 
was issued in the name of a fictitious publisher in Geneva.
8. The book was published under Roy's name, but 'with the collaboration of Abani 
Mukheiji. According to Roy Mukheiji collected all the statistical material for the first 
chapter, and was responsible for its innacuracies-"He was so eager to prove that 
India was in the throes of a proletarian revolution and therefore must have the same 
status in the Communist International as Germany or Britain, that he juggled the
124
Statistical material to present a magnified picture of the development of capitalism in 
India "-Memoirs, pp. 553-54.
9. "Since the capitalist exploitation was carried on by a foreign imperialist bourgeoisie, 
the outward effects of the capitalist mode of production were not clearly felt on the 
Indian society" - M.N. Roy, India in Transition, Nachiketa Publications Ltd. 
(Bombay), 1971, p. 97.
10. Roy writes that in the late nineteenth century "the social forces of history broke the 
bonds of artificial restriction and asserted themselves1"-ibid., p. 93.
Q
11. See also pp. 238-240, where this implied comparison with the bourgeisie in 
Europe is made explicit.
12. Similarly,"its revolutionary energy is not pitted against an enemy which would be 
unrelentingly hostile to it on the ground of class-struggle. Had the Indian 
bourgeoisie been fighting against a feudal absolutism, no such compromise would 
be possible..." - p. 212.
13. The colonial question was not on the agenda of the Third Comintern Congress(22 
June-12 July 1921), an omission which led to a sharp protest by Roy on the last day 
of the Congress-see G. Adhikari(ed.), Documents of the History of the Communist 
Party of India, v. 1, People's Publishing House, 1971, pp. 266-67 ; v. 2 published 
in 1974, v. 3A in 1978, v. 3B in 1979, v. 3C in 1982. Hereafter, this work is cited 
in the abbreviated form, Documents ; except where the reference is not to a 
document in the collection, but to the editor's introductory or explanatory remarks, 
in which case it is cited in the form, Adhikari, op. cit.
14. Roy, "Report on the Eastern Question", Documents, v. 1, p. 536.
15. ibid., p.539.
16. ibid., p. 541.
17. ibid., p. 542
18. ibid., p. 543.
19. "Theses on the Eastern Question" (drafted by ECCI members and delegates from 
Eastern nations), in J. Degras(ed.), The Communist International 1919-1943 : 
Documents, v. 1,Oxford University Press, 1956, p. 384.
125
20. Communist parties were "urged to take part in every movement that gives them 
access to the masses"-i7ti<i., p. 389.
21. Documents, v. 2, p. 360.
22. Roy's articles in Inprecor, his The Future o f Indian Politics (1926) and, most 
especially, Vanguard. Also M.N. Roy and E. Roy, One Year of Non-Cooperation
: From Ahmedabad to Gaya (1923) and M.N. Roy, Political Letters (1924), though 
these publications consisted largely of letters and articles Roy had previously 
published in Vanguard.
23. Roy, "Danger Ahead", Vanguard, 1:3, 15 June, 1922 (Documents, v. 1, p. 461). 
Where Vanguard or Inprecor articles cited have been reprinted in Documents, they 
have been consulted in that source, and this reference is given in brackets, as in this 
case.
24. Roy, "The Political Situation in India", Inprecor, 2 : 60, 21 July, 1922 
(Documents, v. 1, p. 499).
25. Roy, "The Collapse of Extremism", Vanguard, 1: 9, 15 Sept., 1922 (Documents, 
v. 1, p. 484
26. ibid.
27. "Revolution", Vanguard, 3 : 2, 1 Sept., 1923, p. 1.
28. See especially "The Special Session", Vanguard, 3 : 4, 1 Oct., 1923, p. 3 ; Santi 
Devi (E. Roy), "The Turning Point at Ahmedabad", Vanguard, 4 : 2, 15 August, 
1924, p. 3 ; and also the CPI's "Appeal to the Nationalists", directed at the Belgaum 
Congress, which in briefly reviewing the events of 1924 asserted that the Swaraj 
Party had become the main force in the INC, leading to a 'decomposition' of the 
nationalist movement -Documents, v. 2, pp. 439-40.
29. "Future of Indian Nationalism", Masses of India, 2 : 2, Feb. 1926 (Documents, v. 
2, p. 712). An account and analysis of the developing split in in the Swaraj Party is 
also provided in Roy's The Future of Indian Politics, Minerva Associates(Calcutta), 
1971, p. 3 and p. 59.
30. Roy, Future of Indian Politics, p. 3.
126
31. ibid., p. 28.
32. ibid., p. 29.
33. This argument for the 'telescoping' of the national and social revolutions, a 
remnant of Roy's earlier 'ultra-leftism', continued to be occasionally sounded down 
to about 1923. It was, however, inconsistent with other positions and arguments 
being developed by Roy. When in Roy's perception an alarmingly 'economistic' 
note came to be struck by his contacts in India, he sought to correct this - and in the 
process fully abandoned his 'telescoping' argument-by insisting both on the on the 
importance of mational liberation, and on its essentially bourgeois-democratic 
character. On the first of these he wrote, for example, "while talking of the 
immediate interests of the workers and peasants we should not exclude the big 
issues from our programme. This tendency nevertheless is noticeable in many 
comrades...[But] the first and foremost problem that every political party in India 
must face iand solve is the problem of national liberation "-"A Memorandum to the 
Conference for Organising a Working-Class Party in India"(5 June, 1923), 
Documents, v.2, p. 144 (Hereafter cited as 'Memorandum'). In relation to the 
second issue he began to urge Indian communists to recognise that "our slogan 
should not be a vague labour swaraj which cannot be realised for a long time yet but 
a democratic government based upon universal suffrage with as much protection as 
possible for the workers and peasants "{ibid., p. 146), and to accept that "The 
immediate task of the communists in India is not to preach communism but to 
organise the national revolution..."(Roy to Bagerhatta, 22 Oct., 1924, Documents, 
v. 2, p. 386).
34. Manfestoes were sent to the Ahmedabad(1921), Gaya(1922), Belgaum(1924) and 
Gauhati Congresses of the INC, either under Roy's name or in the name of the CPI. 
A Manifesto in the name of Roy and Surendra Nath Ker was also sent to the All- 
India Congress Committee (AICC) meeting in mid-1922. Some of Roy's letters 
were collected and printed as Political Letters, Vanguard Bookshop, Zurich, March 
1924. The Vanguard, although it claimed to articulate and represent the interests of 
the 'masses', did so primarily to the nationalist movement. Thus when the first
issue of the Vanguard editorialised ,"The Indian masses...call for a realist 
orientation in our political struggle. To help the formation of this much-needed 
realist orientation is the object of the Vanguard "("Our Object", Vanguard, 1: 1, 15
May, 1922, in Documents, v. 1, p. 435), it was declaring that it would seek to 
introduce a 'realist orientation' into the nationalist movement.
127
35. "Introduction"yPo/mca/ Letters, p. 5.
36. "The Next Step", Vanguard, 15 Oct.-l Nov., 1923 (.Documents, v. 2, p. 179).
37. Roy, Future of Indian Politics , p. v.
38. M.N. and E. Roy,"Introduction", One Year o f Non-Cooperation : From 
Ahmedabad to Gaya, Calcutta (place of publication probably false), 1923, p. 6. 
This "Introduction" is reprinted in Documents, v. 2, and hereafter citations will be 
to this rather than the (relatively inaccessible, for the reader) original.
39. Roy, "Introduction", Political Letters, p. 5.
40. "The Next Step", Vanguard, 15 Oct.-l Nov., 1923, (Documents, v. 2, p. 179).
41. Roy, India in Transition, p. 18.
42. ibid., p. 19.
43. Editorial, Masses of India, 1:1, Jan. 1925, p. 1.
44. "Our Immediate Task", Vanguard, 1: 4, 1 July, 1922, p. 1.
45. "The Next Step", Vanguard, 15 Oct.-l Nov., 1923 {Documents, v. 2, p. 182).
46. Roy and Mukherji, "Manifesto" to Ahmedabad Congress (1 Dec., 1921), 
Documents, v. 1, p. 345.
47. Roy, "National Communism : Beware of False Friends", Masses of India , 2 : 9 -  
10, Sept, and Oct. 1926 {Documents, v. 3A, p. 104).
48. "Introduction", One Year of Non-Cooperation (in Documents , v. 2, pp. 176-77).
49. Roy and Ker, "Manifesto" to the AICC (15 July 1922), Documents, v. 1, p. 471.
50. Roy, "Introduction", One Year of Non-Cooperation (in Documents, v. 2, p. 175).
51. "Our Object" (Editorial), Vanguard, 1: 1, 15 May, 1922, {Documents, v. 1, p. 
434).
52. Roy, "National Communism", Masses o f India, 2 : 9-10, Sept, and Oct. 1926 
{Documents, v. 3A, p. 103).
128
53. Documents, v. 1 , p. 352.
54. Santi Devi (pseudonym),"Gandhi : An Analysis (II)", Vanguard, 1: 3, 15 June, 
1922 (Documents, v. 1, p. 456).
55. Documents, v. 1, p. 345. Emphasized in original.
56. Reprinted in D ocum ents , v. 1, pp. 577-88. Similarly a 'message' of the 
Communist International, sent to the Gaya Congress, advised that, "Tireless and 
courageous agitation has to be carried on to win the masses for the cause of national 
liberation...The necessity of developing the revolutionary consciousness of the 
masses demands the adoption of an economic programme..."-Documents, v. 1, p. 
577.
57. "Our Programme : Bolshevist or Nationalist", Vanguard, 3 : 3, 15 Sept., 1923, p. 
1. This article reproduces the programme first presented at Gaya, and once again 
offers it to the nationalist movement. See also Santi Devi (E. Roy), "Bolshevism for 
India : A Melodrama", where t t h i s  is described as "a mild social-democratic 
programme1"-Vanguard, 2 : 1, 15 Feb., 1923, p.3.
58. Quoted in Andrzej Walicki, The Controversy Over Capitalism , Oxford (Clarendon 
Press), 1969, pp. 158-59.
59. ibid., p. 159. Further, "Being convinced that capitalist progress necessarily 
brought great suffering to the masses he had to put the strongest emphasis on
necessity ; absolute necessity...was, after all, the only justification for the 
acceptance of human sufferings".
60. Hence too the contrast between the almost tragic quality of Plekhanov's scientism 
and necessitarianism, and the triumphalist character of Roy's. For Plekhanov, 
Marxism discovers capitalist development to a (tragic and unavoidable) destiny.
sweetened only by the fact that it will lead with equal inevitability to socialism. For 
Roy, Marxism's discovery of 'inexorable laws' can be put to the service of the 
nationalist project.which is inevitable but also progressive.
61. Roy, "Introduction", Political Letters, pp. 7-8. Similarly in a Vanguard editorial, 
"We believe in the law of Economic Determinism. Our movement for national 
liberation is also subject to this law. The more the movement grows conscious of 
the economic motive underlying it, the more powerful does it become "-"The 
Bolshevik Bogey", 1: 9, 15 Sept., 1922 (emphasis added). Here the link between
129
knowledge and power is explicit, as is the fact that Marxism is the knowledge 
referred to, and independence the 'power'.
62. In a letter to S.A. Dange, one of his socialist contacts in India (d. Nov. 2, 1922), 
Roy wrote that he would soon send a programme for Dange to submit to the Gaya 
Congress of the ENC. He added that he did not expect it to be adopted, but that its 
popularisation would contribute "towards the organisation of a communist or 
socialist party..."-quoted in Adhikari, op. cit., v. 2, p. 99.
63. Roy, 'Memorandum', Documents, v. 2, pp. 142-43.
64. Quoted in Adhikari, op. cit., v. 2, p. 97.
65. Roy to Dange, 2 Nov., 1922, quoted in ibid., pp. 98-99.
66. Roy to Singaravelu, 21 Nov., 1922, Home Political File (ACHI 1924/ 16).
67. Roy to Dange, 19 Dec., 1922, Documents, v. 1, p. 595.
68. Roy to Dange, 7 May, 1923, Documents, v. 2, p. 136.
69. Roy, 'Memorandum', Documents, v. 2, pp. 140-52. As with the proposal a month 
earlier, the WPP was to be based on a minimum programme, and controlled by the 
communist party. However here Roy comes close to collapsing the distinction 
between the two, for the WPP is to "maintain relation[s] with the Communist 
International as a fraternal party", to which it will be "eventually affiliated" (pp. 
147, 148).
70. Roy to Bagerhatta, 22 Oct., 1924, Documents, v. 2, p. 387. The Vanguard had 
earlier raised the call for a "Revolutionary People's Party"-in "The Special Session", 
3 : 4, 1 Oct., 1922, p. 3, and also in articles in subsequent issues.
71. Roy to Bagerhatta, 22 Oct., 1924, Documents, v. 2, pp. 384-
86.
72. ibid. Thus,"The immediate task of the communists in India is not to preach 
communism", but "to be the heart and soul of the revolutionary nationalist party".
73. Roy to Central Committee's of the CPI and the WPP ('Assembly Letter'), 30 Dec. 
1927, Documents, v. 3C, pp. 231-32.
130
74. ibid., p. 232.
75. Roy, Future of Indian Politics, p. 86. Similarly, the Masses of India declared, 
"The deceived and betrayed rank and file of the Swaraj Party will provide the cadre 
for the party of the people..."-"End of Swarajism", 3 : 1 ,  Jan. 1927 {Documents, 
v. 3A, p. 251).
76. Roy, Future of Indian Politics, pp. 87-88.
77. "Preface", ibid., p. v.
78. ibid., p. 89.
Chapter 5
131
The Early Years of the Indian Communist Movement: Class 
Struggle and Nationalist Struggle
Thus far we have traced the process by which Marxist's came to pose the 
question of nationalism in a colonial context. We have examined how Marxism, as a 
theory, moved 'towards' nationalism, conceptualizing it in particular ways which 
raised further (particular) questions.
The development of the first Indian communists was in the opposite direction - 
from nationalism t£> Marxism. Roy himself, of course, was an example of this. But his 
was an entirely atypical case. His conversion to Marxism occurred abroad, under the 
influence of leading figures in the international communist movement; and it occurred 
without any direct engagement in nationalist (or any other) politics in India.
By contrast, the first communists in India -men such as S.A. Dange, Singaravelu 
Chettiar, Ghulam Hussain, and Muzaffar Ahmad - all began as Congressmen.1 They 
came to Marxism as politically conscious men, as nationalists, most of them with some 
political activity and experience in the Non-Cooperation movement behind them. These 
early Indian communists did not initially seek to 'adapt' or 'redefine' Marxism in order 
to 'include' the nationalist goal within it. Rather, this was an evolution which saw them 
'interrogate' or rethink nationalism with the aid of Marxism. Here the importance of 
national liberation for India did not have to be established or justified. It was the point 
of departure rather than a point of arrival.
The early stages of this movement from nationalism to Marxism are the story, not 
of a theory, but of the progress and questionings of a number of individuals. Its
carriers were less self-consciously theoretical than those who moved in the opposite 
direction, and they have left behind many fewer 'texts'.
One such text is S.A. Dange's Gandhi vs. Lenin . Bom of a well-to-do 
Maharashtrian Brahman family in 1899, Dange began his political activities when he 
went to study in Bombay's Wilson College in 1917. There he and a group of like- 
minded students, strongly influenced by Tilak, organised meetings and published a 
student journal to promote nationalist ideas. Their activities led to their expulsion from 
the College. In 1919 Dange joined the Congress, and played an active part in the Non- 
Cooperation movement. However, by Dange's account2, disagreements with the INC 
leadership's ideology and policy, and a growing interest in the Russian revolution, led 
him to study Marxism.Gandhi vs. Lenin , published in 1921 at Dange's own expense, 
was the product of that study.
This is a particularly interesting book, for our purposes, not only because it is 
an explicit attempt to explore the relationship between Marxism and nationalism, but 
also because it is a 'transitional' text. Its author was a Congressman at the time of 
writing, but one increasingly interested in and sympathetic to Marxism. Gandhi vs. 
Lenin is not, therefore, another example of a Marxist seeking to 'theorise' nationalism, 
of the sort we have studied so far in this work. It is, rather, an effort directed at 
'thinking' both Marxism and Gandhian nationalism, each with the aid of the other. It is 
also a 'moment' in the movement from nationalism to Marxism. As such it illustrates 
some of the issues and problems posed by such a transition.
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Gandhi vs. Lenin
Dange begins with the question, why and how were the British driven to conquer 
India, and why could the Indians not resist ? His answer is based upon the elevation of 
two opposing essences - upon a distinction between 'dynamic' Europe and 'fatalistic' 
India. A dynamic 'spirit', Dange argues, characterises and drives Europe. The essence
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of this spirit is 'individualism'. Individualism began to be propogated with the 
Enlightenment, which taught that the individual was "the sovereign of his desdny and 
his life".3 With the French revolution, this idea came to be established as the basis of 
European society.4
However, rights were asserted and won without any corresponding duties being 
postulated. The result was a corrupted individualism, an individualism "possessing no 
ideal but the negation of a lie, negation of subjection to the chosen few", and not also 
"the ideal of subjection to the Higher Law of God, to life of common good and 
association..." (p. 48). Correspondingly, a corrupt or incomplete democracy was 
achieved. The individual not only did not gain full liberty for himself, he became an 
instrument for denying it to others - "Liberty for the individual was recognized a little 
but liberty for other nations was denied. Whole nationalities began to subject others to 
slavery" (p. 49).
Driven by the acquisitiveness of a corrupt individualism, the British sought to 
conquer. The dynamism which accompanies even a corrupt individualism - deriving 
from a belief in the individual as sovereign, and in his capacity to master nature - 
assured their success. For although the British were no more 'civilized' than the 
Indians," If civilization meant refined virtues and character and mental qualities of high 
order" (p. 55), the "aggressive spirit of Europe" nevertheless "found easy matter for 
subjugation in India", (p. 53).
For India was characterized neither by individualism nor by the dynamism which 
accompanied it. At the core of 'Indian philosophy’, which underpinned a distinctively 
’Indian mind’, was the religious notion of predestination, which "made the individual a 
firm believer in the doctrine of fatalism" (p. 51). The concomitants of this fatalism 
were pessimism and passivity, so that Indians "were never interested in the pursuits of 
gaining mastery over the forces of Nature" (p. 52).
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With the British conquest, the challenge to Indians was "to awaken to the new 
spirit, that was coming from the whites of Europe, and either to assimilate it or reject it 
and give it a death-blow", (p. 54).
Left to themselves, Indians could do neither. It required the 'Genius of Tilak' to 
prepare Indians for the challenge:
He taught the masses their individual rights to freedom, to free speech, to 
be left alone in their own land and not to be exploited for the sake of 
foreigners. His efforts made India conscious of the outside world and 
brought her in level with the ideas, that were governing the forces in the 
new world (p. 57).
He did so, moreover, through religion -"The people of India are always in a 
mood to accept anything that comes from a religious source. Geeta was the only 
source, through which anybody could speak to the people" (p. 59). Thus it was 
through his reinterpretation of the Gita that Tilak propogated the ideals of 
individualism and liberty ; it was by reinterpreting a religion which had produced 
passivity that he fought passivity - "The people, who had been fed over [sic] doctrines 
of inaction or Sadhuism, gradually changed their vision and believed him. Most 
important of all was this conquest, of destroying peoples pessimism and making them 
hopeful about the future, in struggle, while serving humanity", (p. 59).
The last phrase is significant, for the nature of Tilak's individualism - and the 
religious manner of its propagation - made it non-egoistic, unlike the corrupt 
individualism of Europe. "India's faith in the higher Law and Religion was not 
corrupted by the new ideas of individual rights, as was the case with the nations of 
Europe", (p. 57).
Through Tilak, then, India assimilated the 'spirit of the age', whilst at the same 
time 'Indianizing' it. India was 'modernized', and the struggle for liberty began - but it 
was modernized in a way which allowed for the struggle to be conducted in peculiarly
'Indian' ways. "Upon modem India of Tilak, a Mahatma is making his experiments of 
new methods of winning liberty" (p. 60).
If we have dwelt on this at some length, it is because this is a characteristically 
nationalist solution to a characteristically nationalist dilemma. This dilemma is at the 
heart of almost all nationalist thought in India (and not only in India, but also at the 
heart of other colonial nationalisms). It arises out of a conflict between two impulses or 
desires. On the one hand, there exists a desire is to imitate those characteristics of the 
Western conqueror which are seen as the source of his power and his conquest (and 
the lack of which on the part of the colonized made conquest possible), in order to 
acquire that power and overthrow the conqueror. On the other hand, characteristics 
which are seen as uniquely 'Western' cannot simply be 'appropriated' without 
negating the specificity of the very unit for which they are being sought. The nation for 
which a distinct cultural / historical identity is being claimed, against opposition, must 
be defined as a unique 'people', needing and being entitled to form an independent 
political community.^
Gandhi vs. Lenin begins with this problem, central to nationalist thought; it 
offers a resolution which is characteristic of strand of nationalist thought (another 
manner of resolving this problem, that embraced by Nehru, is discussed in the 
following chapter). The resolution, simply put, is that the source of the West's power 
is its 'spirit', the value of which must be recognized, and which must be assimilated ; 
but that in the process it can and must be 'Indianized'.6 In this way the nation will gain 
the strength necessary to overthrow the foreign ruler, but will not thereby cease to be 
uniquely Indian.
At this point, however, Dange introduces a new element. If the rise of 
individualism occurred in Europe 'side by side' with the industrial revolution, in India 
industrialization has also begun. And if 'ideologies' and 'spirit', in finding root in 
India, can be 'Indianized' the same is n£i true, for Dange, of social and industrial
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136
Naturally her industrialisation will be accomplished and is being accomplished 
on the lines of European systems. When this is done, surely, all the evils of 
European industrialism, all the methods of class-war between capitalism [sic] 
and labour, will rear their breeding here in our Society too (p.67).
Why this should be so - whether it is because 'material' factors cannot be 
adapted to different cultural circumstances in the way that 'spirit' can, or whether it is 
because such changes have been forced upon India by its rulers, Dange does not 
specify. He asserts that in India, too, a capitalist class has arisen, which "exhibits] all 
the greediness, idleness, cruelty, luxurious and demoralised life consequent upon 
capitalism in every form and in every country" (p. 72), a class which "supports] the 
foreign despotism over us", and "demoralize[s] and ruin[s] the peasantry and the 
wage-earning classes of our Society", (p. 73).
This too is a challenge to the emergent nation, and to nationalism, and it is one 
not capable of resolution in purely nationalist terms. These are divisions within the 
nation, and they are ones to which there is no peculiarly 'Indian' solution.
The question of national independence and the problem of capitalism are, 
however, structurally unconnected, even if they are contemporaneous. Just as in 
Europe the industrial revolution occurred 'side by side' with the rise of individualism, 
but not as part of the same process, so in India the question of independence and the 
question of capitalism are not two aspects of the same question. Thus their solutions 
are also temporally distinct:
How to throw off the foreign yoke? With what methods? And then how to 
destroy the evil of capitalism amongst us, which is making fast progress 
and will double its speed when we are politically free ? (p. 73, emphasis 
added).
Gandhism and Bolshevism provide different answers to each of these questions. 
Both aim "To destroy the social evils of the day, especially the misery of the poor, and 
to subvert despotism" (p.92), but they prescribe different means to this end. The 
essence of the Gandhiam prescription is individual purification, which alone (through
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non-violence) can end despotism, and which necessarily requires the rejection of 
industrialism. The essence of the Bolshevik prescription is violent class struggle, 
which will overthrow despotism and reconstruct society, building on the basis laid by 
capitalist industrialisation.7 Dange's understanding of the 'Bolshevik prescription' is 
drawn less from the classic texts of Marxism, with which he displays little 
acquaintance, than from the example of the Russian revolution, of which he gives a 
highly appreciative account.
The correct answer includes elements of both these doctrines. Dange sets out his 
own scenario for what he terms 'the Indian revolution'.
According to Dange the Gandhian tactic of boycotting schools, courts etc., even 
though only partially implemented, has proved successful, for it has "created the 
necessary feeling of considering the institutions as worthless and has destroyed the 
feeling of awe towards Government authority" (p. 115). The moral authority and 
legitimacy of the British has collapsed, and they rule by force alone.
However this is only a negative tactic. The collapsed moral authority of the 
British must be replaced by the moral authority of the Indian National Congress (INC), 
by the building of an 'inner state' which commands the loyalty of the Indian people - 
"The Congress must evolve its own ministries of Education, Law and Order. The 
Congress must become the sovereign power of the nation" (p. 117). Having 
established such authority, it must exercise it to strike at the heart of British Indian 
finances - it must command the people to cease payment of taxes.
The British will reply with brute force, and the only answer to this lies in the 
hands of Indian labour :
If at the extreme moment the Indian labour refuses to work in a solid mass, 
if the railwaymen, telegraph men, coolies and all sorts of labourers refuse 
to cooperatewith the government, i.e. arrange, what is called a sabotage, 
our success will be assured... if the Indian labour will not flinch and do its 
duty, we will succeed (p. 119).
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After Swaraj is won in this way, the problem of capitalism must be tackled, and 
tackling it must be given priority. For, "we shall win only with the help of the 
peasantry and labour, who will naturally expect an end of their miseries, after 
emancipation" (p. 121). Neither Gandhism nor Bolshevism offer complete solutions - 
"The spinning wheel alone will not solve the labour problem of modem civilization. 
We cannot accept the communist plan, in all details, because it is too much fraught with 
coercion and violence" (p. 121).
A solution is required which, unlike Gandhism, is realistic, but which also, 
unlike Bolshevism, minimizes coercion and allows men to "work out their ambition". 
Dange sketches such a solution, which includes nationalization of major industries and 
utilities, a limit to the wealth any individual can accumulate, and the breaking up of 
large landholdings in order to distribute land to the peasantry.
If, as we have suggested, Dange's thought very much shares in a nationalist 
tradition, there are also more than mere 'traces' of Marxism in his thought. First of all, 
Dange introduces, alongside the concept of nation, the concepts of capitalism and of 
class. Nationalism is confronted with the question - what sort of nation currently 
exists, and what sort of independent India is being sought ? Second, although 
independence and capitalism are seen as connected only inasmuch as they are 
contemporaneous and important issues, at a practical level a more substantial 
relationship is. effected. For class plays a prominent role in Dange's sketch of how 
independence is to be gained. Further, Dange suggests that how nationhood is 
achieved (by workers and peasants) bears a relation to what sort of independence is 
achieved - and thus the concept of class 'enters into' the concept of nation.
Dange's engagement with Marxism, then, is something more than simply 
sympathy for the downtrodden, or admiration for the Russian revolution - attitudes 
which were, in any case, widespread at this time. In Gandhi vs. Lenin , concepts 
borrowed from Marxism, such as those of 'class’ and 'capitalism', are used to broaden
the concerns of nationalism - to compel it to reflect upon itself, upon its goal and the 
manner of its achievement
This, however, is an additive process - the concerns and concepts of Marxism 
are added to those of nationalism. By contrast with, say, Roy, Dange does not 
establish that there is any necessary connection between the need to transform society 
and the struggle for national liberation. The connection which is claimed to exist 
between how independence is achieved, and what sort of nation created, is at the level 
of a moral imperative. Because independence will be achieved by the workers and 
peasants, it should address their problems and needs. The nation must give justice to 
those who have brought it into being.
As we shall see below, the first attempts in India to establish Marxist or Labour 
parties which also addressed the national issue came to face the same question. If 
Marxists in Europe came to the conclusion that political independence for the colonies 
would assist the struggle for socialism, the first communists in India sought to 
convince themselves and others that Marxism was in some way connected with and 
necessary to the achievement of national independence.
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Radical Programmes and Radical Parties
By 1922 there were small communist groups in a number of Indian cities. The 
Director of the Intelligence Bureau in the British Indian government concluded that, 
"By the autumn of 1922...Roy could justly claim an extended organisation in India : 
Bengal (Muzaffar Ahmad), Bombay (Dange), Madras (Singaravelu), the United 
Provinces (Usmani) and the Punjab (Ghulam Hussain)".^
By this time Roy was in contact with the abovementioned figures, and he played 
an important role in putting these groups in touch with each other, as well as in 
providing them with ideological guidance and advice, through his correspondence, his
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'emissaries'^ and through iheVanguard . These others were not not, however, as the 
report quoted suggests, all part of Roy's organisation. There was no single 
organisation, but rather a number of groups, and those active in them were by no 
means Roy's 'lieutenants'. They corresponded with Roy, and were influenced by him, 
but they acted independently, often ignoring Roy's advice. ^
These small groups of nationalists who had become Marxists 'experimented' 
with publications, programmes and organisational forms which would express their 
new-found Marxism, whilst continuing to address the question of national 
independence.
In August 1922, Dange began to publish a weekly Marxist paper, the Socialist.. 
Its pages attest to his having embraced Marxism, and to the influence on him of Roy’s 
analysis of the relation between class and national independence.11 It was in the Sept. 
16 issue of this, India's first avowedly Marxist paper, that Dange made the first 
proposal for a Marxist party in India - the Indian Socialist Labour Party of the Indian 
National Congress.
By contrast with Gandhi vs. Lenin , this article hardly raised the issue of 
national independence. The object of the ISLP was to be "the establishment of the 
people's state in which land and capital are owned communally and the process of 
production, distribution and exchange is a social function democratically controlled"12, 
to be achieved by "the organization of the workers politically to capture the power of 
the state and industrially to take over the control and management of the industrial 
machine".12
With the zeal of a new convert, Dange was now less concerned with nationalism 
than with estalishing a connection between the class struggle in India and 'the great 
international [socialist] movement", 14 and with putting socialism on the agenda. 
However, even if ideologically Dange had embraced Marxism to the extent of ignoring 
nationalist concerns, his political world was still one where nationalists and nationalist
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organisations remained crucial elements of the landscape, and could not be ignored. 
Thus the proposal for an ISLP was addressedto the 'radical minded men of Congress' 
and the party was to exist and function within the INC. The ISLP was stillborn, and 
future attempts to found a Marxist party in India addressed the national question more 
directly.
At the Gaya Congress of the INC (in December 1922) Singaravelu and others 
distributed Roy's proposed programme for the INC, and the formation of a left-wing 
party was discussed by some of those present. These discussions resulted in the 
production of, and publication of (in March 1923) a 'Manifesto' for a new party. This 
was subsequently rewritten and issued in late April under the names of Singaravelu and 
M.P.S. Velayudham (who signed themselves, 'Indian communists’), as the manifesto 
of The Labour and Kisan Party of Hindustan, launched in Madras on May Day.1^
The manifesto of the Labour Kisan Party began by pointing to the shortcomings 
of the INC. It had not addressed the needs and grievances of the masses, and it had not 
done so because of its class composition -"The backbone of the Congress being 
capitalists and zamindars, it cannot give any economic relief to the labourers". ^  This 
class bias was reflected not only in the day to day activities of the INC, but in how it 
defined its goal - "The Indian National Congress, our chief political organ, appears to 
define 'nation' by reference to the propertied class...Their idea appears to [be to] 
substitute an Indian bureaucracy recruited from the bourgeoisie to stand in the shoes of 
their present European masters".17
Marxist concepts were now being used, not only to reflect upon what sort of 
independent India was being sought, but also to criticise the organisations pursuing 
national independence. The concept of class served to highlight one of the limitations 
of the INC. The Labour Kisan Party was to be a response to this limitation. It would 
seek to inlude the interests of the excluded in the nationalist agenda, thereby making it a 
'truer' more genuinely representative, nationalism - "This party as an organised body
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will affiliate itself to the Indian National Congress, making it the labour and kisan 
section of the Congress...in order to make the Congress a real national body".1**
It would represent both the immediate and the ultimate interests of the workers 
and peasants. The former were summarised in an 'Action Programme' included in the 
manifesto - a potpourri of demands such as the eight hour day, the right to strike, profit 
sharing, rent reductions and so on.19 The ultimate goal of the Party was outlined in a 
detailed and wordy 'Provisional Scheme of Swaraj' a vision of a semi-socialist India 
where industries are nationalised and the state is a vertical chain of democratic 
panchayats (village councils), from village to all-India level.20
However no connection was effected between these 'immediate demands' which 
it was felt necessary to place on the nationalist agenda, and the ultimate goal of an 
independent and socialist India. In Gandhi vs. Lenin , as we have seen, a connection 
between 'means' and 'ends', between how the nationalist struggle was waged and 
what sort of nation was founded, was effected in the form of a moral imperative. 
Because independence would be won by workers and peasants, the new nation, Dange 
concluded, was duty-bound to address their class interests. In the manifesto of the 
Labor Kisan Party no such connection was established between methods of struggle 
and their implications for the end achieved.
The Marxism of the authors of this document consisted of a recognition of the 
existence of class interests and divisions, an identification with the working class and 
peasantry, and a desire to see a (highly unorthodox) form of socialism instituted in 
India. This was then 'combined' with nationalism by being added to it. Marxism 
served to broaden the concerns of nationalism - it included those interests which 
nationalism had excluded. It did not so much reformulate natonalism (in terms of its 
activities and goals) as complete it. Thus in organisational terms, the Labour Kisan 
Party was proposed as a representational device A a means of voicing the concerns 
and interests of those hitherto unrepresented in the nationalist movement. This was 
not, however, accompanied by any alternative strategic conception-although the
proposed party was to seek a 'labour swaraj', it would seek it through the INC, and 
by 'nonviolent means'.^1
The effect of all this was not only that Marxism was simply added to nationalism, 
rather than substantially reformulating it, but also that the 'Marxism' of the manifesto 
was a bifurcated Marxism. Its immediate demands and its ultimate goal each came to 
assume an exaggerated form, appearing as economism on the one hand (narrowly 
defined economic demands) and utopianism on the other (blueprints for socialism). 
This was to be noticed, and criticised, by Roy.22
In the event, the Labour Kisan Party had a short lived and uneventful existence, 
though this owed more to the prevailing social and political conditions than to its 
theoretical confusions. The initial attempts to found a socialist party in India all ended 
in failure. They did not proceed beyond the stage of announcing their existence and 
issuing a manifesto or two. The communist movement in India continued to exist in the 
form of a few small groups in different cities, centred around one or two key 
personalties and sometimes a newspaper.
Even this humble and precarious existence was shattered when, in mid 1923, 
Shaukat Usmani, Muzaffar Ahmad and Ghulam Hussain were arrested. In early 1924 
charges were filed against the above three as well as five others (including, in 
absentia, M.N. Roy) for 'conspiring to deprive the King-Emperor of his sovereignity'. 
The 'Kanpur Conspiracy Case’ was tried in April-May 1924, with Dange, Nalini 
Gupta, Usmani and Ahmad being convicted and sentenced to four years rigorous 
imprisonment. Hussain and Singaravelu were not proceeded against, the former having 
turned informer and the latter being ill.23
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By now socialist ’ideas and sympathies had spread beyond their first 
proponents. On November 1, 1925 the ’Labour Swaraj Party of the Indian National
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Congress' was founded in Bengal, composed of communists, a group of radical literati 
and a number of Muslim radicals.^4
In programmatic terms there was little to distinguish the Labour Swaraj Party 
(LSP) from its predecessors. While it identified its special concerns by declaring its 
goal to be an independence "based on social and economic emancipation", this was to 
be achieved by the INC strategy of "nonviolent mass action", and INC membership 
was a condition of membership to the LSP.25 The party sought to represent the 
workers and peasants in the INC, by putting forward both their 'immediate' and 
'ultimate' demands, again without any discussion of how the former might lead to the 
latter. 26
Exactly a year later, a similar party - the 'Congress Labour Party', composed of 
communists and radicals in the Bombay Congress - was founded. In February 1927 
both parties had conferences where they adopted the common name, 'Workers' and 
Peasants' Party', and where they adopted similar programmes. By now the 
communists, including the Kanpur prisoners, who had been released, were organised 
in their own party and were taking an active role in promoting the development of the 
Bombay and Calcutta parties (see next section).
Reflecting, in part, this fact, the programme of the Bombay Workers' and 
Peasants' Party (WPP) was relatively more sophisticated - certainly more precise and 
less wordy - than those which had preceded it. However the basic political position it 
outlined was very similar. The nationalist parties were accused of having paid only lip 
service to the needs of workers and peasants,while "hav[ing] shown in practice a 
complete lack of interest in the political, economic and social needs of the peasantry 
and working class, and by their actions hav[ing] proved themselves to be parties 
promoting the interests of imperial and Indian capitalism".27 Thus it was necessary 
that "A political party of workers and peasants be established to voice the demands of 
these classes within the National Congress, to promote the organisation of trade 
unions...to advance the organisation of peasants on the basis of their economic and
social requirements...and thus to secure the social, economic and political emancipation 
of these classes".2**
The Bombay and Calcutta WPP 's differed from previous such organisations in 
one important respect. In seeking to represent the masses within the INC, they also 
actively sought to build themselves a constituency which they could then 'represent', at 
a time when conditions were in some ways favourable to such an enterprise. How they 
did so, and with what success, we shall see later.
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The Communist Party of India
The various experiments with founding a party that would at once reflect Marxist 
and nationalist aspirations meant that there was little impetus for the formation of a 
communist party. The idea seems to have been floated for the first time just before the 
arrests of the Kanpur prisoners, by Dange. By his account, he raised the issue again in 
jail, where it met with a lukewarm response from his fellow prisoners.2^
In the event, the initiative which resulted in the founding of the Communist Party 
of India was taken not by one of the leading Indian communists, but by the lesser 
known Satyabhakta, leader of a Kanpur based 'Indian Communist Party' which he had 
established in late 1924.30 in 1925 Satyabhakta issued an invitation to all the existing 
communist groups in India to attend a conference in December of that year (to be held 
simultaneously with the Kanpur Congress of the INC), to found a Communist Party of 
India. The conference was well attended, but Satyabhakta himself was politically 
isolated at the conference, and left the newly formed party soon thereafter.21
In this way the Communist Party of India was founded, with a Central Executive 
Committee (CEC-including Ahmad, Singaravelu, K.N. Joglekar, and S.V. Ghate and 
J.P. Bagerhatta as General Secretaries) and an office to be established in Bombay.22 
These rather casual beginnings were reflected in the absence of any reference to the
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Comintern in the Party's first constitution, and in its failure to adopt any programmatic 
document. Indeed, in its first year, the Party could hardly be said to have existed at 
all,33 with its activities confined to little more than issuing a leaflet on communalism, 
and a brief propaganda tour planned as a lead up to greeting visiting Communist Party 
of Great Britain (CPGB) MP Shapuiji Saklatvala.
In 1927 the lack of international contacts and guidance began to be remedied. At 
its meeting in June the CEC adopted a new constitution which made adherence to the 
Comintern Programme a condition of membership. Acceding to Roy's requests, the 
new constitution also provided for a 'Foreign Bureau' of comrades outside the 
country, to act as an "ideological centre" and as "the organ through which the 
international relations of the party will be maintained".^4 Roy, Clemens Palme Dutt 
and Muhammed Ali were the members of the Foreign Bureau.
Both the Foreign Bureau and the Colonial Commission of the CPGB (which had 
been created in the aftermath of the Fifth Comintern Congress) were to maintain regular 
contact with the CPI. According to the Director of the Intelligence Bureau of the British 
Indian Government, from the latter half of the nineteen-twenties the Foreign Bureau 
was to send fifty or more letters to India, offering advice and instruction on a wide 
range of matters.35 Indian communists in fact now had more than one mentor, with 
the CPGB, and the Dutt brothers in particular (Clemens Dutt was a member of both the 
Colonial Commission and the Foreign Bureau) supplementing Roy.36 Indeed, with the 
despatch of its agents to India, the CPGB became the greater of the two influences. 
Two of these agents - Philip Spratt and Ben Bradley - were to prove active and able 
organisers from the time of their arrival in India (December 1926 and September 1927 
respectively) until their arrest, along with other communist leaders, in March 1929. 
Their active involvement in the Indian communist movement enhanced the prestige and 
influence of the CPGB.
Although there was now an avowedly communist party in India, attempts to 
develop and promote an organisational form reflecting a Marxist-nationalist 'synthesis'
did not cease. The natural inclination of Indian communists was to continue their 
activities in the WPP's, which they had played such an important role in founding.
This inclination was encouraged by their international contacts. By the mid- 
1920's both Roy and R.Palme Dutt had arrived at two related conclusions. First, since 
independence and bourgeois revolution, and not socialism, were the main tasks in 
India, Marxist theory and programmes had to reflect and incorporate these concerns. 
Second, such a synthesis required an organisational form embodying it and seeking to 
'implement' it in practice. Roy, as we saw in the last chapter, continued to offer 
(changing) advice on how this might be achieved. Thus as the WPFs began to register 
successes, they met with an encouraging and sympathetic response from Roy and the 
CPGB.
The effect of this was that, despite the existence of a CPI, the WPP's became the 
main area and vehicle for communist activity in India. Energies were directed at 
building the WPP's ; successive meetings of the CPI CEC urged members to so.37 At 
communist initiative, WPP's were founded for Punjab (April 1928) and United 
Provinces - Delhi (October 1928). And, while the WPP's grew in importance, the CPI 
in this period failed even to develop a press or launch a programme in its own name.38
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The Workers’ and Peasants' Parties
The two Workers' and Peasants' parties which had emerged out of the Labour 
Swaraj Party and the Congress Labour Party found themselves, by 1927, operating in 
a more favourable environment than that which their predecessors had faced. After a 
long period of disorganisation and relative absence of mass activity, which followed 
Gandhi's abrupt withdrawal of the Non-Cooperation movement, the INC and the 
nationalist movement began to pick up momentum. This coincided with the adoption of 
more militant policies and tactics by the INC, indicated by its declaration, at its 1927 
and 1929 Congresses, that complete independence was its goal, by its efforts at
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mobilizing mass opposition to the Simon Commission, and by the increasing 
importance within it of an increasingly radical Jawaharlal Nehru. 1927 also marked the 
beginning of a resurgence of labour militancy, a wave of labour-capital conflict which 
would surpass the tumultous conflicts of 1919 - early 1922.39 Whereas previous 
parties of this kind had been founded at a period of ebb in both nationalist and labour 
militancy,the WPP's were formed at the beginning of a resurgence in nationalist 
struggle, and at a period when the working class constituency they sought to represent 
was to assert itself as never before.
The WPP's were also better prepared than their predecessors to take advantage of 
such a situation. There were more socialists in India, and more experienced ones, than 
before. There was a CPI, composed of some of the most advanced and dedicated left 
elements in India, to guide them. And, despite the theoretical shortcomings of their 
1927 programmes, the WPP's were independent parties ; the scope of their activities 
was not limited by what could be achieved through the INC, but depended, in part, on 
what could be achieved outside of the ENC, amongst workers and peasants.
Within the ENC, the WPP's proposed and sought to mobilize support around 
programmes similar to those which had been proposed by M.N. Roy. Thus in 1927 
the Bombay WPP proposed a programme to the All-India Congress Committee 
(AICC), and at the end of the year the Bengal WPP submitted a manifesto to the 
Madras Congress of the INC. Both sought to commit the INC to leading a mass 
struggle for full independence, and to fighting for an independent nation where 
universal suffrage and peasant and worker rights were guaranteed.4^
In contrast to the situation when Roy had presented his proposals to the INC in 
the early nineteen-twenties, a party now existed to follow up these proposals. Given 
that such programmes were clearly not going to be adopted by the INC immediately, 
the task was to use them to mobilize and unite the left-wing elements within the INC. 
Thus WPP members worked as a fraction at the Madras Congress, seeking support for 
their manifesto and resolutions. The historic resolution which committed the INC, for
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the first time, to pursuit of full independence, was moved by Nehru and seconded by 
Joglekar, the latter a member of the Bombay WPP and the CPI CEC.41 Enough 
support crystallised around militant nationalist and leftist positions for a 'Republican 
Congress' to be held at the Congress pandal upon the conclusion of the Madras 
Congress, bringing together left wing delegates and presided over by Nehru.
Similar successes were registered at provincial and district level Congress 
organisations. The WPP's became a significant force in the Bombay and (less so) in 
the Bengal Provincial Congress Committees, both in terms of gaining representation 
and of influencing the policy and activities of these bodies. Representation was also 
secured on the AICC.
In the context of a general leftward drift within a section of the INC, then, the 
WPP's succeeded in some measure in putting militant nationalist demands and worker- 
peasant demands on the nationalist agenda, if not in actually getting the INC to adopt 
these. They played an important role in bringing together left forces in the INC. 
Finally, WPP members active in the ENC enhanced their own prestige and influence 
and that of their organisation.
The greatest successes of the WPP’s, however, and particularly of the Bombay 
WPP, occurred outside of, and sometimes despite, the INC - amongst the working 
class itself. By late 1928 the Bombay WPP had established unions on the docks, in the 
printing industry, on the trams and among municipal workers, and had considerable 
influence amongst GIP railway worker s and oil depot employees.42 Most important, 
they had established a strong base amongst the largest, oldest, most concentrated and 
most class-conscious section of the Indian proletariat - the Bombay textile workers.
The mid-1920’s were a period of serious depression and of labour-capital 
conflict in the Bombay textile industry. Management attempts to surmount the crisis by 
a series of measures designed to standardise wage rates and intensify the labour 
process (which necessitated redundancies) were met by resistance - largely sectoral
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and uncoordinated - from the workforce.4^  Strikes in this period heralded the major 
showdown which was to come, and they saw WPP members and sympathisers active 
in the mill areas - K.N. Joglekar, Dange, S.S. Mirajkar, and two worker leaders close 
to the WPP, A.A. Alve and G.R. Kasle - became well known and popular figures 
among the mill workers.
The expected showdown came in 1928. The general strike in Bombay's textile 
mills from late April to early October was total, an astonishing example of the militancy 
and class solidarity of the Bombay mill proletariat.44 It also saw the creation of the 
communist and WPP led Gimi Kamgar Union. Established part-way through the strike 
(in May), the GKU soon outstripped the moderate textile unions in influence and 
popularity. More than that, the GKU pioneered forms of strike organsation designed to 
allow workers control over the conduct of the strike. The system of 'mill committees' 
instituted by the GKU placed initiative and power in the hands of the workers 
themselves, building their confidence and militancy, and creating a cadre of worker- 
militants for the future.4^
After the strike was concluded, with employers forced to agree to return to 
previous wage rates and to suspend 'rationalizations' pending a report by an Enquiry 
Committee, the GKU drew the full fruits of its activites. Workers flocked to join the 
new union. In October, at the conclusion of the strike, membership was about 27,000 ; 
by December, about 50,000 ; by January 1929, possibly as much as 100,OOO4^
The 1928 mill strike saw the WPP extend its influence by organising workers 
around economic, class demands. However the work of linking these to national 
demands, and of seeking to involve the working class in the nationalist movement, was 
not entirely neglected. The WPP press organ, Kranti , propagandized on the 
connection between the workers economic grievances and the British rule in India, and 
the Party sought to effect a practical link between these.
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In this regard, the Bombay WPP registered an important success during the visit 
of the Simon Commission to Bombay in February 1928. The Simon Commission, 
appointed to draft recommendations for political change in India, but without any 
consultation with Indian opinion, was opposed by almost all shades of nationalist 
opinion. February 3 was declared by the INC to be an all-India protest day against the 
exercise, and the hartal and huge demonstrations which greeted the Simon Commission 
in Bombay owed much, in the judgement of the Bombay Commissioner of Police, to 
the communist's success in mobilizing workers for it.4  ^ WPP slogans and banners 
such as "Nothing Short of Independence" and "Living Wage" were prominent at the 
demonstrations.48
Thus by late 1928 the Bombay WPP had succeeded in organising, and 
establishing its influence over, a significant section of the Bombay proletariat, and in 
becoming an organised and not insignificant presence in the provincial Congress. It 
had üqI succeeded in translating its increased influence into organisational strength, nor 
is there evidence indicating that much of an attempt was made to do so. This, along 
with the worry that the Party was not sufficiently distinguished in the public eye from 
the INC, was a cause of concern, and was to contribute to a more assertive stance from 
the end of the year.
Despite this, the Party's achievements were considerable. Its influence within the 
Bombay working class was significant. Amongst mill workers the Party had a strong 
base, with the GKU being an organization of the WPP, and its executive committee 
composed almost entirely of WPP members. The party organ, Kranti , had become 
regular reading among mill workers diiring the 1928 strike. Party leaders, in 
consequence of the strike, commanded recognition and support; in one somewhat 
ungenerous description, they were "transformed in a few short weeks from a faction of 
self-important Congressmen to something close to a band of popular heroes".4^  One 
indication of the growing importance of the WPP and of the Bombay workers was the 
reaction of the British Government. Upon assuming office in late 1928, Frederick
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Sykes, new Governor of Bombay, identified "the labour situation, and especially the 
Communist agitation" as one of the two main problems confronting him (the other 
being the crisis in Government finance).50
The record of the Bengal WPP was more mixed. In 1926 (as the Peasants' and 
Workers' Party) it had only forty members, and as its Executive Committee Report of 
1928 admitted, "the Party was able to make little progress".^ In the following two 
years, however, progress was made. In 1927 the Bengal Jute Workers' Association 
affiliated to the WPP, and a number of officials of the union joined the Party. The party 
also established unions, in 1927 and 1928, amongst Calcutta Corporation scavengers, 
the carters of Burrabazaar, the workers at the Kesoram Cotton Mills in Calcutta, 
ordnance factory workers at lchapore, and the employees of the Angus Engineering 
works at Shamnagore.52
Party members were also active in the great strike wave of those years, in such 
major strikes as that of the Bengal-Nagpur Railway workers at Kharagpur in 1927, the 
long and bitter strike at the Lilloah rail workshops (January-July 1928), which saw 
police fire on workers and workers respond with massive marches through the 
industrial suburbs of Calcutta, and the jute mill strikes at Chengail and Bauria in 1928, 
which saw WPP activists and union leaders addressing the almost daily meetings of 
striking workers in the mill areas.
If, like its Bombay counterpart, the Bengal WPP was active in the working class 
upsurge of these years, it was also, however, less successful. WPP capacity to 
influence the Kharagpur railway workers strike was limited by moderates' control of 
the union, and the strike ended in failure. The strike at the Lilloah workshops ended in 
complete defeat, and with militant workers being victimised in the aftermath of the 
strike. Spratt was later to describe the Lilloah strike as a mistake which ended 
'tragically''.53 The jute mill strike at Chengail, primarily over the issue of union 
organisation, ended inconclusively, with the management forced to negotiate with the 
union, but refusing to accord it official recognition. The jute workers strike at Bauria,
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which began with a management lockout over worker resistance to an intensification of 
the labour process and retrenchments, was long (July 1928-January 1929), bitter and 
protracted. Despite attracting considerable public sympathy, the aggressive and 
sometimes violent prosecution of the dispute by management saw it end in defeat for 
the strikers.
Perhaps more than this, the Bengal WPP failed to establish any strong base - and 
any enduring union structure - among the working class. Its control of a few unions 
did not amount to the same thing, for unions in India were ffequentiy little more than a 
few self-appointed middle class union 'leaders'^4, with a real or paper membership, 
but no functioning union structure. The Bengal WPP failed to establish any equivalent 
of the GKU.55
The Party was also bedevilled by internal differences. The entry of some former 
Anushilan Samiti members into the Party in 1927 enhanced its prestige and influence, 
establishing a link between it and the main non-Congress nationalist current in Bengal, 
that of 'revolutionary terrorism'. But it also factionalized the Party. Two competing 
and hostile groups formed, one around Muzaffar Ahmad, CPI member and autocratic 
and doctrinaire guardian of communist orthodoxy, and the other around ex-terrorists 
Gopen Chakravarty and Dharani Goswami. This factionalism seriously impeded party 
work, and in 1929 led to a debilitating split.
Despite all this, the Bengal WPP succeeded in establishing its presence - it 
appears relatively unsuccessful only in comparison with its Bombay counterpart. Party 
members gained election to the All-India Trade Union Congress (AITUC) Executive, 
the Bengal Provincial Congress Committee, and the AICC.5  ^ It sought, like the 
Bombay WPP, to use its influence to involve workers in the nationalist struggle, and 
thereby influence the conduct of that struggle.
Thus in December 1928, together with radical Congressmen and trade union and 
peasant leaders, the WPP led over 20,000 workers in a dramatic storming of the
Calcutta Congress of the INC. After a scuffle the Congress session was temporarily 
suspended, and the workers and their leaders occupied the Congress auditorium, 
passing a resolution declaring that, "The mass meeting of the workers and peasants 
from all industries declare that we, the workers and peasants of the land shall not rest 
content till complete independence is established and all exploitation from capitalism 
and imperialism cease. We call upon the National Congress to keep that goal before 
them and organize the national forces for that purpose".^7 The Party was similarly 
active in mobilizing attendance for the big demonstration which greeted the Simon 
Commission upon its arrival in Calcutta in January 1929.58
The growing strength of the Bengal and and especially of Bombay WPP in the
n
trade union movement was reflected in the All-India Trade UnioNCongress (AITUC), 
which they made an important sphere of work. Working class militancy and, relatedly, 
the growing representation won by the WPP's in the AITUC, saw it abandon its stance 
of keeping a distance from political issues, a stance it had maintained since the mid­
twenties. From 1927 the AITUC began to adopt a position, and an increasingly militant 
one, on the important issues of the day, declaring itself against imperialism, for 
independence, and in favour of a "socialstic republican government of the working 
classes".59 At the ninth Congress of AITUC, in December 1928, WPP members felt 
sufficiently confident to contest the position of President, which they lost only 
narrowly, despite the fact that the opposing candidate was the highly popular 
Jawaharlal Nehru. When the first split in the AITUC occurred, at the end of 1929 it was 
the 'moderate' elements who left, finding themselves in a minority.
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The Workers' and Peasants Parties: From Practice to Theory
The formation of the WPP's marked the first successful attempt attempt at 
establishing viable Marxist parties, parties which succeeded in establishing real links 
with the class they sought to represent. The form they took and the policies they 
pursued endeavoured to combine Marxism and nationalism by effecting a relation
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between working class and nationalist struggle, between class demands and the 
national demand.
The WPP's came to do much more, however, than simply 'voice the demands' 
of workers and peasants in the INC, as their 1927 programme declared. They also 
organised trade unions and led strikes ; they sought to politicize workers and to involve 
them in the nationalist struggle ; and in doing so, they emerged as an independent force 
articulating an independent politics, both within and outside the INC.
Even in the early stages of this process, it seemed clear to the communists that 
the WPP's were the most appropriate organisational form through which to advance 
communist politics in India, and that this form should be developed and extended. In 
mid-1927 a CPI CEC meeting had called for the creation of WPP's wherever possible. 
A CEC meeting in December of that year announced that "the formation of an All-India 
Workers' and Peasants' Party was desirable in the near future". 60 It decided that a 
conference for this purpose should be convened in February or March 1928, and 
appointed Dange, Joglekar, Usmani and C.G. Shah to prepare resolutions and theses 
for the conference.
This was followed up by an extended Executive Committee meeting of the 
Bombay WPP held in early in 1928, and attended by representatives from the Bengal 
WPP as well as trade union and other sympathisers of the party. This meeting decided 
to launch an All-India Workers' and Peasants' Party (AIWPP) at a conference in April. 
The resolutions which had been commissioned at the December CPI CEC meeting 
were tabled and discussed.
As the conference to launch an AIWPP had to be deferred until December, the 
resolutions which had been prepared for it were, in the interim, adopted by the 
Bombay WPP (with some amendments) at its annual conference in March 1928, and 
(with further small changes) at the Bhatpara conference of the Bengal WPP on 31 
March -I April 1928. They were then reproduced for public distribution in A Call to
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Action , a pamphlet reporting the proceedings and resolutions of the Bhatpara 
conference.^1
These five resolutions or theses - a general political analysis cum programmatic 
statement, and resolutions on organisation, trade union, peasant and youth work - were 
impressive for their scope, and for their concrete and realistic analysis. The general 
resolution was also substantially different from the WPP programmes of 1927, 
indicating yet another attempt to combine Marxism and nationalism, this time in the 
light of the experiences gained since 1927.
At the heart of this 'Marxist-nationalism' were two linked propositions. First, 
that national independence and a bourgeois-democratic regime were in the immediate 
and long-term interests of the working class and of other exploited classes in India. It 
was both a good in itself and a necessary step to be achieved in pursuit of the socialist 
goal. The WPP, its resolution declared, "must demand on behalf of the masses 
complete independence, and the establishment of democracy - universal adult suffrage, 
freedom of speech etc., the abolition of the native states and the landlord system, and 
the guarantee of the economic, political and social rights which the workers and 
peasants as classes require". These would be achieved by a Constituent Assembly, 
which would declare independence and promulgate such rights. 62
Such a goal, the resolution went on to declare, was not sought by the Indian 
bourgeoisie, which to an increasing degree was in a position of "subordination but 
alliance" vis-a-vis the imperialist bourgeoisie, and which therefore sought 
"compromise with imperialism". Having abandoned leadership of the nationalist 
struggle, the bourgeoisie had become, in fact, an obstacle - "the bourgeoisie by the 
policy of acquiescence are obstructing the progress of India".63
This led on to the second fundamental proposition of the document - that "the 
industrial working class alone is fitted to lead this struggle through to the end", at the
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head of a mass movement composed of "the expoited sections of the population, the 
workers, the peasants, and the middle classes".^4
Neither of these propositions was new in the history of Marxism. The view that 
national independence was the immediate goal in the colonies, even from the viewpoint 
of the working class, had been held by most communists since the Second Congress of 
the Comintern in 1920. The assertion that the working class was also necessary, even 
central to nationalism, was a step which could logically follow, and one which had the 
considerable advantage of suggesting a necessary link between Marxism and 
nationalism. This was a step which, as we saw, Roy took. Now communists in India, 
because they were influenced by Roy and others, but also very much because of their 
own experiments and practical experience, were arguing similarly that the relation 
between national struggle and class struggle was a necessary one.
The WPP resolution deduced two main 'tasks' arising out of this claim. First, 
that since it was necessary for the working class to secure national independence 
before it could achieve socialism, it was also necessary to 'share' this goal and this 
struggle with others. That is, it could not be appropriated by the working class and by 
Marxism alone. Therefore it was necessary to work with and within the most important 
nationalist organization, the INC, precisely in order to develop a movement broader 
than the working class alone :
We must endeavour to make the Congress adopt a programme of mass 
demands and to support them in its current propaganda. We and our 
sympathisers must become members of the provincial and all-India 
congress committees, and take active part in such work as leads towards 
the development of [a] mass movement. We must support the Congress 
while it fights imperialism, but must not hesitate to criticize the 
compromising tendencies of Congress leaders, however prominent.65
However, and second, the fact that the working class was also seen as essential 
to the achievement of independence meant neither merely 'voicing the interests' of the 
working class in the INC, nor simply seeking to capture the INC, would do. Precisely
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because the mass movement was broader than could be encompassed by any one 
organisation, the crucial task was to organize the working class as a class, in order that 
it participate in and leave its decisive imprint on the nationalist struggle :
The fundamental work before the party is to organize the working class and 
give it sufficient political education to enable it to come forward as the leading 
section of the mass movement which is now rising in India.66
These two tasks, ways of realising in practise the necessary interdependence of 
the working class and the nationalist goal which was postulated in theory, required in 
turn an independent political party for their achievement A party was required to work 
within and outside the INC to build a mass movement of the exploited; to organize and 
politicize the working class, and make it an active element in the mass movement; and 
to do so in such a way that it eventually assumed leadership of that movement.
The task of building such a party could not be subordinated to pedagogic aims or 
to alliance building. Its fundamental relation was not with other parties which were 
premised on different but overlapping goals, but the mass nationalist movement which 
was rising and had to be built. Such a party would work with and through other parties 
in order to effect a relationship between Marxism and the nationalist movement, not 
between Marxism and nationalist parties. Thus it was necessary for it to have an 
independent and distinct identity :
The party must be prepared to cooperate, without losing its identity, with 
all parties and organisations which will fight for the liberation of India from 
imperialism. But the establishment of our own organisation is our first 
task...67
Based upon - and seeking to effect in practice -a relation between Marxism and 
nationalism, the party would reflect that in its own 'form'. It was a party which fell 
short of being communist, on the one hand. On the other, it was not simply a 'voice' 
within a nationalist party - the party was not the same as the nationalist movement 
(which included many classes and parties), but was the working class element of it, 
seeking to become the leading element
The resolutions of the Bhatpara conference indicated that by this point, in 1928, 
communists in India had arrived at a position in which the relationship between 
Marxism and nationalism was seen as a necessary one ; a position which neither simply 
'added' Marxism to nationalism, nor 'swallowed' the latter into the former. This was a 
position very similar to that of Roy's, though the practical conclusions drawn were 
somewhat different The WPP did not aim at capturing the INC, but rather at building a 
working class movement to the point where it could take over leadership of the 
nationalist struggle.
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The End of the Workers' and Peasants' Parties : the CPI's 'Left Turn'
The resolutions adopted at Bhatpara had been prepared for the All-India 
Workers' and Peasants' Party which was to have been launched early in 1928. 
However when the first conference of that party was held on December 23-28, 
substantially different resolutions were adopted. These contrasted sharply with the 
Bhatpara resolutions in being more critical of nationalist organisations, and in 
assigning the WPP an almost exclusive role as leader of the nationalist struggle.
In part this change in position arose out of the frustrations inherent in seeking to 
work through the INC as Congressmen, whilst at the same time seeking to build the 
WPP's. Many felt that the WPP was failing to establish its own identity or even gain 
credit for work it had done. The Bengal WPP Executive Committee Report, presented 
at Bhatpara, contained the following assessment - ''we have not been sufficiently 
aggressive...Party policy has not been brought sufficiently before the public which has 
been allowed to suppose that on such important questions as the boycott of the Simon 
Commission, or the boycott of British goods, we have no policies at all, or none 
different from those of the Swaraj Party ".68
Conversely, the very successes of the Bombay WPP in organising labour made 
the implementation of the other part of its brief - working through the INC -
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increasingly difficult. The 1928 Executive Committee Report of the Bombay WPP 
noted that although significant representation had been won in the Bombay Provincial 
Congress Committee, "there has been growing a systematic opposition to our group 
from the nationalist section which is more and more finding expression in the 
BPCC".69
Thus a desire to more strongly assert an independent WPP identity, along with 
tension over work in the INC, was already apparent in 1928. However the decisive 
factor in the 'left turn' of the WPP's between early and end 1928 was a change in 
Comintern line. The Sixth Congress of Comintern (July 17 -September I, 1928) 
declared that post-war capitalism had entered its 'third period', one characterised by 
"the most severe intensification of the general capitalist crisis",7  ^ as a result of which 
"the revolutionary crisis is coming inexorably to a head".71 As is well known, this 
analysis and the conclusions drawn from it had as much if not more to do with 
factional struggles in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and with Stalin's 
consolidation of his power as with any developments in capitalism. Whatever the 
reasons, the Sixth Congress, as we saw in Chapter 3, directed communists to shift to 
the 'united front from below', i.e., to 'expose' social-democratic parties and leaders to 
their followers, and similarly to expose bourgeois nationalist organisations in the 
colonies. In the case of policy regarding India, Roy and the CPGB were attacked for 
allegedly holding the view that India was being rapidly industrialized and 
decolonised,77 the 'national reformism' of bourgeois parties such as the INC was 
identified as a major obstacle to bourgeois revolution and national independence, and 
the WPP's were criticised.
On the latter point, the "Theses on the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies 
and Semi-Colonies" adopted by the Congress abruptly declared,
Special Workers' and Peasants' Parties, whatever revolutionary character 
they may possess, can too easily, at particular periods, be converted into 
ordinary petty bourgeois parties, and, accordingly, Communists are not 
recommended to organize such parties.7^
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The left tum of the Comintern did not have an immediate impact in India. The 
change in line took quite some time to reach Indian communists. The main contact of 
the Indian communists with the Comintern was through Roy and the CPGB, who do 
not seem to have hastened to advise abandonment of positions they had championed. 
But by late 1928, a vague knowledge of the trend of the Sixth Congress was filtering 
through. It found an echo in the resolutions adopted by the AIWPP Conference.74
Thus in the 'Political Resolution' adopted at the AIWPP Conference, the twin 
tasks of the WPP's, as defined earlier in the year - to organise and politicise the 
working class, and to radicalise the INC and use it to build a mass nationalist 
movement - were effectively reduced to one. The report cited as the important 
development of the year the retreat, on the one hand, of "almost all parties of the 
bourgeoisie, including the Congress, in support of a timid liberal programme of 
constiutional demands", and on the other, "Considerable increase in the strength and 
militancy of the mass movement".7  ^ From this it concluded that the old policy of 
seeking to work within and influence the INC had to be abandoned - "The Workers' 
and Peasants' Party is the representative of the advancing mass movement...The two 
movements separate, and their leading organizations must do so also". WPP members 
were instructed to remain in the INC for the moment, but only for the purpose of 
"exposing its reactionary leadership".7*>
Presented as a reaction to political developments, this change of position in fact 
reflected a more fundamental theoretical shift. Previously the WPP's were careful to 
distinguish between the mass nationalist movement, composed of many parties and 
classes, and the WPP,the representative of the working class. The task was precisely 
to develop both and place the latter at the head of the former. However now the 
development of a mass movement was seen to depend upon the working class, under 
the WPP, taking a leading role. Such leadership was not something to be achieved, but 
was the necessary premise of political action :
162
it is necessary to insist more strongly than has been done previously upon 
the independent role of the WPP, as the only organization which has a 
correct policy and can unite and lead all the mass revolutionary forces of 
the Country...It is the only genuine representative of the rising mass 
movement.77 (emphasis added).
This dramatic change of position from the Bhatpara resolutions, intended for an 
AIWPP, to the resolutions ultimately adopted, was nevertheless not sufficient to satisfy 
the Comintern. Kuusinen's report at the Sixth Congress, and the Theses adopted there, 
did not simply criticize WPP policy ; they criticized the WPP's as an organisational 
form. This was repeated in the ECCI message of greeting to the AIWPP Conference, 
which in calling upon the conference to "discuss the question of separating the 
workers' organization from the peasants' organizations"7  ^ effectively called - as the 
Sixth Congress had not - for the dissolution of existing WPP's.
This step the Indian communists were unwilling to take.79 They opted instead, at 
their December 1928 and March 1929 CEC meetings, to placate the Comintern by 
reorganizing the CEC, adopting a new constitution, and resolving to do more political 
work and issue more propaganda in the name of the CPI.80
It was in this situation of uncertainty, as the CPI leadership endeavoured to adapt 
to the Comintern's new line without completely abandoning the theory and practice it 
had so laboriously developed, that the British settled the issue. On March 20 1929, 
thirty-one CPI and WPP leaders were arrested.
Although the Meerut Conspiracy Case trial was to prove something of a 
propaganda triumph for the communists, it also deprived the fledgling CPI of most of 
its most able and experienced leaders. This had the effect, not only of disorganising the 
CPI and the WPP, but also of facilitating adoption of the Comintern line. The 
inexperienced figures who rose to assume leadership of the CPI proved less able - and 
less willing - to resist the Comintern line.81
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The Tenth Plenum of the ECCI in July 1929, in any case, eliminated any room 
for manoeuvre. The left turn taken at the Sixth Congress was reaffirmed and taken 
further, and 'right deviationists'- Bukharin, Lovestone and others - were removed 
from the ECCI. The colonial bourgeoisie was now found to be outrighdy 'counter­
revolutionary', and with reference to India the Tenth Plenum declared, "The tasks of 
the Indian revolution can only be solved through struggle for the revolutionary 
democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry under the banner of 
Soviets.. .".82
By late 1929 the CPI had come to be under the direct tutelage of the Comintern. 
Intermediaries such as Roy and the CPGB were dispensed with - the latter being 
expelled from Comintern in late 1929 - as a succession of ECCI representatives came 
to India bearing instructions and supervising their implementation.
Developments in India also facilitated adoption of an ultra-leftist line. A second 
general strike of textile workers occurred from April-August 1929, this time led from 
the outset by the communist controlled GKU. However this time the mill-owners were 
better prepared, and moreover had full government support. This, combined with 
tactical mistakes and an excessive prolongation of the strike by the communists, led to 
its defeat and to the near-collapse of the GKU. In one stroke, the Bombay communists 
lost much of the organisation and support they had built up. In Bengal, the simmering 
factional differences within the WPP erupted into a split. The Chakravarty-Ghoswami 
faction who had earlier walked out of the AIWPP Conference quit the party altogether 
in early 1929, and formed a 'People's Party'.83 Public recriminations and abuse 
followed, leaving the party organisationally weakened and with greatly diminished 
political credibility.^4
This general weakening facilitated the slide into sectarianism. As the communists 
proved less able to influence events, they took more readily, with encouragement from 
the Comintern, to denouncing those who could. Attacks on the INC, and especially its 
left wing, grew more frequent and acquired an increasingly hysterical tone. And, as the
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exclusive role of the CPI as leader of the masses came to be increasingly asserted, the 
WPP's themselves came under attack.
In early 1930, the newly established organ of the CPI, Workers Weekly , ran a 
series of articles on the WPP's. Although not entirely unappreciative, the articles 
voiced strong criticism. "The WPP movement" pronounced the Workers Weekly ,"  in 
its basic, fundamental theoretical premises, was a Congress movement. It did not 
advocate the hegemony and leadership of the working class in the Indian national 
struggle...Its programme was not a communist programme. It reflected [the] petty 
bourgeois socialism of [the] Indian petty bourgeoisie".^
This somewhat malicious accusation was correct on two counts - that the 
WPP's did not put forward a communist programme, and that the 'fundamental 
theoretical premises' underlying them were what were now under challenge. For it was 
now held that a mass nationalist movement could, by definition, only develop under 
communist leadership and with the working class at the forefront. WTiat was required, 
therefore, were not workers' and peasants' parties, but workers and peasants 
organisations , led by the CPI. The Workers Weekly concluded, "We believe that it 
will be much better...to reorganise the WPP into some sort of a federation of workers 
and peasants organizations".^
Indeed, the second conference of the AIWPP in end-1929 was also its last. By 
the time the "Draft Platform of Action" of the CPI was published in Inprecor in 
December 1930 - the first full programme of the party - the WTP's were dead and 
buried. The "Draft Platform" did not even deign to mention the WPP's, but its contents 
made it apparent that the 'fundamental theoretical premises' underlying the formation of 
the WPP's had disappeared altogether. Not only did it declare that national revolution 
could only occur under the aegis of the CPI and that the INC and especially its left 
wing were the main obstacle to revolution, and so on. It also announced that the main 
objectof the Indian revolution was not a Constituent Assembly and a bourgeois-
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democratic republic, but "Establishment of a Soviet Government...The creation of an 
Indian Federal Workers' and Peasants' Soviet Republic".^
The CPI’s lurch to the left did not involve any repudiation of the struggle for 
national liberation. On the contrary, nationalism, it was declared could have no 
existence independent of the CPI. The nationalist goal could only be realised by a 
communist party, and could only take the form of a (non-bourgeois) Workers' and 
Peasants' Republic, itself a stage in the march towards full socialism. But the corollary 
of this was that Marxists did cease to engage with nationalist organisations . These, 
because they were now regarded as not 'truly' nationalist, were treated as obstacles 
needing to be exposed, denounced and overcome.
The sectarianism underlying the exclusive role assigned to the CPI, far from 
building the party, split it. Regional communist groupings developed separately and in 
opposition to each other. The new leadership was at loggerheads with the old, publicly 
criticizing the jailed leaders and even withdrawing their party membership for the 
duration of their jail terms. The new leadership itself was factionalized and repeatedly 
split. In the Party's own, later verdict on this period, "The CPI was actually reduced to 
a number of small local circles functioning without a centre, continuously fighting one 
another and even denouncing the old leadership confined at Meerut". 8 8
This failure to build the CPI was part of a broader political failure. In early 1930 
the second great wave of nationalist struggle began, as Gandhi launched the Civil 
Disobedience movement. At the very moment when the nationalist struggle once again 
became a mass struggle, led by an INC with a growing left wing, the communists 
directed the bulk of their energies to attacking the INC and its left wing. The 
communist's declarations that the national struggle could only be led by the working 
class and the CPI remained that - declarations, and moreover ones which ensured their 
marginality to the great struggles of the time. Far from leading the nationalist struggle, 
the CPI was confined to a carping role at its margins. The working class, far from
spearheading the struggle, played less of a role in it than it had played during the Non-
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Cooperation movement, before there were any communist groups in India.
Conclusion
In contrast to the course which the communist movement in Europe followed in 
determining its attitude to the colonial question, the first converts to Marxism in India 
began as nationalists, seeking to in some way redefine nationalism with the aid of 
Marxist concepts.
The first fruits of this labour were programmatic documents and political parties 
which sought to broaden the concerns of nationalism ; attempts to point out and correct 
what were perceived as shortcomings and omissions in the methods and goal of the 
Indian nationalist movement. Very soon communists in India were addressing the same 
question which Roy and communists in other colonial countries were grappling with : 
namely - what role could Marxism play in the colonies, and in what ways could that be 
shown to be, and / or made to be, an important one. The way in which Indian 
communists sought to answer this was, we might say, by translating what appeared as 
a moral imperative in Gandhi vs. Lenin - that national liberation should be linked to 
and address the question of social inequality - into a structural necessity, a must. *
This, of course, was precisely what Roy sought to do. That Indian communists 
did likewise, despite their different point of departure, undoubtedly owed something to 
Roy's influence on them. It also, however, indicated something more than just the 
'influence' of mentors. With Marxism Indian radicals asked new questions of 
nationalism, and posed it new tasks. To act upon these insights to make them 'real', to 
transform nationalism on the basis of insights gained through Marxism, required 
making Marxism relevant to politics in India. The relevance and importance of 
Marxism could best be established in theory, and best demonstrated in practice, if it
could be shown that the connection between Marxism and nationalism was necessary ,
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not merely 'possible', or 'desirable'.
The alleged importance of the working class and the peasantry to national 
liberation, and the importance of 'class demands' to these two groups, became 
central to this new theoretical construction. The class which in Marxist theory was seen 
as the bearer and instrument of achieving socialism, it came to be argued, was essential 
to national liberation as well. The realisation of national liberation thus depended upon 
success in mobilizing the working class, which in turn required class issues becoming 
part of nationalist demands and struggle. In this way the existence of a 'necessary' 
relation between Marxism and nationalism was argued - indirectly, by suggesting a 
necessary relation between nationalist struggle and class struggle.
None of this is to suggest that there was a theoretical imperative, a logical 
necessity, governing this theoretical evolution. It did not inevitably follow, by some 
immanent logic of Marxism, that once having taken an important first step - that of 
acknowledging the existence of classes in the nationalist movement - it was necessary 
to proceed to believing that class and nationalist struggle were inextricably interlinked. 
Many accepted that the nationalist goal was too narrow, and its methods adapted to the 
interests of an elite, without arriving at the conclusion that the working class and 
peasantry had to lead the nationalist struggle, or that the latter classes could only be 
mobilised on the basis of economic-class demands. There were many who shared 
Dange's concerns in Gandhi vs. Lenin , but who did not go on to embrace the 
positions that Dange and others came to embrace. Such people did not, by and large, 
identify themselves as communists, and they were certainly not regarded as such by 
those who did see themselves as communists. Only those were communists who went 
on to argue and to seek to effect a necessary relation between the class struggle and the 
national struggle ; or, to put it another way, it was only those who took this further 
step who became communists.
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Why should this come to be so ? The cause, once again, arises out of the way in 
which the colonial question came to be posed within Marxism. Once it was conceded 
that national liberation was the first project in the colonies, it was at least theoretically 
possible to be passionately committed to socialism and yet to believe that Marxism 
was, for the moment at least, of secondary importance in the colonies, and that there 
was no specifically 'Marxist' task at hand. Such a position went against the spirit of 
Marxism, and those who embraced communism in India sought a much more active, 
and important role. In defining their role, they came to stress - but also to seek to 
actively create - a mutually reinforcing relationship between the nationalist movement 
and the movement of workers and peasants which they were trying to build.
Thus the defining feature of Marxism in India in this period, and the meaning of 
the word 'communist', came to be precisely this - those who sought to link class 
struggle with national struggle, in the belief that nationalism was necessary for the 
oppressed classes of India, and that these classes were necessary to national liberation. 
Initially the efforts to translate this theoretical claim into practice were undertaken not 
through a communist party, but through the Workers' and Peasants' Parties. These 
sought their constituency amongst the working class and (secondarily) the peasantry, 
concentrating on their needs and demands as a class, but also seeking to link these with 
nationalist agitation. They did so in a relatively undogmatic way, not confusing the 
claim that only the working class could lead a successful nationalist struggle with the 
belief that this class actually was leading the struggle. At a time when this strategy had 
yielded some results, but was also showing signs of strain, it was abandoned at the 
behest of the Comintern.
For reasons that had little to do with India, the Comintern imposed a new line on 
Indian communists. Communists in India and elsewhere were instructed to cease 
'engaging' with nationalist organisations, and instead to devote their energies to 
'exposing' the nationalist pretensions of these organisations.
169
At this very time the effort to find and establish connections between Marxism 
and nationalism was being continued from another quarter. Jawaharlal Nehru, fresh 
from a visit to the Soviet Union and from having attended the Congress of Oppressed 
Nationalities of the East, having recently 'discovered' the poor and exploited of India, 
was making his own attempts to combine nationalism with Marxism.
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'Nehruvian Socialism', 1927-37 : Marxism in the Service of 
Nationalism
In 1927, whilst in Europe, Jawaharlal Nehru proclaimed himself to be a 
socialist. A year after his return to India, in his Presidential Address to the Lahore 
Congress (December 29,1929), he declared :
I must frankly confess that I am a socialist and a republican, and am no 
believer in kings and princes, or in the order which produces the modem 
kings of industry, who have greater power over the lives and fortunes of 
men than even the kings of old, and whose methods are as predatory as 
those of the old feudal aristocracy.1
Over six years later, upon the occasion of his second Presidential address to the 
Indian National Congress, at Lucknow, Nehru reaffirmed his commitment:
I am convinced that the only key to the solution of the world's problem and 
of India's problem lies in socialism, and when I use this word I do so not 
in a vague, humanitarian way but in the scientific, economic sensed
In the intervening years, Nehru had propagated his socialist ideal at innumerable 
youth and trade union conferences, peasant gatherings, and Congress organised public 
meetings. He had urged the desirability and at times the inevitability of socialism in 
many of his published writings - most notably the series of newspaper articles 
published in October 1933 under the title, "Whither India?", and in his acclaimed 
Autobiography, written in gaol between June 1934 and February 1935. Above all, 
Nehru had propagated socialism within the Indian National Congress, seeking to 
educate and persuade the INC's membership of its necessity, and constantly urging
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upon the INC that it define its goal of independence more clearly - and to make that 
'definition' consist of social and economic change for the benefit of the 'masses'. 
Such urgings sometimes brought Nehru into conflict with the more conservative 
elements which dominated the INC^, but they also yielded some limited successes. 
The 'Resolution on Fundamental Rights' adopted by the INC at its Karachi Congress 
in 1931, which declared that "This Congress is of the opinion that in order to end the 
exploitation of the masses, political freedom must include real economic freedom of 
the millions"4, was the outcome of Nehru's persistent efforts. The emphasis placed 
by the INC on economic issues during the election campaign of 1936-37 had much to 
do with Nehru's urgings, and he was the most energetic and effective campaigner for 
the Congress in the lead-up to the election. Nehru was also virtually the sole architect 
of the anti-imperialist and generally 'progressive' policies adopted by the INC on 
international issues.
In the years following 1936, the emphasis Nehru placed on socialism lessened, 
although he did not renounce his adherence to it. With independence and the 
assumption of power by the INC, and by Nehru personally, socialist rhetoric 
increasingly served to justify the pursuit of state-capitalist ends.
However, in the years 1927-37, there is no doubting the sincerity of Nehru's 
convictions and the energy with which they were pursued. This was something other 
than the - by now familiar - pattem of nationalists in colonial countries more-or-less 
cynically employing Marxist rhetoric in the service of non-Marxist ends. 'Nehruvian 
socialism' was characterised by a seriousness of intent and an intellectual coherence 
that marked it as a politically and intellectually genuine attempt to combine nationalist 
and socialist goals.
Nehru's socialist declarations were frequently delivered from Congress 
platforms, and were usually couched in the first person, as in the two passages quoted 
above. The use of the first person was a consequence of Nehru's position - that of a 
nationalist and a socialist who played a leading role in a heterogeneous, non-socialist
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nationalist organisation. The sometimes President and frequent General Secretary of 
the INC could only speak for himself when speaking of socialism.
This 'position' was itself an indication of one of the defining features of Nehru's 
socialism - the fact that nationalism, and a commitment to the INC, were the 
foundations upon which it was based. Nehru's conversion to socialism did not 
compromise his absolute dedication to the nationalist cause and to the INC as the 
vehicle for its pursuit Where his commitment to the INC came into conflict with other 
commitments or beliefs, the same pattem invariably ensued : personal crisis and soul 
searching, the occasional threat of resignation, but always, in the end, capitulation.5
This assignation of priority to nationalism and the INC was not only reflected in 
Nehru's practice as a political activist; it was provided with a theoretical justification 
by him. Despite the importance of socialism, the national goal, under 'present 
conditions' - namely, the British subjugation of India - of necessity had priority. 
Sometimes this was argued with reference to the existing level of consciousness of the 
Indian people :
It seemed clear to me that nationalism would remain the outstanding urge 
till some measure of political freedom was attained. Because of this the 
Congress had been, and was still (apart from certain labour circles) the 
most advanced organisation in India, as it was far the most powerful...It 
had not exhausted its utility yet, and was not likely to do so till the 
nationalist urge gave place to the social one. Future progress, both 
ideological and in action, must therefore be largely associated with the 
Congress...6 (emphasis added).
At other times, the priority assigned to the nationalist goal has 'structural' 
causes. Nehru tells an audience of railway workers,
it is obvious that in order to have socialism in this country, we must have 
political power in our hands...We have thus two definite things to work for 
and to fight for, and the first in order of precedence is independence.7
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If so far in this work we have examined the attempts of Marxists to 'become' 
nationalists, in Nehru we encounter the opposite - one for whom nationalism always 
came first, and who sought to 'graft' socialism onto nationalism.
This did not mean that Nehru's socialism was confined to public declarations. It 
did mean, however, that Nehru's various activities in promoting the socialist ideal 
were constrained by his commitment to nationalism and to the INC. Nehru sought, 
above all else, to radicalise the INC - to introduce socialist elements, step by step, into 
the programme and practice of the INC. He sought to do so at a pace which would not 
endanger the unity of an ideologically diverse organisation. Thus in his 1936 
Presidential address to the INC, after proclaiming his commitment to socialism, Nehru 
hastens to reassure his audience regarding his method of achieving i t :
Much as I wish for the advancement of socialism in this country, I have no 
desire to force the issue in the Congress and thereby create difficulties in 
the way of our struggle for independence. I shall cooperate gladly...with 
all those who work for independence even though they do not agree with 
the socialist solution. But I shall do so stating my position frankly and 
hoping in the course of time to convert the Congress and the country to it^
Thus unlike Roy and the Indian communists examined earlier, the organisational 
and strategic aspects of the struggle for socialism did not figure prominently in 
Nehru's thought or activity. The nationalist and the socialist goals were both to be 
sought, for the moment, through the INC. The task of promoting socialism therefore 
became an essentially ideological one - of winning over increasing numbers of 
adherents to socialism, and thereby facilitating the radicalisation of the INC. Even the 
shortlived radical organisations Nehru helped establish - the Republican Congress and 
the Independence for India League - functioned within the INC and had an essentially 
ideological and educational role. Similarly Nehru's public speeches were an exercise 
in 'converting' the Congress and the country. As he wrote of his hectic touring in 
1928, "I wanted to spread the ideology of socialism especially among the Congress 
workers and the intelligentsia...".9
If, as all this suggests, Nehru's case is one of a nationalist who sought to 
combine his nationalism with socialism, any study of Nehru's thought should begin 
with his nationalism.
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The Unity of India
The first question which Nehru had to address - as indeed did any Indian 
nationalist - was, what is India? What is this entity for which 'independence' is being 
sought, what constitutes its unity and distinguishes it from other nations?
This question had become particularly pressing and particularly difficult to 
answer with the growth of communalism in the nineteen-twenties. A brief period of 
Hindu-Muslim cooperation under the nationalist banner ended soon after the abrupt 
withdrawal of the Non-Cooperation / Khilafat movement. From the mid-1920's, one 
of the characteristic features of Indian politics was communal violence and a 
proliferation of communal bodies.
Thus Indian nationalists had to establish not only that the British had no right to 
dominion over India. They had also to establish, in argument and in practice, that there 
was an 'India', a unified collective entity rather than a congerie of (warring) religions, 
castes and princely states.
Part of Nehru's answer to the question, what constitutes the unity of India, is 
culture. In an article directly addressed to this question, entitled "The Unity of India", 
Nehru writes that despite the immense variety of India, "the tremendous or 
fundamental fact of India is her essential unity throughout the ages...This Indian 
background and unity were essentially cultural". ^
Similarly in The Discovery of India , Nehru writes that although Gujaratis, 
Punjabis, Kashmiris and others all have their own 'peculiar characteristics', they are 
nevertheless also 'distinctively Indian'. For "Ancient India, like ancient China, was a
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world in itself, a culture and a civilisation which gave shape to all things...Some kind 
of a dream of unity has occupied the mind of India since the dawn of civilisation".1 1
Nehru is only too well aware, however, that 'Indian civilisation' is composed of 
many religions, languages and customs - is composed, in short, of many cultures. 
What allows us to assimilate all these into a single, all-encompassing 'Culture'? The 
answer is that Indian culture was an eclectic mix of all these diverse elements. Or, as 
Nehru prefers it, it was a 'synthesis' :
we see in the past that some inner urge towards synthesis, derived 
essentially from the Indian philosophic outlook, was the dominant feature 
of Indian cultural and even social development. Each incursion of foreign 
elements was a challenge to this culture, but it was met successfully by a 
new synthesis and a process of absorption. This was also a process of 
rejuvenation and new blooms of culture arose out of it, the background and 
essential basis, however, remaining much the same.1^
This composite culture was dominated, it is true, by one particular strand 
within it - Hinduism. Hinduism in pre-modem times, however, was "vague, 
amorphous, many sided, all things to all men. It is hardly possible to define it...".15 
Because it could not be defined, because it was a 'way of life' rather than a religion, it 
was inclusive rather than exclusive. Indian culture was Hindu only in the sense that it 
was marked by a flexibility and tolerance which enabled it to synthesise many cultures 
into the one culture, one dominated not by any specific set of beliefs and practices, but 
by the principle of tolerance.14 Thus "A Christian or a Moslem could, and often did, 
adapt himself to the Indian way of life and culture, and yet remained in faith an 
orthodox Christian or Moslem. He had Indianised himself and become an Indian 
without changing his religion".15
Culture, then, is part of Nehru's answer as to what constitutes the unity of 
India. Taken by itself, however, this answer does not satisfy him. For this unity is 
the combination (or synthesis) of so many particularities of religion, caste, custom and 
so on. It is not an inner or organic unity - unless all these particularities are conceived,
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in metaphysical terms, as so many 'expressions' of a single Geist. Although Nehru is 
not above recourse to such an argument (particularly in writings after the period under 
consideration, such as The Discovery o f India ) it does not satisfy his desire for 
intellectual clarity. Moreover, as we shall shortly see, Nehru is a vehement critic of 
many of these particularities ; it is not upon these that he wishes to found an 
independent nation.
Furthermore, such a unity is an unconscious one. Culture may provide bonds 
which unite Hindus and Muslims, Bengalis and Pathans, and so on ; but it does not 
provide a subjective desire to realise and express this unity politically, in the form of a 
nation-state.Nehru himself writes that even if a cultural unity has existed in India for 
thousands of years,
The desire for political unity, in India as in other countries before the 
advent of nationalism, was usually the desire of the ruler or of the 
conqueror and not of the people as a whole.16
It is only with the rise of nationalism that an 'objective' unity finds subjective 
expression :
The growth of the powerful nationalist movement in India, represented by 
the National Congress, has demonstrated the political unity of India...This 
voluntary organisation, commanding the willing allegiance of millions, has 
played a great role in fixing the idea of Indian unity in the minds of our 
masses.17
Culture may provide the foundations for unity, but this unity finds its active 
expression in an organisation, one which represents the will of the people. This 
organisation is the Congress, which is at once the proof of the unity of India (because 
it commands the 'willing allegiance of millions'), and the instrument for forging that 
unity. It is the latter because even the INC is not an adequate expression of the unity 
of India. It is an instrument in pursuit of that goal which will properly express that 
unity - Swaraj, or independence.
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What is Swaraj? Seeking to present this idea in a form relevant and accessible 
to a semi-rural audience in the town of Sultanpur, Nehru describes it as follows :
Swaraj means a kind of panchayati [village council] rule under which the 
common people will elect their representatives and manage their own 
affairs...a panchayati mle in which all the people of the country -whether 
they are Hindus, Muslims, or people of any other faith - will have equal 
rights and they will rule their country, with the help of these rights.1**
The unity of India is to be embodied in a nation-state, where all people, 
irrespective of their religious and other identities, will have equal rights - above all, the 
right to representation. The Indian nation will represent the ’Indian people' without 
regard to their numerous particularities. This is the message Nehru takes to the Indian 
masses, particularly to the peasant who, with his 'limited outlook', had to be taught 
the meaning of 'India' and of independence. In The Discovery of India Nehru 
describes the pattern of his nationalist pedagogy as he toured the Indian countryside 
during the election campaign of 1936-37 :
Sometimes as I reached a gathering, a great roar of welcome would greet 
me : Bharat Mata ki jai ,'Victory to Mother India'. I would ask them 
unexpectedly what they meant by that cry, who was this Bharat Mata , 
Mother India, whose victory they wanted? My question would amuse 
them and surprise them...I persisted in my questioning. At last a vigorous 
Jat, wedded to the soil from immemorial generations, would say that it was 
the dharti, the good earth of India, that they meant - What earth? Their 
particular village patch, or all the patches in the district or province, or in 
the whole of India? And so question and answer went on, till they would 
ask me impatiently to tell them all about i t  I would endeavour to do so and 
explain that India was all this that they had thought, but it was much 
more...what counted ultimately were the people of India, people like them 
and me, who were spread out all over this vast land Bharat Mata , Mother 
India, was essentially these millions of people, and victory to her meant 
victory to these people. You are parts of this Bharat Mata , I told them, you 
are in a manner yourselves Bharat Mata. . .^
Despite some use of an imagery which belongs to a nationalism very different to 
Nehru's own - the nation as M other^ - this is an eminently 'modem' nationalism.
The nation is the people who constitute it, and whom it represents. But this 'people' is 
itself, of course, a construct - to characterise Hindus, Muslims and so on as 'the 
people' is to abstract from their particularities a common essence, and thereby 
construct them as homogeneous. Thus the demand for an Indian nation is at once 
made possible because an abstract and homogeneous 'people' have been posited, and 
its achievement also creates this people - the Indian nation, once founded will, through 
its panoply of abstract laws and juridical rights, constitute out of Punjabis, Gujaratis, 
Hindus and so on an Indian people.
Culture, then, is a point of departure in Nehru's argument for the unity of India, 
but the argument itself departs from its reliance upon culture. It is a shared culture - 
with all the particularities of religion, caste, language and region which that implies - 
which confers unity upon India. But 'India' is not simply culture ; this unity finds its 
concrete expression, its material embodiment, in the form of a nation-state, which 
must posit and render its own foundations abstract and homogeneous - as a 'people'. 
India is thus the Indian people stripped of all their particularities ; the citizen is the 
foundation of the nation.
The constituent elements of this nationalism are rooted in a history and a culture 
other than that of India. Some of the central concepts in Nehru's nationalism - the 
people, democracy, rights, representation - derive from a sensibility different to that 
which informed the nationalism of a Tilak or a Gandhi. This 'sensibility' makes its 
first appearance, and is elaborated, in the course of the European Enlightenment, and it 
is this Enlightenment sensibility which is at the heart of Nehru's very notion of 
'India'. We turn now to a further examination of this aspect of Nehru's thought
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Rationalism and Historcism
The independent India for which Nehru struggles is one which will be modem. 
One of the central aspects of modernity, which accompanies and defines it, is the
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sovereignty of Reason. Nehru is one of her most ardent champions. Thus he urges a 
youth conference to "reject also everything, however hallowed it may be by tradition 
and convention and religious sanction, if your reason tells you that it is wrong or 
unsuited to the present condition".2*
As this passage indicates, Nehru espouses Reason in a battle against unreason. 
In an unpublished article he writes of India, "The world has marched on and left us far 
behind immersed in our superstitions and observances which we do not even 
understand".22 in India, "Our chief enemy today is absence of reason, and its 
necessary consequence - bigotry" 22 The corrective to this, which Nehru continually 
urges, is that "We must honour reason more and test everything by the light of that 
reason...We must cultivate the spirit of enquiry and welcome all knowledge whether 
the source of it is the East or the West".24
Thus reason or science are the 'spirit of the age',2  ^ and they must also be 
applied to the manner in which the independence struggle is conceived and conducted. 
The mysticism and revivalism which have accompanied the growth of Indian 
nationalism must be rejected :
Our politics must be either those of magic of of science. The former of 
course requires no argument or logic ; the latter is in theory at least entirely 
based on clarity of thought and reasoning...Personally, I have no faith in 
or use for the ways of magic and religion and I can only consider the 
question on scientific grounds.2^
Such an Enlightenment espousal of reason, science and critical enquiry - of 
rationalism, to employ a convenient shorthand- was not new in the history of Indian 
nationalism. Such an outlook - albeit in a less consistent and uncompromising version 
- more or less dominated the Congress before the advent of the Extremists and, later, 
of Gandhi.
Such a rationalism, however, sat uneasily with nationalism. Since science was 
seen as a peculiarly European product, and its arrival in India was inseparable from the
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British conquest of India, admiration for and a desire to emulate this ’virtue' were not 
easily compatible with a militant nationalism.
This dilemma found all manner of resolutions. Very schematically,we may 
identify three. One was to accept science and reason (and, usually, rule of law, stable 
government etc.) as European qualities worthy of respect and emulation, superior to 
an Indian tradition of unreason. In this case - and this was the dilemma of Indian 
liberalism - rationalism compromised nationalism. 'Demands' for self-government 
took the form, not of demands, but of appeals - appeals to the British to confer upon 
India those British rights and traditions which the Indian supplicants so greatly 
admired and desired. This 'Moderate' or liberal tradition was later to be denounced as 
'mendicancy', as Indian nationalism took a more assertive and militant form in the 
late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Another 'solution' to this problem was to reject the claims of European science 
and reason to superiority, in favour of an Indian tradition, usually one of faith and 
spirituality. Here, nationalism was maintained by a rejection of rationalism - but 
inconsistently, for inasmuch as this solution still aimed at founding a modem nation, it 
necessarily drew upon a European tradition.
A third solution was to acknowledge the superiority of the West in certain 
matters, but to characterise these as 'material' or even technical; and to postulate the 
existence of another domain which was peculiarly Indian. From this position, a 
synthesis could be sought, one in which Western virtues could be acknowledged and 
emulated whilst leaving an Indian 'core' intact. Such a resolution bifurcated the world 
and knowledge of it into two domains ; further, in self-consciously seeking to identify 
and define the Indian / spiritual domain it almost inevitably defined that as essentially 
Hindu.
In the case of Nehru, rationalism is not compromised in any such way. For his 
rationalism is accompanied by a rejection of essentialising categories in favour of a 
historicism :
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We are often told that there is a world of difference between the East and 
the West. The West is said to be materialistic, the East spiritual, religious, 
etc...but there is no such thing as East and West except in the minds of 
those who wish to make this an excuse for imperialist domination, or those 
who have inherited such myths and fictions from a confused metaphysical 
past. Differences there are but they are chiefly due to different stages of 
economic growth.27
The differences between East and West are the product of their different 
economic development, which is embedded in history. Science and industry are the 
products, not of Western culture, but of history ; that they are so closely associated 
with the West is a function of the uneven nature of historical development, not of any 
essential superiority of Westerners or their culture. Specifically, these differences are 
largely a result of the industrial revolution, which occurred in the W est:
fundamentally there was no basic difference between the East and the West 
before the advent of the machine age...The real difference that we observe 
today between the East and the modem West was therefore introduced by 
the industrial age. The virtues of the West are the virtues of 
industrialisation : science, organisation, cooperation, activity ; and the so- 
called virtues and vices of the East are those which, in a large measure, 
could be found in the West before the machine age.28
The 'virtues' of the West are acknowledged, but also immediately historicised, 
and thereby detached from their Western origins. Rationalism and nationalism are 
reconciled with the aid of historicism. Western science and industry can be praised and 
emulated by a militant nationalism - precisely by postulating their socio-historical 
origins, rather than their origins in a specific spirit or culture. Indeed, it is now 
possible for nationalism to assume a radical,transformative position, to criticise Indian 
culture vigorously from a 'modem' rationalist perspective, without ceasing to be 
nationalist. Nehru writes,
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...I see no particular reason to pride ourselves on our pecularities, 
angularities and insularides...I am not unconscious of the greatness of our 
past. But when I study our later history and survey our present condition I 
see very little of the chosen people about us...Indian civilisation today is 
stagnant.29
Nationalism need no longer take recourse to the glorification of Indian culture 
and history. Indeed, all such attempts to find peculiarly Indian virtues are simply 
delusions designed to offer solace :
It is commonplace that in the modem industrial West outward development 
has far outstripped the inner, but it does not follow, as many people in the 
East appear to imagine, that because we are industrially backward and our 
external development has been slow, therefore our inner evolution has been 
greater. That is one of the delusions with which we try to comfort 
ourselves and try to overcome our feelings of inferiority.2^
Because Western ’virtues' are no longer seen as specifically Western, a project 
for the transformation of India along Western lines is compatible with nationalism. 
Nehru bluntly writes to Gandhi,
You have stated somewhere that India has nothing to learn from the 
West... I entirely disagree with this viewpoint and I neither think the so- 
called Rama Raj was very good in the past, and nor do I want it back. I 
think the western or rather industrial civilisation is bound to conquer 
India...21 (emphasis added).
Such an outcome - the transformation of India along Western, 'or rather 
industrial', lines - is precisely what Nehru aims a t :
I believe in industrialisation and the big machine and I should like to see 
factories springing up all over India. I want to increase the wealth of India 
and the standard of living of the Indian people and it seems to me that this 
can only be done by the application of science to industry resulting in large 
scale industrialisation.22
Thus Nehru's rationalism goes hand in hand with a desire to 'modernise' India. 
These are, in fact, both aspects of what Nehru terms the 'spirit of the age' - the spirit
of science and its achievements (industry, technology etc.). This commitment to a 
spirit which has its origins in Europe is reconciled with nationalism by the aid of a 
historicism which owes much to Marxism.
Having been reconciled, they are declared to be inseparable. For, Nehru writes, 
even if "In the past we have seen the curious phenomenon in India of the political 
extremist being a reactionary in social matters, and not unoften the political moderate 
has been more advanced", today it is clear that "the social reactionary is the ally of 
those who wish to keep India in subjection".33 Nehru provides militant nationalism 
with new foundations, where it must perforce go hand in hand with rationalism. Both 
liberalism and revivalist nationalism are, from the viewpoint of this nationalism, found 
to be not 'truly' nationalist.
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Nationalism and Internationalism
'Reason' is for Nehru not merely a category or a viewpoint; it is in the process 
of being actualised in history. Science, industry and technology are all so many 
manifestations of the march of Reason through history - of progress. Progress is the 
development and spread of science and industry - the progressive universalisation of 
Reason. It is necessary to Nehru's argument that Reason be seen as potentially 
universal - that what began in the West is seen as capable of developing in the East - 
for only then is the marriage between rationalism and a militant nationalism viable.
The development and spread of science and industry (with the economic and 
social changes which accompany them) have the effect of creating doubt and 
instability, as the old is criticised and transformed by the new :
The whole world today is one vast question mark...The age of faith, with 
the comfort and stability it brings, is past, and there is questioning about 
everything, however permanent or sacred it might have appeared to our 
forefathers. Everywhere there is doubt and restlessness and the
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foundations of the state and society are in process of transformation...We 
appear to be in a dissolving period of history...
However, all this turmoil also makes for the creation of a single world, one 
marked by increasing commonalities and interdependence - "Science and industry and 
new methods of transportation have made each country dependent in a large measure 
on others..."35, and today "The world has become internationalised...No nation is 
really independent, they are all interdependent".^
This increasing internationalisation of the world is a symptom of progress. 
Nehru laments the Indian nationalist movement's ignorance of world developments - 
"I am afraid we are terribly narrow in our outlook and the sooner we get rid of this 
narrowness the better".37 India's ignorance of and isolation from the world mean she 
runs the risk of not being part of the world's 'progress'. To call for the establishing of 
international links is therefore not simply a matter of publicising the Indian nationalist 
cause in foreign countries,
but of ending the isolation in which India has lived for generations and of 
developing contacts with other parts of the world. Whether we wish it or 
not, India cannot remain, now or hereafter, cut off from the rest of the 
world. No country can do so. The modem world is too closely knit 
together to permit of such isolation.^8
In accordance with these views, an important aspect of Nehru's activity in the 
INC was directed towards breaking down its insularity. Nehru was instrumental in the 
INC joining (as an associate member) the League Against Imperialism, and was 
virtually the sole contact between the latter and the INC. From 1927 he began to urge 
the INC to establish a foreign department, eventually meeting with success. Through 
his writings and speeches, and the resolutions he sponsored through the Congress, he 
was the architect of what eventually emerged as a coherent foreign policy, covering 
most of the important issues and events of his day - peace, empire, China, Abyssinia, 
Spain and so on.
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But if internationalism is an embodiment of progress, what then of 
nationalism- the elevation of the particular ?
Nehru's response is uncompromisingly honest. Nationalism is normally 
narrow, provincial and particularistic, and as such it is contrary to the real movement 
of history -"Although the myth of nationalism flourishes and holds men's minds, it is 
an outworn creed and internationalism approximates more and more to reality".39
Such a narrow nationalism is not to be emulated -
I do not want our country to be a victim of that narrow nationalism which
is now to be found in almost all countries of Europe and Africa.4^
Here indeed is a 'mature' nationalism - one that points to Europe not as the 
justification for its own project, but as an example to be avoided. At the same time, a 
commitment to internationalism does not lead to a rejection of nationalism as such. 
Instead, a distinction is made between 'good' and 'bad' nationalisms, distinguished by 
their content and their historical context (for nationalism also does not escape history).
For, Nehru's argument runs, even if Reason (in the form of science and 
industry) is becoming universal, the manner of this universalisation is a profoundly 
'unreasonable' and inequitable one. One of the specific historical mechanisms by 
which the world is increasingly becoming 'one' is imperialism , which is also 
characterised by inequality and oppression. The increasing interdependence which the 
nations of the world show is not one between equals, but between imperialist powers 
and the colonised. In the form of imperialism, it represents not the progress of the 
world, but a problem of world dimensions- "The world problem is ultimately one of 
imperialism - the finance-imperialism of the present day".41 And if India has become 
part of a single world, it has also become part of the same problem - "the Indian 
problem is but part of the world problem of imperialism, the two are indissolubly 
linked together..,4^
Thus although imperialism is one of the mechanisms by which connections are 
established between different peoples and nations, this is not itself a true 
internationalism, for it lacks the crucial elements of equality and freedom. "The 
British Empire and real internationalism", Nehru writes, "are as poles apart, and it is 
not through that empire that we can march to internationalism".^
The 'true internationalism’ which Nehru seeks requires, not a rejection of 
nationalism, but an affirmation of i t :
progress can only come through more and more internationalism. But there 
can be no real internationalism unless the component parts are entirely 
free...Thus though we must look forward to an international order, we can 
only reach it by achieving national independence first.44
In Nehru's thought, then, the universal and the particular, nationalism and 
internationalism, are reconciled by means of the crucial mediating concept of 
imperialism. Indeed, not only are they reconciled, national freedom is declared to be 
essential to the achievement of real internationalism.
Through a circuitous route, then, we discover that nationalism is, after all, part 
and parcel of the march of Reason and freedom. Not in the terms normal to much 
nationalist thought, for not äü nationalism is progressive - all too often, it is 'narrow 
and aggressive'. But where it is the nationalism of the oppressed, and where it is self­
consciously anti-imperialist and internationalist, it is an essential part of the progress 
of history.4^
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'Nehruvian Socialism'
Nehru's nationalism, we see, is a rationalist, modernising and 'universalising' 
nationalism. Marxist historicism and the concept of imperialism are what make this 
combination possible, enable Nehru to combine nationalism with rationalism, and 
nationalism with internationalism.
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It should not be thought, however, that Nehru merely 'borrows' from Marxism 
selectively, in order to fill embarrassing gaps in a non-Marxist discourse. The notions 
of 'history' and 'its' progress, as we have seen, are central to Nehru's thought. In his 
1936 Congress Presidential address, he urges his audience :
Let us try to develop the historic sense so that we can view current events 
in proper perspective and understand their real significance.Only then can 
we appreciate the march of history and keep step with i t 4^
This 'historic sense', Nehru writes in his Autobiography , was provided for him 
by the Marxist conception of history :
the theory and philosophy of Marxism lightened up many a dark comer of 
my mind. History came to have a new meaning for me. The Marxist 
interpretation threw a flood of light on it, and it became an unfolding drama 
with some order and purpose, howsoever unconscious, behind it. In spite 
of the appalling waste and misery of the past and the present, the future 
was bright with hope, though many dangers intervened.47
Thus Nehru's Marxist historicism is part of his more general acceptance of the 
materialist conception of history. This conception provides history with meaning and 
purpose, and hope for the future. In these respects, far from contradicting, it 
complements Nehru's Enlightenment rationalism.
For Nehru historical materialism represents, as it did for most of his 
contemporaries, a form of economic determinism. He writes of Marxism :
Essentially it is based on certain scientific methods of trying to understand 
history, trying to understand from past events the laws that govern the 
development of human society...Marx showed that the economic factor 
was the most important factor.4**
This view, to which Nehru subscribes, gives him the means by which to 
understand India's problems and their solutions - "as I conceive it, the fundamental 
problem of India really is economic in its various aspects".4^  Thus for example 
communalism, that bane of the Indian nationalist movement, is analysed by Nehru as a
case of elites pursuing their economic interests by manipulating the religious 
sentiments of the masses ; a manipulation made possible by the economic disparities 
between the two communities.^ Part of the solution, then, is to bring to the fore the 
'real', economic interests which underly and determine religious conflict. In an 
independent India, Nehru writes, "parties will be formed with economic ideals. There 
will be socialists, anti-socialists, zamindars, kisans and other similar groups. It will be 
ridiculous to think of parties founded on a religious or communal basis".51
Since economic causes shape history, and economic interests determine the 
behaviour and allegiances of classes, it is imperative that the INC address itself to the 
economic interests of the Indian masses. Delivering the Presidential address to the 
U.P. Provincial Congress Conference in October 1928, Nehru urges this upon the 
INC:
My present object is to impress [upon] you that we can no longer make any 
progress by the cry of Swaraj only. We must make it clear that we aim at 
economic and social Swaraj as well as political,and for this purpose we 
must lay down a definite economic and social programme.^
Ultimately, a recognition of the importance of economic factors means 
embracing socialism. Nationalism alone is necessary but incomplete - "Nationalism, as 
such, though inevitable under the present conditions, offers no solution of the basic 
economic problems of the country...Socialism, on the other hand, directly tackles all
such problems".^
Roy’s Marxist pedagogy could scarcely have found a more receptive pupil. 
Embracing the ideas of economic determination and the primacy of economic interests, 
Nehru sought to act upon these - to persuade the Congress to adopt an economic 
programme which would appeal to the masses, and eventually to adopt the socialist 
goal.
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If Nehru's historicism is part of his more general acceptance of historical 
materialism, he similarly does not simply use the concept of imperialism rhetorically.
Although the concept is not developed or used rigorously by him, it plays a similar 
role in his thought to the role it played in Lenin's. By distinguishing between 
oppressor and oppressed nations, it legitimates certain nationalisms, whilst adopting a 
critical stance to nationalism 'in general'. Furthermore, Nehru draws what a Marxist 
might consider the 'logical conclusion' which follows from the theory of imperialism - 
namely, that as an anti-imperialist struggle, the Indian struggle for independence must 
also tend towards being an anti-capitalist struggle.
It is not the case, then, that Nehru appropriates certain 'elements' of Marxism in 
order to bolster a rationalist and modernising nationalism. Nehru's nationalism is 
constructedupon a foundation which is not only rationalist, but also socialist. Nor, as 
we shall see below, does Nehru conceive of these as different elements simply 'added* 
together.
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In "Whither India?", Nehru answers the question posed by his title as follows:
Weither India? Surely to the great human goal of social and economic 
equality, to the ending of all exploitation of nation by nation and class by 
class, to national freedom within the framework of an international 
cooperative socialist world federation.54
This passage contains many of the elements which we have identified as central 
to Nehru's thought. The goal which India must pursue is a universal one, embodied in 
a cooperative federation of nations. The path to this universal goal, however, requires 
an end to imperialism, requires national freedom instead of national oppression. The 
goal is also one of social and economic equality, a goal to be achieved by, and 
embodied in, socialism.
Underpinning all this is a notion of progress - a 'goal' to which humanity tends, 
marked by the triumph of reason, universality and justice. There are different 
conceptions and measures of progress, however, and Nehru urges his nationalist
colleagues to adopt the right measure, for only then can progress be properly 
recognised and facilitated:
Most of us have grown up under the nationalist tradition and it is hard to 
give up the habits of a lifetime...the process of crossing over to a new 
ideology [socialism] is always a painful one...But the crossing has to be 
made, unless we are to remain in a stagnant backwater, overwhelmed from 
time to time by the wash of the boats that move down the river of 
progress.^
Here socialist theory, with its emphasis upon economic equality and 
international cooperation, points to the direction in which to move and criteria by 
which progress is to be measured. It thus not only 'makes possible1 a world-view 
which sees history as the progress of reason ; it is a constitutive part of that 
rationalism. In fact, in helping to define the ultimate 'human goal', socialism is not 
only part of, but is the highest point of, rationalist thought
If this is so of socialist theory, it is also true of socialism as a social system. The 
conflict between capitalism and socialism, Nehru writes,
is not, fundamentally, a moral issue, as some people imagine...the 
question now is whether the capitalist system has not outlived its day and 
must now give place to a better and saner ordering of human affairs, which 
is more in keeping with the progress of science and human knowledge.^
Socialism, in other words, is that 'saner' and more 'scientific' ordering of 
society - it is the application of science and knowledge to human affairs. It is thus part 
of, indeed the culmination of, the march of Reason through history. If what we have 
termed 'rationalism' is a constitutive element in Nehru's nationalist vision, socialism is 
in turn a constitutive element of his rationalism, and not something external to and
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added on' to it.
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'Nehnivian Socialism' and Marxism
Does this mean, then, that Nehru was a Marxist ? Does 'Nehruvian socialism' 
belong to the history of Marxism in the colonies ?
A number of facts support an answer in the affirmative. Nehru publicly 
committed himself, not only to socialism, but to Marxian or 'scientific' socialism. As a 
nationalist he desired independence for India not only, or even primarily, as a goal in 
itself, but as a necessary means through which the economic and social problems of 
the country could be addressed. The means by which he sought to achieve 
independence were connected to this end ; Nehru repeatedly emphasised that national 
liberation could only be achieved with the help of the masses, and that mobilising the 
masses required that ’Swaraj’ be given an economic content. Nehru was a passionate 
nationalist, but one not uncritical of nationalism, including varieties of Indian 
nationalism other than his own. On international questions there was usually not much 
to distinguish his position from that of communists.
Here, then, was a nationalist who had imbibed the lessons of Marxism - one 
who was a living proof of the communist contention that any consistent and clear- 
minded nationalism had perforce to have socialistic leanings. In the periods 
immediately before and (in particular) in the period immediately after the one under 
consideration this is more-or-less how he was seen and characterised by Indian 
communists, though during the years 1928-35 he was condemned by them as an 
’agent’ of the Indian bourgeoisie.
Against characterising Nehru as a Marxist we have the fact that his efforts to 
combine socialism and nationalism were constrained by his commitment to the INC, 
and took place largely within it  Nehru did not believe, as the communists did, that the 
involvement of the masses in the nationalist struggle would be most efficacious (and 
best serve their interests) where they were mobilised under the banners of their own 
class organisations. Nor did he assign a preponderant role to the working class in the
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struggle for national liberation, as the communists did. All these are certainly reasons 
enough to avoid mistaking Nehru for a communist - a label he himself disavowed.57 
Whether they are reason enough to eschew calling him a Marxist is another question. 
Obviously, to raise the question of whether Nehru was a Marxist is also to raise the 
issue of what it meant to be a Marxist in the colonies ; it is to raise the question of what 
differentiated Marxism from other political philosophies aiming at national liberation. 
This is an issue we will return to.
We could answer the question we have posed ourselves by switching our 
attention to the historical meaning of Nehruvian socialism. Here the historical record 
would seem to provide a clear answer, demonstrating as it does the gap between 
Nehru's socialist protestations and what was actually achieved, and even what he in 
actual fact sought to achieve. Nehru was not a Marxist
Such an exercise in 'debunking' would be to the point, in demonstrating the 
limitations of 'Nehruvian socialism', and, in the ultimate analysis, the inaptness of the 
latter term. It would also be politically salient, since Nehru's legacy continues to be a 
matter for political debate and contestation in India. However such an analysis would 
leave unexplained why Marxism is, nevertheless, an important element in Nehru's 
thought. It would highlight, but not explain, the gap between the historical 
significance of Nehruvian socialism and its intellectual content.
To explain this one could take the argument a decisive step further, by situating 
Nehru's thought within another, non-Marxist project, and specifying the relation 
between this and Nehru's 'socialism' - as Partha Chatteijee has done so well. 
Chatteijee argues that nationalists like Nehru appropriated Marxism's emphasis on 
economic factors as determining social development, and Marxism's claims to 
possessing a 'scientific' outlook, finding in these "a particularly useful theoretical 
foothold from which they could reach out and embrace the rationalist and egalitarian 
side of Marxism, leaving its political core well alone".5 8
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For nationalists who sought to 'modernise' their nation, the criteria of 'economic 
progress' provided a ’scientific' basis upon which to distinguish the progressive from 
the backward. Marxism "provided a new scientific legitimation to a whole set of 
rationalist distinctions between the modem and the traditional, the secular and the 
religious, the progressive and the obscurantist, the advanced and thebackward".6  ^
Chatteijee suggests, as we have done, that for such a nationalism Marxism appears 
(and hence its attraction) as "the most advanced expression yet of the rationalism of the 
European Enlightenment".6^
Once interpreted in this way, Marxism is then appropriatedby a modernising, 
secular, rationalist but non-revolutionary nationalism. This nationalism, a new 
development in the history of nationalist thought in India, represents a 'reconstruction' 
of nationalist thought, "a reconstruction whose specific form was to situate 
nationalism within the domain of a state ideology".61 For in this nationalism the 
establishment of an independent Indian nation-state is desired not simply as a question 
of sovereignty ; that state is seen as the motor, the instrument, for the modernising of 
India. This was a nationalist etatisme, "explicitely recognising a central, autonomous 
and directing role of the state and legitimising it by a specifically nationalist marriage 
between the ideas of progress and social justice".62
Thus according to Chatteijee, Marxism is appropriated by and becomes an 
important and necessary element in a new, reconstructed, nationalist thought. This 
nationalism is deeply committed to 'progress', and to the notion that progress in 
general depends upon economic progress in particular, and also upon increasing 
economic equality. These notions are borrowed from Marxism, but the manner of their 
combination is a specifically nationalist and etatist, rather than a Marxist, one.
Nehru's ideology, then,
is an ideology of which the central organising principle is the autonomy of
the state ; the legitimising principle is a conception of social justice. The
argument then runs as follows : social justice for all cannot be provided
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within the old framework because it is antiquated, decadent and incapable 
of dynamism. What is necessary is to create a new framework of 
institutions which can embody the spirit of progress or, a synonym, 
modernity. Progress or modernity, according to the terms of the 20th 
century, means giving primacy to the sphere of the economic, because it is 
only by means of a thorough reorganisation of the systems of economic 
production and distribution that enough wealth can be created to ensure 
social justice for all...the principal political task before the nation is to 
establish a sovereign national state. Once established, this state will...take 
an overall view of the matter and, in accordance with the best scientific 
procedures, plan and direct the economic processes in order to create 
enough social wealth to ensure welfare and justice for all.63
This analysis seems to us persuasive. We have already discussed the importance 
of Marxism to Nehru's nationalism - how it enables him to adopt a critical and 
transformative stance towards Indian society, how it enables him to combine 
nationalism with internationalism, and so on. Situating Nehru's Marxism within 
another project in this way explains why his Marxism nevertheless did n£l lead to a 
revolutionary politics. It also, we may note in passing, helps explains the post- 
Independence trajectory of Nehru's politics - the efforts to modernise and create some 
degree of economic equality through a state- sponsored capitalism.
Despite its explanatory power, however, to the extent that such an analysis 
implies - as even Chatterjee does - that Nehru's appropriation of Marxism was 
deliberately selective and hence superficial (even if the suggestion of cynical 'trickery' 
is avoided)^4, it is mistaken.
For what is distinctive about Nehru's thought, as we have sought to show, is 
that Nehru's appropriation of Marxism is nof carefully selective and superficial. Nehru 
is not a communist, it is true ; but nor does he simply borrow a few phrases and 
concepts from Marxism to buttress a modernising, etatist nationalism. Marxism, as 
we have argued, is a central, constitutive element in his modernising, etatist 
nationalism.
Chatteijee's analysis, then, takes us further, but it still leaves us with a paradox. 
Namely - 'Nehruvian socialism' did not cynically ’use’ Marxism for non-Marxist 
ends, yet it did represent the appropriation of Marxism in the service of a nationalism 
which was not Marxist.
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Conclusion
How was this possible? The answer lies in the relationship of Marxism to its 
intellectual heritage, and also in the position Marxists came to take on the national 
question.
Marx’s thought, as we observed in the ’Introduction’ to this work, is at once 
intellectual heir to the Enlightenment, and an attempt to develop a radical critique of 
some of the central concepts which Enlightenment thought bequeathed to subsequent 
intellectual systems. ’Enlightenment thought’ is used here in a very broad sense, to 
denote not only the ’movement’, but some of the related and even critical currents of 
thought associated with it (e.g., Hegel and Herder).65 ’Enlightenment’ here denotes, 
in effect, modernity - a ’way of thinking’, embodied in certain notions and concepts, 
which begins with the Enlightenment, and which has shaped the Western intellectual 
tradition since.
Prominent in these ways of thinking were notions of the paramountcy of Reason 
; of history as progress, and particularly as a process of the emergence of Reason into 
its own ; of knowledge as science (a conception of knowledge deeply indebted to the 
developments in natural science); an evolutionist view of history and a view not only 
that history has order and meaning, but that order and meaning reside in history ; and 
so on. Not all of these notions were ’discovered’ by the Enlightenment, and some 
(certainly, historicism) do not strictly speaking belong to it at all. But the 
Enlightenment sensibility marks the ground in which such conceptions grew, until
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they gained a currency which marked them, precisely, not as features of 
Enlightenment thought, but of 'modem' thought
Marx, as is obvious at first glance, also accepted many of these notions. At the 
same time, he sought to subject this whole intellectual system to a far-reaching 
critique, in at least two important senses. He accepted and 'developed' some of the 
central categories of bourgeois thought, thereby revealing their contradictions and 
limitations ; the method of an 'immanent critique'. His Economic and Philosophic 
Manuscripts , and the first part of Capital I (on value) are particularly good 
illustrations of this.
Marx also sought to show that all systems of thought were products of particular 
historical and social conditions. Thus the Enlightenment became the bourgeois 
Enlightenment, and its most fundamental propositions (and errors), it was suggested, 
bore the marks of these historical conditions. It was not simply a question of 'errors' 
and 'shortcomings' of particular thinkers (though these existed), which were to be 
discovered and then corrected or else rejected. Marx's relationship to pre-Marxist 
thought, rather, was first to show the conditions which produced and shaped that 
thought; and second, recognising these fundamental (because historical) limitations, 
to develop a new world view based upon different historical conditions, precisely by 
'overthrowing' and 'superseding' past systems of thought - by subjecting them to a 
radical critique.
If Marxism, in the hands of its founder, bore such a two-fold relationship to 
Enlightenment thought - as part of the 'modernity' which the Enlightenment ushered 
in, but also as a critique of it - it is also true that in Marx's thought this relationship 
was uneasily maintained. In Marx's writings, the project of critique is always present, 
but always also partial and incomplete. It is this which provides many ambiguities - 
but also much of the creative tension - in Marx's thought.
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In Marxism , as it came to be systematised by Engels and leading figures of the 
Second and Third International - Plekhanov, Kautsky, Stalin and even (though here 
the picture is more complex) Lenin - much of this ambiguity and tension was lost. 
Marxists came to conceive of their theory as a science , above all, as a science of 
history. This was possible precisely because history was assumed to be a rigid 
evolutionary process, governed by ironclad laws. Scientism and evolutionism came to 
reinforce each other - history and society were governed by 'laws', and science was 
the grasping of these laws in thought.
Marxists thus came to accept, and incorporate, the central notions and categories 
of the Enlightenment. To be sure, their content was transformed - progress was above 
all a matter of economic progress ; science was itself imbedded in history, and thus 
shaped by historical conditions; and so on. But, with their new content, these concepts 
became central to Marxism. And Marxism's relationship with Enlightenment thought 
thus changed fundamentally. Marx's immanent critique was not pursued. In the hands 
of most of his successors his 'historical' critique now took the form of saying : 
Enlightenment thought, because of the historical circumstances of its production, is 
'blind' to things such as the class 'motor' of social development, to the historically 
bound nature of its own vision of society, and so on. That is, Enlightenment 
categories were treated as 'mistaken' in the sense that they were incorrectly or 
incompletely developed. But take away the veil and the self-same categories - of 
Reason, science and progress - were held to yield truth. Reason, science and progress 
were not themselves to be subjected to a critique. Marxism became and presented 
itself, often explicitly, as the fulfilment and true heir to the Enlightenment, a 
knowledge expunged of its 'bourgeois’ limitations and mistakes, and thus constituted 
as a true science.
Thus even where Marxism remained, politically, a radical, transformative 
project, it no longer aimed at a critique of Enlightenment thought. Indeed, its political 
radicalism increasingly rested upon its particular manner of interpreting and
appropriating this thought. Science revealedjthat history's laws led to socialism ; 
science and evolution were the guarantors of the truth and ultimate victory of 
socialism.
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It is this - Marxism as a scientific theory of historical evolution - which lent itself 
to appropriation by a theory and a project which was not Marxist. In Europe this took 
the form, not of Marxism being appropriated, but rather of one section of the Marxist- 
inspired workers' movement 'surrendering'. After the great split in the communist 
movement in the aftermath of World War One and the Russian revolution, that section 
of it which remained faithful to the politics of the Second International soon ceased to 
be qualitatively different from other brands of radical or liberal politics. Marxism in its 
Leninist form, which had broken with some of the political consequences of such an 
uncritical assimilation of Enlightenment concepts, provided in its emphasis on class 
struggle, the dictatorship of the proletariat and the necessity of revolutionary rather 
than evolutionary roads to socialism a 'political core' which continued to distinguish 
Marxists of this type from other radicals and liberals. Wherever this 'core' has been 
diluted - as during the 'Popular Front' period and as in many Western communist 
parties today - the differences between Marxism and other post-Enlightenment radical 
political philosophies has narrowed.
However in the East Marxism in its Leninist reformulation itself narrowed the 
gap between its own positions and one of the main forms of non-Marxist politics and 
thought in the colonies. It did so the moment it endorsed 'progressive' nationalism. 
When a communist politics came to be developed in and for India, nationalism was at 
the heart of it. The 'political core' of Marxism in the colonies - that which 
distinguished it from others seeking national liberation - shrank to a series of 
propositions relating to strategic and organisational questions. Thus in the East there 
was an added element which had the effect of narrowing the gap between Marxism 
and other political philosophies and movements, and thus making possible an 
appropriation of Marxism - the Marxist endorsement of nationalism (and, one could
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add, Soviet socialism's strong emphasis on the state as the instrument for
industrialisation).66
It was this combination of Marxism's endorsement of nationalism, and its 
development into the most consistent form of Enlightenment rationalism, which 
facilitated its appropriation by a nationalism which was also committed to 
modernisation, and also wedded to notions of science and progress. In the colonies, 
where Marxism was not a critique of 'modernity', and where it was largely shorn of a 
distinctive 'political core', it could be appropriated by a rationalist and modernising 
nationalism without doing violence to Marxism - that is, without cynicism and careful 
selection. Indeed, such a 'fusion', amounting to the appropriation of Marxism bv 
nationalism, would be successful - would result in the production of a nationalism 
which could at once be critical of India yet nationalist, internationalist and rationalist, 
one which could define progress and identify its project as representing progress - in 
the very measure that it was 'genuine' rather than cynical and selective.
This, then, is the meaning of Nehruvian socialism. It represents the 
appropriation of Marxism in the service of a non-Marxist nationalism ; an 
appropriation made possible, not by the cunning of Nehru, but by the nature of 
Marxism as it developed after Marx, and by its attitude towards nationalism in the 
colonies.
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The Politics of the United National Front
The years from 1936 to the outbreak of World War Two saw both the nationalist 
and the communist movements enter new phases in their development. The Indian 
National Congress (INC) recovered relatively rapidly from the tapering off and 
eventual suspension (in April 1934) of the Civil Disobedience movement, despite the 
severe repression unleashed by the British from early 1932. Within three years of the 
cessation of Civil Disobedience the Congress won a striking victory in the elections 
held under the Government of India Act, clearly establishing itself as the pre-eminent 
political organisation in the country.
The single major issue confronting the nationalist movement in this period was 
the Government of India Act. Enacted in the United Kingdom parliament in August 
1935, it was the culmination of a long process which had begun with the appointment 
of the Simon Commission eight years earlier. India's new constitution made no 
mention even of Dominion Status. Its grant of elected responsible government in the 
provinces was compromised by the retention of important reserve and discretionary 
powers for the Provincial Governors, and by a limited franchise. The Federal part of 
the Act (which was to be implemented later) vested responsibility for foreign affairs 
and defence in the hands of the Viceroy ; it provided only for indirect elections, and for 
a loose federal legislature dominated by the Princes. It thus met no nationalist 
demands.
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The Congress opposed the new Act. Faced with British determination to 
implement it, however, it had to decide how most effectively to oppose it. The 
Congress opted to contest the elections held under the Act and, following its 
impressive performance, to form governments in provinces where it had a majority. 
Thus in this period the INC came to function both as a party of government and as a 
movement of opposition, dedicated to 'wredäng' the 1935 Act in its pursuit of full 
independence.
This was also a time of change for the Communist Party of India. It combined 
illegality (it was declared illegal in July 1934) with a re-entry into the 'mainstream' of 
Indian politics - that is to say, with a re-entry into nationalist politics. We suggested in 
Chapter 5 that the positions adopted by the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, and 
developed further at the Tenth Plenum of the ECCI - such as that class struggle and 
nationalist struggle were one, and could only be effectively conducted by the CPI - led 
to Indian communists becoming isolated from mass politics. Exacerbated by the arrest 
of communist leaders in 1929, this saw the communist movement in India split into 
competing, and increasingly ineffective, factions.
Reports to this effect which the Comintern received from its own emissaries, and 
may have received from the imprisoned CPI leadership1, led it to offer criticism and 
advice directed at remedying the situation. In June 1932 and November 1933 Inprecor 
published 'Open Letters' to the Indian communist leaders, the first under the name of 
the Central Committees of the communist parties of China, Great Britain and 
Germany, the second by the Central Committee of the CCP alone. Both letters accused 
the CPI of a self-imposed isolation from nationalist struggle.2 The letters called on the 
CPI to cease staying aloof from nationalist struggle, and not to counterpose strike 
struggles to the struggle for national independence.
The criticism was in bad faith, for the CPI was, in effect, being criticised for 
having faithfully followed the Comintern line, with disastrous consequences. On the 
presumption that the masses were deserting the INC, the Comintern had instructed the
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CPI to concentrate its fire on the Congress and thus seize leadership of the nationalist 
movement. Since the premise was false, the policy directly contributed to the isolation 
of Indian communists.
The two letters to the CPI did not depan, in any significant degree, from the 
Sixth Congress line. Calls for the 'exposure' of the INC, and particularly resolute 
exposure of its 'Left Wing', were reiterated, and the CPI's ultra-left 1930 "Draft 
Platform of Action" was endorsed.5 Since the premises underlying the positions 
adopted at the Sixth Congress had not been abandoned, it followed - from the 
Comintern's point of view - that the CPI's failure to emerge as the leader of the 
national struggle could only be due to its failure to implement the prescribed policies, 
and / or from an inability to do so, due to organisational shortcomings. Thus both 
letters devoted considerable attention to organisational matters, expressing concern at 
the failure to build a united and all-India CPI, and offering suggestions as to how this 
might be done.4
There was little the CPI could do in response to the political criticisms of the 
Comintern. The call to continue denunciations of the INC led precisely to that isolation 
which was being decried. In this regard the best the CPI could do was engage in 
further self-criticism5 and, more positively, pursue the call for trade union unity. In 
1935 the Red Trade Union Congress and the All India Trade Union Congress were 
reunited.
Organisational problems were relatively easier to address, particularly as the 
Meerut prisoners began to be released from August 1933 (G. Adhikari was released a 
few months earlier). In late 1933 a 'Provisional Central Committee of the CPI' was 
established, and in early 1934 publication of The Communist , the 'organ of the 
Provisional Central Committee', commenced. 6
Even here, British repression made the process of reorganisation a slow and 
difficult one. In April and May 1934 a number of the former Meerut prisoners were
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rearrested, and in July the CPI was declared illegal. Both the emergence of a united 
CPI, and the ending of communist isolation from the mass nationalist movement, were 
not to occur until later. They were to be achieved not along the unhelpful and 
contradictory lines suggested by the two letters, but in response to the change in 
analysis and strategy undertaken at the Seventh Congress of the Comintern.
The Seventh Congress of the Communist International
Hitler's appointment as Chancellor in March 1933, and the subsequent events 
(Reichstag fire, the crackdown on the KPD, etc) marked the biggest disaster for the 
line pursued by the Comintern since 1929-30. The initial Comintern response was to 
refuse to even acknowledge that a disaster had occurred, let alone admit any errorJ 
Indeed, even after the Sixth Congress line was completely abandoned, it was never to 
be repudiated ; where failures were acknowledged, the procedure (well establishedby 
1928-29) of scapegoating individual leaders of communist parties was followed.
Nevertheless, by 1934 pressures were building up in the Comintern and its 
constituent parties to abandon the 'class against class' line. Perhaps the foremost of 
these pressures resulted from the changing requirements of Soviet foreign policy.
From the late nineteen-twenties Soviet foreign policy had been directed towards 
preventing an anti-Soviet alliance of the Western powers, and thus towards securing 
the USSR’s territorial integrity whilst collectivization and economic reconstruction 
proceeded under the First Five Year Plan. Developing good relations with Germany, 
and bi-lateral non-aggression pacts (with Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Turkey, 
France and Italy) were among the key instruments in this pursuit.
With Hitler's accession to power, and increasing provocation from Japan in 
Manchuria, such an 'even-handed' policy became difficult to sustain - despite the best 
of Soviet endeavours.^ As relations with Germany and Japan deteriorated (culminating
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in the German-Japanese 'Anti-Comintern Pact' of November 1936), Soviet diplomacy 
began the search for 'collective security' against the German threat.
The establishment of diplomatic relations with the U.S.A.in November 1933, 
described by Molotov as "the greatest success of Soviet foreign policy [in 1933]"9, 
was the outcome of diplomatic efforts pre-dating the changed situation. It did, 
however, symbolise and facilitate a shift in Soviet foreign policy in the direction of 'the 
West'. The Soviet entry into the League of Nations in September 1934 - after Japan 
and Germany had withdrawn from the League - was definitely a step in seeking allies 
and using an international forum in defence against the hostile policies of Germany and 
Japan. Another significant step in the pursuit of this policy was the USSR's Treaty of 
Mutual Aid with France, signed on May 2, 1935. This not only committed both parties 
to come to each others aid if either was attacked, it also involved Stalin taking the 
unprecedented step of "expressing] complete understanding and approval of the 
national defence policy pursued by France".*0
As this statement by Stalin - a complete reversal of the communist position on the 
'national defence' of bourgeois states1 *- indicated, the new goals of Soviet foreign 
policy had implications for the internal politics of allied or potentially allied countries. 
As the Soviet Union cultivated new allies, its national interest was best served by 
political developments in these countries which facilitated their alliance with the USSR. 
To the extent that communist parties in such countries had influence, this was best 
exercised by their adopting a 'moderate' stance - that is, placing friendship with the 
Soviet Union and anti-fascist struggle ahead of proletarian revolution.
The changing requirements of Soviet foreign policy foundtheir counterpart in 
pressures 'from below' that is to say, from some of the communist parties themselves, 
most notably the Communist Party of France (PCF).
Even if, in the aftermath of the German debacle, the Comintern did not admit any 
errors, neither it nor any national communist party facing a fascist threat wished to see
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a repetition of the German events. The changes in Soviet foreign policy provided an 
opening for a change of tack. The party at first most affected, the PCF, was quick to 
seize the opportunity. Following a national conference in April 1934, the PCF 
offeredthe French Socialists (SFIO) a united front, which would include a cessation of 
communist criticism of the SFIO. A pact to effect was signed between the two parties 
on 27 July. 12
This initiative, obviously undertaken with the expectation that it would meet with 
approval from above, was duly endorsed by the ECCI in August. ^  Encouraged, 
Thorez in October proposedthat the Radical-Socialist Party be included in the front. 
Given that the Radical-Socialists were a bourgeois party, this went considerably 
further than the united front agreement with the SFIO - it was the first major step in 
what would later be known as the Popular Front.
In May 1935 the signing of the Franco-Soviet treaty further confirmed the PCFs 
new course. The new front was tested in the local elections of May-June, where 
cooperation between the three parties resulted in major gains for the Left, particularly 
the PCF. On July 14 the three parties held a joint, and highly successful, 
demonstration. By the eve of the Seventh Comintern Congress, the united and popular 
fronts had already been bom.
At the same time as all this was taking place in France, preparations were 
underway for convening a congress of the Comintern. Changes in Comintern 
personnel in the lead-up to this congress (must notably Dimitrov's rapid rise in the 
Comintern hierarchy), and the decisions made on the reports to be delivered1^ , 
signalled clearly what the function of the Congress would be.
The Seventh Congress of the Comintern, which began its meetings on July 25 
1935, was to systematically formulate the change in strategy begun more than a year 
earlier ; to explain and justify the circumstances necessitating its adoption ; and to 
impress upon the assembled parties what was now required of them.
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The keynote report was Dimitrov's "The Offensive of Fascism and the Tasks of 
the Communist International in the Struggle for the Unity of the Working Class 
Against Fascism", which elaborated and justified the new line and set the tone for the 
rest of the Congress. Dimitrov's report was notable for its more sober and realistic 
appraisal of the nature, strength and appeal of fascism, for its unreserved and urgent 
appeal for the adoption of the united front and popular front strategy, and (although 
criticism of the Sixth Congress line and the ECCI was avoided) for its sharp criticisms 
of communist habits of 'sectarianism' and 'formalism'.
A more realistic assessment of the dangers of fascism and the reasons behind its 
advance led Dimitrov to posit unity of the working class as the main defence against 
fascism, and the united front as the means by which such unity was to be achieved and 
the form which it would take. The resolution arising out of Dimitrov's report declared 
that, "at the present historical stage, it is the main and immediate task of the 
international labour movement to establish the united fighting front of the working
class".
Such a united front, Dimitrov made clear, could not be based on "bare appeals to 
struggle for the proletarian dictatorship". Unlike calls for a united front in the early 
nineteen-thirties (which amounted to little more than a demand that social democratic 
organisations and workers adhere to the communist programme), the united front 
being advocated by Dimitrov was not to be in pursuit of revolution and proletarian 
dictatorship. It was to be organised, rather, around "The defense of the immediate 
economic and political interests of the working class, the defense of the working class 
against fascism". These aims were to form "the starting point and main content of the 
united front in all capitalist countries".^
Communist parties were to seek the united front with reformist organisations and 
parties of the working class, which in most countries were Social Democratic or 
Labour parties, and which were represented internationally by the Socialist and Labour 
International.17 A measure of the extent of the change in policy being proposedby
Dimitrov was indicated by the fact that on the basis of the united front of the working 
class, communist parties were to approach non-working class parties, even those with 
bourgeois leadership (as long as they included the petty bourgeoisie and / or peasantry 
in their ranks), for participation in an ’anti-fascist People's Front'. Communist support 
for a government composed of such different classes and political tendencies was not 
ruled out, as long as such a government was one of "struggle against fascism and 
reaction". Such governments were, of course, to be formed in France and Spain not 
long after Dimitrov's speech.
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The Seventh Congress was very much a European occasion ; in a lengthy report, 
Dimitrov devoted a sum total of six paragraphs to the colonial and semi-colonial 
countries. More important, the whole strategy outlined and advocated in Dimitrov's 
report was a response to an essentially European phenomenon and a European problem 
- that of fascism.
Nevertheless, the few paragraphs in Dimitrov's report concerned with colonial 
affairs extended the theoretical and strategic shift represented by the call for a 'united 
front' to the E ast:
The changed international and internal situation gives exceptional 
importance to the question of the anti-imperialist united front in all colonial 
and semi-colonial countries.19
The united and popular fronts were to find their counterpart, in the colonial 
countries, in an anti-imperialist united front or anti-imperialist people's front.
The brief remarks by Dimitrov were amplified, for the colonial countries, by 
Chinese Communist Party and ECCI Presidium member Wang Ming - not in a separate 
report on the colonial question, for no such report was delivered at the Seventh 
Congress, but in the course of discussion on Dimitrov's report.211
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The brevity of his remarks aside, Dimitrov's extension of the united front 
strategy to the colonies, where there was no fascist threat, itself required explanation. 
As with Dimitrov, Wang Ming justified the new course not by acknowledging the 
errors of Comintern's past policy, but by reference to changed circumstances. The two 
such circumstances of principal importance which he cited as necessitating the adoption 
of 'united anti-imperialist front' tactics - increased imperialist oppression and 
exploitation on the one hand, and a growth in the 'forces of colonial revolution' on the 
other - were the very same two elements which at the Sixth Congress and subsequently 
had been cited in favour of a leftist line.^l
Another reason advanced by Wang Ming in favour of adoption of the united anti- 
imperialist front in the colonies was simply successful precedent. Brazil, and more 
importantly China, were referred to as examples which showed that pursuit of such a 
strategy yielded good results. The CCP's application of united front tactics, declared 
Wang Ming, although not done consistently enough, was proving successful, and was 
the key to meeting an 'unprecedented national crisis'- namely, the Japanese 
invasion.^
Neither of these two justifications or explanations for the adoption of united front 
tactics was very convincing. No amount of casuistry could draw any convincing 
parallel between the rise of fascism in Europe (and hence adoption of a united front 
strategy), and changed circumstances in the East requiring a similar tactical shift - 
particularly when these 'changed circumstances' were little more than what had been 
standard Comintern rhetoric for years, namely, that imperialist repression was 
increasing, and anti-imperialist struggle mounting. The argument for a united front in 
China was, of course, quite persuasive - but precisely because the Chinese situation 
was unique. Other colonial countries did not face invasion by a foreign power.
Nevertheless, united front tactics were held to be necessary in all colonial 
countries. The CPI was one of the parties singled out and specifically enjoined, in 
Wang Ming's speech, to unlearn sectarian habits, to follow the Chinese example, and
to "formulate a programme of popular demands which could serve as a platform for a 
broad people's anti-imperialist united front".22
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The 'Dutt-Bradley Thesis'
The Seventh Congress of the Communist International had instructed 
communists in Europe to adopt the united front strategy, and communists in colonial 
countries to build the anti-imperialist united front, or people's front. In the case of the 
colonial countries, however, this new line was couched in very general - and 
ambigious - terms. Partly because of the low priority given to colonial issues, but also 
because, as argued, the new line was a response to European events which had simply 
been 'transferred' to the colonies, questions crucial to the application of the new 
strategy in colonial countries were not answered. In the case of India, such questions 
included - was the INC to be part of the united front ? ; if so, how was a united front to 
be effected between a small communist party and a large nationalist organisation ? ; did 
the united front mean that a Worker-Peasant Soviet Republic was no longer the 
culminating point of nationalist revolution? ; if the INC was no longer to be regarded 
as counter-revolutionary, did this mean that the Indian bourgeoisie was also no longer 
counter-revolutionary, or did it mean rather that the INC was no longer to be regarded 
as a bourgeois organisation? - and so on.
As no logical, coherent position underpinned the change of line (the obvious 
one, that the old position was simply mistaken, being inadmissable), it was also a 
difficult exercise to 'deduce' the answers to such specific questions ; to deduce specific 
applications from a general line. An authoritative pronouncement on the meaning of the 
new line for India was clearly required.
At this point the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) reassumed its role as 
mentor to the CPI and provided such a pronouncement. In January R. Palme Dutt and 
Ben Bradley, in their capacity as CPGB leaders with a long involvement in Indian
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affairs, but also with the authority of their candidate membership of the ECCI behind 
them, sent the CPI an article outlining a strategy for India. In February this was 
published in Inprecor , and in March it was republished in the CPGB journal, Labour 
Monthly.
"The Anti-Imperialist People's Front in India" made a number of clarifications.
First of all, with regard to 'ends'. Palme Dutt and Bradley made it clear that, just as in
Europe the united front was a weapon in the defence against fascism, and for
'immediate' working class demands rather than the pursuit of socialism, so in India it
was to be directed at the achievement of national independence and the 'vital needs' of
the masses, rather than socialism. The demand for a Constituent Assembly, which 
£
wh^n it was raised by Nehru was vehemently denounced by the CPI, was now 
described by Palme Dutt and Bradley as "a central rallying slogan" for the anti­
imperialist front or united national front (UNF).24 The slogan of 'a Worker-Peasant 
Soviet Republic', raised in the CPI's "Draft Platform of Action" of 1930 and 
numerous subsequent documents, was thus abandoned.
If the main goal in India was the relatively modest one of independence, then 
unity between different classes and organisations, in pursuit of this goal, was possible. 
Dutt and Bradley announced that the UNF was to unite existing Left Wing forces, 
defined as "Congress Socialists, Trade Unionists, Communists and Left 
Congressmen"(p. 150).25 it had also, however, to include nationalist organisations, 
the most important of which was the INC, descibed by Dutt and Bradley as "the 
principal existing mass organisation of many diverse elements seeking national 
liberation"(p. 152).
The obviously unlikely possibility of the CPI David successfully proposing a 
united front agreement to the INC Goliath was not even considered by the authors of 
this document. Instead, they described the INC as having already "achieved a gigantic 
task in uniting wide forces of the Indian people for the national struggle"(p. 152); the 
task was to "strengthen and extend this unity to a broader front"(p. 153). Thus in the
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Indian context, the UNF was to take the form, not of an agreement between different 
classes and their organisations, but of the coming together of different classes and 
organisations within a single body, the INC.
Palme Dutt and Bradley posed this only as a possibility :
It is even possible that the National Congress by the further transformation
of its organisation and programme, may become the form of realisation of
the Anti-Imperialist People's Front, (p. 152)
They then proceeded to sketch in some detail how such a 'transformation' might 
be effected, making it clear that this 'possibility' was in fact what they proposed to 
realise (pp. 153-57). To make the Congress the locus of the UNF required, first of all, 
that the 'collective affiliation' of trade unions, peasant organisations and youth leagues 
to the INC be secured. By supplementing individual membership of the INC by such 
class-based affiliation, the INC could become an organisation which at the same time 
was the UNF.
Second, the masses, once drawn into the Congress in this way, had to be given 
more of a say in the Congress. Its constitution had to be democratised, with a 
reduction of power at top levels, and an enhancement of it at rank and file level.
Third, programmatic changes had to be made. If the Congress was to become a 
UNF, it had unequivocally to declare its goal to be full independence and a 
Constituted Assembly, and this had to be linked to the immediate demands of workers
and peasants.26
Finally, the UNF was to be a 'fighting front', and this meant it was to be a front 
of 'mass struggle'. Such struggle was incompatible with the doctrine of non-violence, 
which had, therefore, to be renounced.
The 'Dutt-Bradley thesis', as it came to be known, was a faithful application of 
the Comintern's new line to Indian conditions. It answered some of the questions the 
Seventh Congress had not addressed, and translated the generalities of the new line 
into specific proposals and a concrete strategy.
The political ’moderation’ of the Dutt-Bradley thesis - its perfunctory references 
to the ultimate socialist goal, its more modest demands and slogans for the present, and 
the premium it placed upon unity - had their counterpart in the theory and practice of all 
communist parties in the post Seventh Congress period. What was unusual in this 
thesis was its proposal that the INC, a non-socialist, non-working class organisation, 
could become not simply a partner in the UNF, but the very form of its realisation. 
This was a volte face , not simply in relation to the Sixth Congress analysis and line, 
but in relation to all earlier analyses by Indian communists. For the INC had always 
been regarded by them as a bourgeois or middle-class organisation which, if not 
outrightly counter-revolutionary, had clear limits to both its social / economic 
radicalism and its nationalist militancy. On the question as to whether this volte face 
was based upon a reevaluation of the role of the Indian bourgeoisie, or else upon a 
changed understanding of the class nature of the INC (or both), the Dutt-Bradley thesis 
was conspicuously silent; just as it was silent on why, if national independence and 
not socialism was the main goal in India, the united front strategy had not been applied 
throughout.
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The Initial Reception and Application of the New Line
The CPI’s two delegates to the Seventh Congress never reached their 
destination, being arrested en route. Thus information on the decisions made at the 
Seventh Congress filtered through slowly.
At this time the CPI was still factionalised and disorganised. The reconstitution 
of a single leadership in late 1933 to early 1934 had been a step forward, but continued
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political differences, and British repression, meant that a united party under a single, 
functioning leadership was still a goal to be achieved.27 In April the Politbureau was 
re-formed, with P.C. Joshi, one of the most able of the former Meerut detainees^, 
and a leader not closely aligned with any faction, as General Secretary. The new 
leadership was in the course of time to successfully establish a united party, but 
initially factional and organisational problems persisted. In August 1936 a Politbureau 
plan for party reorganisation referred darkly to 'underhand' factional plotting and 
'sectarian' resistance to the new line, and admitted that "To-day we exist by the grace 
of British imperialism. At any minute the police likes it can wipe us out of 
existence
In these circumstances, the party was slow to react to news of the Seventh 
Congress decisions, and to its receipt of the Dutt-Bradley thesis in January 1936. It 
was not until March that the CPI responded to and accepted the Seventh Congress 
decisions, and that too in a manner which indicated that it did not understand, or 
wilfully misunderstood, the full extent of the change in line.30 Internal party debate 
revealed significant opposition to the Dutt-Bradley thesis, with opponents claiming that 
Dutt and Bradley were advocating a 'Royist' line (that is, one similar to that which 
Roy, now no longer a member of the Comintern, was advancing at this time) in 
suggesting that the INC could be transformed into an anti-imperialist front, and 
reaffirming, against this, "the Marxian principle, that the INC [is] an organisation of 
the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie".31
In late July the Politbureau adopted a lengthy statement on the Dutt-Bradley 
thesis, and this was published in The Communist in September. This statement 
accepted the Dutt-Bradley thesis "as embodying an entirely sound policy which must 
be immediately put into practice".32 However, in this statement as in other CPI 
pronouncements in the course of 1936 and early 1937, ambiguity, confusion and 
contradiction prevailed.
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These arose both out of what the Dutt-Bradley thesis advocated, as well as what 
it left unanswered. The call to transform the INC into the very form of the UNF, 
instead of just one of its elements, was obviously too much of a radical departure from 
previous positions for the CPI to be able to accept without reservation. Although the 
call for ’collective affiliation' was raised, and communists were also instructed to join 
the INC individually, CPI statements on this remained ambigious and sometimes 
contradictory.^^
The Dutt-Bradley thesis had not addressed a crucial and, as we have seen, much 
debated question : that of the role of the Indian bourgeosie in the nationalist struggle. 
On this issue the CPI's statements were markedly more 'left' than was warranted by 
the general tenor of the Dutt-Bradley thesis - and markedly more left than was 
consistent with a tactic of making the INC the UNF.34
These ambiguities and contradictions meant that, even as the call for the UNF 
was raised, it was very unclear as to what form it would take, and whom it would and 
would not include. The only point of (relative) clarity was on method. The CPI raised 
the call for collective affiliation of class organisations to the INC, proposed a 19 point 
platform for the INC to adopt in its election manifesto^, and instructed its members to 
energetically popularise this platform and support INC candidates in the scheduled 
elections, "as out of the united front work for elections can arise the united front work 
for the Anti-Imperialist People's Front line..."36 Indeed, the CPFs calls to united front 
action around the elections functioned as a means of avoiding answering some of the 
more difficult questions, and giving the call for a UNF some form and shape.
The CPI's acceptance of the Seventh Congress decisions and the Dutt-Bradley 
thesis was, then, not without its ambiguities. A decision had, nevertheless, been taken 
- a decision to raise the call for a UNF, to seek allies amongst formerly reviled 
organisations and individuals, and a decision to work within and outside the INC to 
develop its radical and nationalist potential, rather than assail it as the chief impediment 
to national revolution.
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The Political Context
Political circumstances favoured such a strategy, for this was a time of growing 
militancy and struggle, both outside the INC and inside it.
Within the INC, the formation of the Congress Socialist Party (CSP) in 1934 
meant that for the first time the call for a leftward shift in INC programme and tactics 
was not largely limited to the solitary voice of Nehru. Such a call now had an 
organisational base, and included senior and respected Congressmen, some of national 
stature.
The CSP sought to "agitate within the Congress for the adoption of an economic 
programme with a view to socialise the nationalist struggle", in connection with which 
it also sought to mobilise and organise workers and peasants.^7 In fact it was a very 
heterogeneous organisation, one including left-nationalists of various descriptions, 
socialists, and Marxists. The future political trajectory of its leaders was to include 
anti-communism (Minoo Masani) and Gandhian mysticism (J.P. Narayan).
The CSP was an almost ideal point at which to begin implementing the new 
united front tactic. It afforded the CPI a point of entry into the INC and the nationalist 
mainstream, and as a body bringing together a diverse collection of 'leftists', it 
constituted a ready made and potentially receptive audience to CPI influence.
Tentative discussions between CSP and CPI leaders on forms of cooperation 
between the two parties had begun in late 1934. According to Minoo Masani's later 
account, CPGB leaders approached him in connection with this matter soon after the 
Seventh Congress, when he was visiting Moscow.38 The initiative, however, came 
from the CSP, when at its Meerut conference in January 1936 it decided to admit 
communists to its ranks, subject to supervision (and to a record being kept) by its 
National Executive.39 Soon after, the 'Lucknow Pact' between the parties put the seal 
on united action, and communists began to join the CSP - with the 'safety clause' of 
National Executive approval not being enforced.
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Cooperation yielded results for both parties. The CPI gained new respectability, 
the capacity to influence the nationalist movement from within, and a forum for the 
propagation of its ideas and the gaining of new recruits. The CSP gained a corps of 
disciplined and dedicated cadres, and a contact with the working class that it did not 
previously have.
Another factor conducive to united front tactics, and to 'transforming' the INC 
into a more militant organisation, was the emergence of a more-or-less organised 
peasant movement in parts of India. The Bihar Provincial Kisan Sabha (Peasant 
Assembly), after its revival and re-formation in 1933, grew rapidly under the 
leadership of Swami Sahajanand.4^ By 1935 it had 80,000 members and, at its height 
in 1938, 250,000. The growth of the BPKS coincided with its radicalisation. In 
November 1935, at the third session of the BPKS, the Sabha declared zamindari 
abolition (abolition of feudal landholdings of this type), without compensation, to be 
one of its chief goals. In 1936 the BPKS 'Manifesto' was adopted, with a constitution 
which included a radical charter of 'Fundamental Rights' for kisans (peasants).
In the course of its campaigns and struggles, most notably the protracted struggle 
over bakasht lands (land 'resumed* from tenants by their landlords), the methods of 
the Kisan Sabha also grew more militant. Mass rallies and campaigns were combined 
with forcible sowing and harvesting of land, leading to clashes with zamindars and 
big landlords.
In 1936, at the urging of the CSP (and over the reservations of Swami 
Sahajanand), the All-India Kisan Congress (later All-India Kisan Sabha, or AIKS) 
was founded. As with the BPKS, its largest constituent, the AIKS stood for "the 
achievement of ultimate economic and political power for the producing masses 
through its active participation in the national struggle for the winning of the complete 
independence of India",41 and regarded the INC as the vehicle for the achievement of 
this independence, as well as for measures to improve the lot of kisans . Although 
never a truly all-India organisation - its strength was mainly limited to Bihar, Andhra,
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Punjab, U.P. and Bengal - the AIKS did grow in strength and influence, and its third 
conference in Comilla in 1938 assembled delegates representing 546,800 members.4^
Neither AIKS nor the BPKS were dominated by the CPI4^, but the emergence 
of a peasant movement facilitated, and then seemed to vindicate, the CPI's adoption 
of UNF tactics. AIKS and the BPKS combined the ’social' with the national struggle, 
and in the process did contribute in some measure to the leftwards movement of the 
INC in the mid nineteen-thirties.
A third factor conducive to united front tactics was a renewal of labour militancy 
and strike activity from 193544, and the re-establishment of trade union unity at peak 
level. From 1935 onwards, there were strikes in all key industrial sectors - textiles, 
mining, railways, iron and steel, and the jute and oil industries, and the strikes 
included most industrial centres in India. In addition other, less organised sections of 
the working class - such as tonga-wallahs, bidi makers, dhobis, stonebreakers, 
municipal sweepers - began to utilise the strike weapon.
Trade union membership increased significantly, with a mammoth 50% rise 
between 1937 and 1938.4  ^The reuniting of the Red Trade Union Congress and the 
All-India Trade Union Congress in 1935, and then of this united body with the 
National Trade Union Federation in 1938, contributed to the consolidation of trade 
union organisation - although it made less of a contribution to successful conduct of 
strike struggles, which continued to be largely spontaneous affairs.^ After 1935 the 
reunified AITUC was to become an instrument through which united front policies 
were pursued, as it called not only for workers’ demands to be met, but also added its 
voice to the call for a Constituent Assembly, for 'collective affiliation' to the INC, and 
so on.
Finally, the INC as a whole moved perceptibly to the left in 1936 and early 
1937. This was, in part, a consequence of the efforts of the Left, and a response to the 
rising tide of peasant and worker struggles - as anticipated in the UNF strategy.
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The leftward shift in the INC was indicated by Nehru's presiding over both the 
Lucknow (April 1936) and Faizpur (December 1936) Congress sessions, in the 
frankly 'socialist' speeches he gave there, and in the election manifesto and agrarian 
programme adopted by the INC. The Congress Election Platform, adopted by the All- 
India Congress Committee (AICC) in August 1936, declared that independence was 
necessary to "give us the power to solve our economic and social problems and end the 
exploitation of our masses".4^  In its general tenor as in its specific proposals for 
ameliorating the lot of workers and peasants, the Election Platform clearly signalled the 
INCs increasing orientation towards the masses.
The Agrarian Programme adopted at the Faizpur Congress pledged the INC to a 
"radical change in the antiquated and repressive land tenure and revenue system", 
adding a few more demands / promises to those contained in the Election Manifesto, 
such as for abolition of all feudal dues and levies, wiping out of arrears of debt in most 
cases, a minimum wage for agricultural labourers, recognition of peasant unions, and 
’fixity of tenure’ for agricultural tenants.4**
Such promises of economic betterment for the poor figured prominently in the 
Congress election campaign, particularly, as we saw in the last chapter, in Nehru's 
energetic campaigning in the months prior to the April 1937 elections. And such a 
'mass orientation' contributed greatly to the Congress' s electoral success. This was 
recognised by the Congress Working Committee (CWC) immediately after the 
elections, when it paid tribute to the 'great awakening of the masses'. It was also 
recognized, though expressed more crudely, by the Viceroy, who wrote, "I have little 
doubt that...undertakings to skin the well-to-do for the benefit of the cultivator have 
played a great part in persuading the electorate to vote for Congress" 49
The Politics of the United Front
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As we have seen, the initial reaction of the CPI to the Seventh Comintern 
Congress decisions, and to the Dutt-Bradley thesis, was a somewhat ambivalent one. 
The CPI began to seek united action with other forces, and called for the building of a 
UNF, but without specifying what form this would take ; in particular, by remaining 
evasive on the crucial question of whether the Congress could 'become' the UNF, as 
envisaged by Palme Dutt and Bradley.
With the elections over, and the assumption of office by the INC in six provinces 
in July 1937 (later Congress ministries were also formed in the North West Frontier 
Province and Assam), such an ambivalent position could no longer be maintained. The 
call to build the UNF through election work was no longer relevant, and with the 
Congress in government, it was no longer possible to avoid clearly specifying its role 
in the UNF.
The Congress had, quite clearly, moved to the left. On the other hand, the 
Election Platform and the Agrarian Programme did not go much beyond the 1931 
Karachi Congress Declaration of Fundamental Rights. Like it, they were vague on 
specifics.^ Both fell well short of the CPI's proposed 'minimum programme' for the 
UNF, which had been ignored by the INC. An attempt to get individual Congress 
candidates to sign a 'Peasants Pledge' incorporating AIKS demands as a condition of 
AIKS support had been publicly denounced by Patel, the right-wing Congress leader, 
forcing AIKS President N.G. Ranga to back down.51 jn SOme labour reserved 
constituencies communist supported candidates had won as a result of 'united front' 
agreements with local Congress committees, but these were more in the nature of 
'gentlemen's agreements' not to compete against each other than joint efforts around a 
shared platform.^2
Organisationally, the right wing remained in control of the INC. The CWC 
appointed by Nehru at the Lucknow Congress included three CSP leaders, but they 
were still far outnumberedby the Right Most important, the crucial communist demand 
for collective affiliation of class organisations to the INC had not been granted - though
238
for the CPI bringing revolutionary classes into the INC was to be one of the key levers 
for its 'transformation'. Instead, the Lucknow Congress had established a Mass 
Contacts Committee, to investigate means of promoting 'closer association between the 
masses and the Congress organisation'. Due to report by end-July 1936, the 
Committee's report had not been prepared even by the time of the Faizpur Congress.
The very decision to accept office under the 'slave constitution' marked a major 
defeat for the Left, which had promoted non-acceptance as an issue of fundamental 
principle, involving nothing less, in Nehru's words, than "the question of 
independence and whether we seek revolutionary changes in India or are working for 
Parliamentary reforms under the aegis of British imperialism'.^ The CPI was one 
element of the Left which regarded the issue of accepting office as a tactical question 
rather than one of principle,but the very logic of the UNF had led it to add its support 
to the rest of the Left on this issue, rather than break ranks.54
The 'balance sheet' drawn up over the last few pages can be summed up as 
follows : the early phase of the application of united front tactics yielded and was 
encouraged by some promising developments, but the picture was a mixed one, with 
the INC in particular 'moving left' only to a limited degree. Thus the question 
confronting communists in the aftermath of the elections and the decision to form 
Congress ministries, when further development of the UNF required outlining its 
shape and form more clearly, was - should the UNF be treated as something being 
formed, requiring further radicalisation of the Congress ? ; or was it something already 
achieved, with the INC as its central element or even its very 'form' ?
In the course of 1937-38, answers to these questions emerged, and the politics 
of the united front assumed clear and coherent shape. The central elements in the UNF 
strategy, as developed and promoted in the CPI press (particularly The New Age and 
National Front ,which began publication in December 1936 and February 1938 
respectively), in pamphlets and leaflets specifically on this issue, in communist appeals
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and addresses to the INC, and of course in the practical-political activity of the CPI, 
can be identified as follows.
First, there was a clear and unambigious identification of independence and a 
democratic regime as the immediate goal in India, without the normal 'rider' that 
independence and radical social transformation would necessarily coalesce, under the 
leadership of the working class. As The Communists and the Congress , a pamphlet 
clarifying the communists attitude to the INC announced, "the immediate task before 
us is the liberation of the Indian people and the creation of a democratic regime".55 
Communists thus ardently embraced 'democratic' demands, chief amongst them the 
demand for a Constituent Assembly. Communists were to demonstrate to nationalists 
and patriots that their goals were shared, just as the united front in China had "taught 
the Chinese people that the Chinese Communists were the best Chinese 
Nationalists."56
A second aspect of the UNF was that it involved a re-evaluation of the nature and 
role of the INC. Although communists continued to criticise the INC, such criticisms 
were generally directed at specific actions or policies, rather than as parts of a general 
indictment of the Congress. "The formulation that the Congress is a bourgeois 
organisation", declared The Communists and the Congress , "is wrong in the given 
situation, to-day".57 As the INC was not to be regarded as a bourgeois organisation, it 
clearly could be the form of realisation of the UNF, as "the great National organisation 
which to-day embodies the growing unity of our people".5**
If the characterisation of the Congress as 'bourgeois' had been re-evaluated, the 
role of the bourgeoisie had itself been re-evaluated. The Indian bourgeoisie too, or at 
least a section of it, was to be part of the UNF. The editorial in the first issue of 
National Front defined the UNF as "a unity of different classes including a 
considerable section of the capitalists and a section of the landlords against 
imperialism".^ The bourgeoisie's conflict of interest with imperialism was declared to 
be greater than its fear of the masses - "The scope for extension of Indian capital is
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being restricted. None of the demands of the Indian bourgeoisie, which cut across 
imperialist interests, have been satisfied...The bourgeoisie cannot afford to isolate 
itself from the masses, without whose support it has no weapon of offence or defence 
against Imperialism...This is the basis of the united national front embracing all 
sections of the people whose interests are opposed to the policy of Imperialism, 
including even the nationalist bourgeoisie".^
Third, it was now argued that programmatically the INC had become the UNF ; 
that is, it was suggested that the INCs policies were already an appropriate platform 
around which to mobilize all nationalist forces and classes. Nothing indicated more 
clearly that the CPI had consciously opted, by 1937, for a UNF which involved a 
highly conciliatory and supportive attitude towards the INC. Although the Lucknow 
and Faizpur Congresses had not accepted the CPI’s proposed platform, the CPI 
nevertheless hailed the outcome of these INC sessions as "a programmatic victory for 
the Left, official adoption by the Congress of the programme which the Left had been 
advocating for a decade". The UNF had been built or won, programmatically ; the task 
was now "to implement it in practice" .6*
Fourth, the central slogan of the UNF strategy - that of 'unity' - referred, above 
all else, to the INC. The unity of the UNF was not merely a unity of the various 
organisations and classes which constituted it, but unity within the INC. This was held 
to be both necessary and possible. It was necessary because, inasmuch as the INC was 
the 'form' of the UNF, the unity required by the latter was simply extended to the 
former. Thus the communist press became the most ardent proclaimer and guardian of 
Congress unity in this period, with the National Front assigning responsibility for the 
preservation of this unity to the Left - "to preserve the unity of the National Front äM 
the National Coneress is the two-fold task before the Left to-day ".62 (emphasis 
added).
The unity of the INC implied, of course, unity with its bourgeois or right-wing 
leadership. This implication was embraced in full. In the past, communists had seen an
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intensification of worker and peasant struggles as the harbinger of disunity within 
nationalist ranks. The growth of such struggles, once held to be the catalyst for the 
Indian bourgeoisie's capitulation to imperialism and thus of a split in the INC, were 
now seen as a means of preventing precisely such a development - "with the increasing 
strength and sweep of the mass movements of the workers and peasants and with the 
growing strength of the Left Wing inside Congress itself, the possibility of checking 
the vacillations of the leadership has increased more than ever before".163
Thus militant (and class-based) struggle and Congress unity were no longer seen 
as incompatible, but rather as mutually reinforcing. Unchecked, the vacillations of a 
section of the Congress leadership would produce demoralisation and a disintegration 
of the INC ; but struggle would "neutralize the conciliatory drift of a part of the 
leadership...without allowing any section of [the] leadership to split off".64
Another aspect of this emphasis on unity within the INC was the CPI 
characterisation of the Congress leadership as'Right-Wing' rather than 'bourgeois' in 
most of its propaganda. This semantic shift at once reflected and subtly reinforced the 
theme of unity, emphasising a difference of strategic / political perceptions and not 
what were hitherto seen as 'objective' and fundamental class differences. Such a 
change in terminology was not required by the logic of the UNF strategy, for a section 
of the bourgeoisie was in any case now seen as a part of the UNF. It did, however, 
'ease' the way to the CPI's frequent call for distinguishing between struggle against 
the British and struggle against elements within the INC - "The fight for the UNF does 
not imply a simultaneous struggle on two fronts - against the Right INC leadership and 
against Imperialism. Our main and one enemy today is British Imperialism...".^
Fifth, such a 'blurring' in the analysis and language of class was also reflected, 
to some degree, in the CPI analysis of worker and peasant struggles. These were, of 
course, encouraged and vigorously supported by the CPI, and the bulk of CPI activity 
continued to be in the trade union and peasant fronts. However, even here there was a 
tendency, in theory at least, to 'appropriate' class struggles to the nationalist struggle.
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This was despite the fact that the reality was very different, and one of the frequent 
laments of CPI leaders was precisely the failure of the Left to give strikes and peasant 
struggles a nationalist orientation. In June 1937 The New Age admitted, "there has 
been little progress in the task of linking up the working class struggle with the 
national struggle".66 Two years later, CPI and trade union leader B.T. Ranadive was 
still complaining that "the bulk of workers remain strangers to the national organisation 
[i.e. the INC] and to the specific political task facing them in connection with it".67
Despite this, the call for class conflict to be given a nationalist content was 
occasionally confused with the existence of such a content. A few months before 
complaining that workers remained 'strangers' to nationalist politics, the same 
Ranadive proclaimed, "Strike-struggles are nothing but economic revolts against the 
results of Imperialist misrule, and constitute a part and parcel of the Indian discontent 
and unrest against British domination. Their national significance lies in the fact that 
thousands of workers have started resisting imperialism in their daily life ...".68
Here, from the twin premises that imperialism oppressed workers, and that 
workers were an essential part of the nationalist movement, worker s' struggles became 
nationalist outbreaks by definition - and wish became reality. In the process, of 
course, the varied causes and the history of workers’ struggles was appropriated to the 
one struggle and the one history - that of nationalism.
Communists also occasionally described strikes as 'sectional','partial', 'local' 
and 'economic', usually when engaging in self-criticism. Here, in another semantic 
slide, what was being implicitely counterposed to 'local' was not simply 'national', but 
nationalist: the opposite of 'economic' was not simply 'political', but a particular 
politics, those of nationalism.69
Even as they were championed, the strikes of workers and the struggles of 
peasants were 'read' as instances of a growing tide of nationalist struggle. They were 
cited as evidence of the correctness of the fundamental propositions of the UNF
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strategy (unity, etc.), and thus as proof of the fact that the INC needed to develop 
closer links with such struggles. Or else, they were criticised for being 'sectional' and 
'local' rather than properly national and political (i.e. nationalist).
Sixth and finally, the CPI's conception or theorisation of the UNF not only 
involved declaring that the struggle for national independence was the 'primary' task in 
the sense of being temporally prior to socialism. Nationalist struggle also came to be 
treated as primary in the sense of being objectively more important than class struggle.
This followed from, and was implicit in, the other constituent elements of the 
UNF strategy. If the immediate struggle was for an independent bourgeois-democratic 
state ; if a section of the bourgeoisie was a partner in that struggle ; if the unity of the 
INC was a means to i t ; and if class struggles were, or should be, instances of anti- 
imperialist struggle - then it could easily follow that the conflict between the greater 
part of the Indian people and British imperialism was objectively primary (and not just 
prior), while class struggle within the Indian nation was secondary. In this case, 
'class struggle' was an important element of the UNF strategy not in its proper sense 
(as a relational concept, denoting conflict between classes which are linked in their 
opposition), but in the almost tautological sense that it brought into nationalist struggle 
hitherto excluded classes and their organisations.
Such a conclusion, no matter how logically it followed from the other elements 
of the UNF strategy, was not an easy one for communists to reach. It ran counter to 
what in a sense had been the primary theme of Marxism in India since the 1920's, 
namely that class and nationalist struggle were inextricably connected, and nationalists 
ignored the former at their own peril. Thus this element of the UNF remained largely 
implicit, although on occasions it was made explicit and attempts were made to give it a 
theoretical justification, in Marxist terms - as when Communists and the Congress 
found that the UNF "does not abolish the class-conflict, but shifts it to a new dividing 
line - the one between the anti-imperialist people on the one hand and Imperialism and
the anti-national vested interests on the other, so that it assumes the form of a great 
National conflict".7^
As in the past, the pursuit of a strategy went hand in hand with the propagation 
of an ideology explaining and legitmating the strategy. In explaining the premises 
governing their actions, communists also sought to convince others of the validity and 
viability of these actions.
During the period of the UNF, this ideology may be termed a 'Left-nationalist' 
ideology. It accepted many of the premises of 'bourgeois nationalism' (and accepted its 
main organisation, the INC), whilst insisting that these required a more pronouncedly 
'leftist' orientation. As before, it was declared that class struggle and nationalist 
struggle were closely interlinked. But more so than before the inherently nationalist 
character of class struggles was emphasised, and the potential conflict between these 
and nationalist struggle was downplayed, even denied.
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The elaboration of such a united front strategy, and its energetic pursuit, yielded 
the CPI rich dividends. It re-enteredthe mainstream of Indian politics, increased its 
membership and, although it remained a small party, its influence was greatly 
disproportionate to its membership.71
The tactic of working with and in the CSP, both to extendthe influence of the 
Left within the nationalist movement, and the influence of communists within the CSP, 
proved remarkably successful. The relatively greater political clarity of the 
communists, as well as their undoubted commitment and organisational skills, won 
them many allies and converts in the CSP - including such later communist leaders as 
E.M.S. Namboodiripad, A.K. Gopalan and R. Krishna Pillai.72
In association with the C.S.P. and independent mass leaders such as Swami 
Sahajanand, the CPI also partially realised its goal of building a nationwide peasant
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movement. As we have seen, the BPKS and the AIKS grew in numbers and militancy, 
with the AIKS even adopting the Red Rag as its emblem in 1937.
Similarly on the trade union front labour militancy (and trade union membership) 
grew in this period. In the early months of the Congress Ministries, labour agitation 
did result in some pro-labour legislation being enacted, vindicating the communist 
contention that working class and nationalist struggle could be mutually reinforcing 
through the UNF. Strikes in Kanpur in 1937, beginning with textile workers but 
spreading to include most of the city's workforce, secured the support of the local and 
(for a while) provincial Congress committees, an occurence the communist press 
hailed as "a decisive turning-point not only in the history of Labour but of our entire 
anti-imperialist movement, demonstrating in real life the power of the UNF in
action".7^
Despite the extension of communist influence over sections of the working class, 
however, this remained a problem area in the context of the UNF. The CPI, as we 
have noted, repeatedly bemoaned the fact that nationalist and trade union struggles 
were conducted in isolation from each other. The very significance the CPI attached to 
the Kanpur events was an indication of how isolated this example was.
In the student area and the 'cultural' field, CPI efforts to promote UNF politics 
met with great success. The All India Students' Federation and the Progressive 
Writers' Association, both founded in 1936, were to prove important vehicles for 
consolidating the hold of a 'left-nationalist', communist-influenced ideology over 
sections of the intelligentsia in India.
The leftward drift of the INC also seemed to vindicate the UNF strategy. The 
attention paid to the needs of the 'masses' at Lucknow and Faizpur was followed by 
action in the early months of the Congress Ministries, with some pro-labour and pro- 
peasant legislation being implemented, and British restrictions on civil liberties being 
repealed. In general, mass struggles were strengthening the hand of the Congress as a
nationalist organisation, whilst it in turn became more attentive to the demands of the 
masses - as anticipated in the UNF strategy.
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Contradictions of the United National Front (I)
The very successes of the UNF strategy - a strategy premised upon and striving 
towards unity of all anti-imperialist forces - were a factor in undermining that unity. 
Communist successes in working through the CSP generated tensions between the two 
parties ; working class and peasant demands and struggles come into conflict with the 
INC, and particularly the Congress Ministries, which were subject to strong 
countervailing pressures ; and the increased influence of the Left in the Congress was 
met with a consolidation and a fightback by the Right.
Almost from the outset, it became clear that the CPI and the CSP had quite 
different understandings as to the nature and purpose of their unity. In the CPI's view 
the CSP was not "a socialist party of the working-class, but rather the growing 
organisational expression of Left unity". As such, strict membership controls and 
attempts to enforce ideological / political homogeneity (and discipline) were out of 
place. As a 'platform' or expression of Left unity, it was rather necessary for the CSP 
to "open its door to all active left anti-imperialists...".74
By contrast most CSP leaders saw their party as precisely that, a disciplined 
party rather than a heterogeneous collection of leftists. They defined the CSP as such 
in proportion as communists sought to define it otherwise. Minoo Masani made the 
point strongly in his Chairman's address to the Lahore Conference of the CSP in April 
1938 - "The Congress Socialist Party is a Revolutionary Socialist Party. As such, it is 
a Party which must act as a homogeneous team...In a revolutionary Party there is no 
room for internal conflicts that inevitably lead to paralysis and stagnation".7^
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Underlying these doctrinal and definitional disputes were very practical 
considerations, chief amongst them the CPI's desire to extend its influence in the CSP, 
and the alarm of CSP leaders at the CPI's success in doing so. The fears of the CSP's 
leadership were expressed concisely by Narendra Dev - "Those who desire the C.S.P. 
to be the party of socialist unity also demand the broadening of the Party to include all 
active anti-imperialists. The intention is clear - to transform the C.S.P. into a platform 
of broad unity wherein the Communists would get ample opportunities to increase their 
influence" .76
As early as end-1936, only a few months after the two parties signed the 
Lucknow Agreement, CSP leaders were expressing concern at reports of communists 
working in fractions and seeking to 'capture' the CSP. In August 1937 an internal CPI 
document questioning the CSP's credentials as a socialist party was tabled, to great 
indignation ; the CSP National Executive thereupon barred further admittance of 
communists to the CSP.
The extent of communist influence was revealed at the Lahore Conference of the 
CSP (April 1938), where the communists put up their own list for the Executive 
elections, in opposition to the 'official' list, and were only narrowly defeated ; and by 
what was allegedly an internal CPI document, published with great fanfare by Minoo 
Masani in late 1938, which claimed that the Andhra, Tamil Nadu and Madras 
provincial units of the CSP were entirely under CPI influence, and a majority of CSP 
members in Bengal, Orissa and Punjab were CPI sympathisers.77
Such conflicts continued to develop. When sharp political differences between 
the two parties emerged a few months after the outbreak of World War II, the 
combination of organisational jealousies and political differences ended the period of 
unity. In 1940, communists were expelled from the CSP. The CPI walked away with 
a significant section of the CSP membership, including the entire Kerala unit and most 
of the Tamil Nadu and Andhra membership.
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At the same time as strains were undermining unity on the Left, the mass 
movements and the INC were also coming into conflict. The formation of Congress 
Ministries, elected with promises of economic and social reform, had raised 
expectations in the worker and peasant movements. The Congress Ministries did, 
particularly in the first months after they assumed office, enact measures for agrarian 
reform, including rent reduction and tenancy reform. However these fell far short of 
even the Agrarian Programme adopted at Faizpur, and were further diluted in the 
course of their passage through the legislature, as with the Bihar Tenancy Amendment 
Act (1937) and the Bihar Restoration of Bakasht Lands and Reduction of Arrears of 
Rent Act (1938)78 in Bihar, where the kisan movement was strongest, legislation 
was enacted, but in a weak form ; and at the same time the Congress made its peace 
with the rural landlords through the infamous Congress - Zamindar Pact.
Thus pressure from below generated conflict with the Congress Ministries ; their 
failure to implement radical reforms, in turn, led to the alienation of the peasant 
movement. In 1937 three Congress District Committees in Bihar banned Swami 
Sahajanand from touring in their districts (a ban he promptly defied). In late 1937 the 
Bihar Provincial Congress Committee (PCC) Executive passed a resolution 
condemning the 'cult of violence' being promoted by some elements in the BPKS, and 
directed Congressmen not to involve themselves in such activities. This resolution was 
approved at a national level by a Congress Working Committee (CWC) meeting in 
January 1938, which also approved disciplinary action against Congressmen who 
offended in this manner, and which sanctioned 'coercive action' by Congress 
Ministries in response to incitements to violence over any issue.7^ Official repressive 
measures were in fact undertaken by the Bihar and other Congress governments, as 
were unofficial means such as the employment of thugs to break up kisan rallies. In 
early 1938 the Office of the Secretary to the Governor-General approvingly remarked, 
"the policy of the Congress party towards the Kisan organisations has been firm, and
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As conflicts between the Congress Ministries and the kisan sabhas and other 
movements escalated, the INC took a tougher line. Mass pressure for an extension of 
civil liberties, including repeal of all British repressive legislation, was partly met But 
when such pressure took militant forms and embarrassed the Congress, the AICC (at 
its Delhi meeting in September 1938) declared that "the Congress...will support 
measures that may be undertaken by the Congress Governments for the defence of life 
and property".^ Such blatant pandering to the fears of businessmen and landlords, 
and endorsement of repressive action by the Congress Ministries, led to a Left walkout 
from the AICC meeting.
As with peasant concerns, the Congress governments were initially sympathetic 
to labour demands. However as strikes in pursuit of such demands and led by the Left 
mounted on the one hand, and business pressures increased on the other, the Congress 
Ministries became increasingly authoritarian in their response. In Bombay and Madras 
Congress Chief Ministers worked closely with the British Governor to maintain 'law 
and order'82, and in November 1938 the draconian Bombay Trades Dispute Act was 
passed. Repressive ordinances which had been used by the British and long 
condemned by the INC were used against workers, and a massive 80,000 strong 
protest rally against the Bombay Trades Dispute Act was fired upon by police.
Thus the growth of the peasant and worker movements, although they did 
provide the Congress with a base of active support, and did-function to 'push' the 
Congress governments into enacting some progressive legislation, also served to create 
conflict between what were, in the communist analysis, mutually supportive elements 
of the UNF. Moreover, not only were cracks beginning to appear in the UNF - the 
nationalist militancy of the INC was becoming blunted, as the Congress Ministries 
settled down to governing under the Constitution of India Act, rather than making it 
'unworkable from within'. This was what the British Indian Government had hoped 
for83, and after a year of Congress being in office, a British report concluded,
when due weight has been given to every activity of Congress Ministries 
and of the Congress High Command, it is impossible not to feel that the 
main strength of the party has gone into the tasks of administration rather 
than into preparations for renewed revolt. 84
The Haripura session of the INC, held in February 1938, was a very different 
occasion to the Lucknow and Faizpur Congresses. It met in an atmosphere of tension 
and internal conflict, with many fearing a destructive confrontation between the Right 
and Left of the party. In the event the feared brawl did not eventuate, partly because the 
resignation of the U.P. and Bihar Ministries over the Governor's refusal to sanction 
release of political prisoners united the various elements in the Congress, but also 
because the Left was decisely trounced whenever it opposed the Right. As communist 
leader A.K. Ghosh conceded, "The delegates voted overwhelmingly for the Right 
Wing on each and every issue". 85
On the critical question of where the nationalist movement was to go next, the 
Left's concrete proposals for action were ignored in favour of leaving it to the AICC to 
determine a course of resistance in the event of the Federal provisions of the 
Constitution being implemented by the British. The Right Wing not only won 
handsomely, but aggressively, with Patel attacking the Left and apparently declaring, 
"Let me make it clear we have tolerated you for two years, but the time has come when 
we shall no longer tolerate you".86
Indeed, in the course of 1938 the Right Wing did become increasingly 
aggressive, as reflected in the conduct of Congress Ministries and the pronouncements 
of the Congress High Command. Gandhi lent the weight of his authority to this 
campaign, condemning labour and peasant agitations in the name of 'discipline' and 
'non-violence', and authoring the AICC resolution committing the INC to defence of 
life and property.87 An unhappy Nehru was amongst those who recognised (in 
private) what was going on, referring in a letter to Bose to "the new orientation of 
Congress policy which involves a suppression of left elements and mass 
88
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movements .
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The Right Wing also moved to further consolidate its control of the 
organisational machinery of the INC. Throughout this period, the Right dominated the 
INC organisationally. Nehru's two terms as President of the INC had been the 
occasion for advance by the Left, not a consequence of it - Gandhi had installed him as 
President, and the CWC remained overwhelmingly Right Wing and Gandhian, as had 
the influential Congress Parliamentary Board established in 1936. As Right-Left 
conflict sharpened, the Right further extended this control ; constitutional changes 
adopted at Haripura, and recommended by the CWC at the end of 1938, were directed 
not only against opportunist and corrupt elements which had flocked to the INC now 
that it was in power, but also against the Left. Here again, Gandhi lent his considerable 
weight and prestige to such moves, conducting a campaign against those who joined 
the Congress without unreservedly accepting its creed.^9
Thus in the course of 1937 and (particularly) 1938, in the same measure that the 
UNF strategy was successful - seeing cooperation within the Left, an advance in 
worker and peasant struggles, and so on - it undermined its own foundations. Unity of 
the Left became increasingly fragile ; the mass movements came into conflict with the 
Congress Ministries and the High Command ; and conflicts between Right and Left in 
the INC increased, being resolved in most cases not by the Left 'pulling' the Right 
along in its wake, but by the Right demonstrating that it was still securely in control of 
the Congress.
The communist reaction to such evidence of disunity was, on the whole, 
conciliatory. The CPI strove ever harder for unity, and proclaimed all the louder that 
such unity was possible and necessary. Thus, for example, a communist evaluation of 
the Haripura Congress was titled "Haripura - A Step Forward". Despite the fact that 
the resolutions adopted at this congress had little in common with those which had 
been proposed by the CPI^O, it found that "Haripura opens the doors to acceptance of 
what the Left has been insisting on, the unity of Parliamentary and extra-Parliamentary 
struggle".^1
By the latter part of 1938, however, as the Right Wing offensive mounted, the 
CPI and the Left more generally responded with greater aggression. The Left walkout 
at the Delhi AICC in September 1938 was a gesture not only of frustration, but of 
(somewhat ineffectual) defiance. The CPI press, whilst continuing to call for unity, 
began to acknowledge the evidence of growing disunity, and began to blame the 
Congress Right Wing for this. The cracks which were beginning to appear in the UNF 
found their reflection in the CPI 'line', which began to show signs of inconsistency 
and incoherence.92
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Contradictions of the United National Front (II) - Tripuri and After
These developments - an access of strength to the Left outside the Congress, and 
a polarization within the Congress, resulting in a Right Wing offensive and reassertion 
of control - found their culmination at the Tripuri session of the INC, in March 1939. 
Here the relative success of the UNF strategy also starkly revealed its fundamental 
weaknesses, and limits.
The elections for the position of Congress President ( to be held before the 
Tripuri session of the INC) saw the incumbent Bose decide to a stand for re-election 
against Gandhi's preferred candidate, Pattabhi Sitaramayya. In the public polemics
■vVse.
between Bose and^mostly Right Wing CWC which preceded the election, Bose treated 
the contest as a Left / Right struggle, and as a contest between a policy of militant 
nationalism verses a policy allegedly willing to compromise with the British, even to 
the extent of agreeing to the Federation provisions of the Constitution. The CPI threw 
its support behind Bose - indeed, was amongst the first to urge him to stand - and it 
endorsed his 'Plan of Action' for the INC as "an alternative line - the line of struggle, 
of no-compromise, of building the United National Front...the line for which the Left - 
the communists and socialists - have always stood".92
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The events that followed are well known. The Presidential election in late 
January 1939 saw Bose elected by 1580 votes to 1375. The vote did to some extent 
indicate the Left's strength amongst the Congress rank-and-file, although it owed more 
to Bose's personal popularity in certain regions, and to dissatisfaction with the 
performance of Congress Ministries and the directionlessness of the INC. Gandhi 
immediately declared Sitaramayya’s defeat to be ’more mine than his’, challenged Bose 
to appoint an entirely Left Wing CWC, and strongly hinted that he and his supporters 
might withdraw from the INC altogether. Thus prompted by Gandhi, 13 of the 15 
members of the CWC resigned on February 22, in protest at the aspersions cast against 
them by Bose in the exchanges preceding the election.
The Tripuri Congress met in an atmosphere of polarization and crisis. The Pant 
resolution, expressing confidence in the CWC, Gandhi, and Gandhian policies, and 
asking Bose to appoint a CWC in accordance with Gandhi’s wishes, was easily passed 
- thereby effectively censuring Bose. After Bose's attempts at some sort of 
compromise were rebuffed by Gandhi and the Right, Bose resigned as President in late 
April 1939, and the Right Wing leader Rajendra Prasad was appointed President.
The fact that Bose had declared himself to be a candidate of the Left, and had 
been supported by it, transformed the election contest into a Right / Left conflict - even 
if, given Bose's record, there were good reasons to doubt his Leftist credentials. 
Subsequent events demonstrated both the unwillingness of the Congress Right to 
accept such a defeat, and its capacity to reverse it
The significance of the events at Tripuri lay not only in the fact that the Left was 
ultimately defeated in a direct confrontation with the Right, but in the fact that it 
capitulated. The moment Gandhi threw down the gauntlet, making it clear he would 
not accept the election result, the CSP and CPI developed cold feet. The Congress 
rank-and-file's vote for Bose, editorialized the The New Age, "is not a vote against the 
present leadership ; nor can it be interpreted as a vote for an alternative leadership. 
They have voted for militant action and a democratic functioning".^4
254
Gandhi's challenge to Bose to appoint an entirely Left CWC had thus to be 
rejected. The need of the hour, declared a statement signed by 16 communist leaders, 
"[is] not a new leadership, not a homogeneous cabinet, not a new ideology, not even a 
new programme... [but] full implementation of the Congress Programme", a need 
which for its fulfilment required "A united Congress moving forward under a united
leadership ".^5
Having won a victory, of sorts, the CPI immediately began to downplay it, as its 
implications became evident. At theTripuri Congress itself, the main political 
resolution, although much less militant than the one Bose had campaigned on (and 
which the Left had endorsed), was actively supported by the CPI and CSP.
The Tripuri crisis was precipitated by a victory of the Left. It was, in a limited 
sense, evidence of the success of the UNF - of a radicalization of sections of the 
nationalist movement. However the reaction of the Congress leadership put the lie to 
another ’thesis’ or premise of the UNF strategy - that unity and militant struggle were 
entirely compatible, that the Right could be pulled along in the wake of Left advances. 
The Presidential crisis was an illustration of the contradiction that lay at the heart of the 
UNF strategy - namely, that Left advance came into conflict and contradiction with 
preservation of the unity of the UNF. That the actions of the Congress leadership did 
not ’comply’ with the UNF analysis meant the CPI was confrontedwith a choice 
between pyrrhic victory (accompanied by the collapse of any pretense of unity), or the 
preservation of ’unity’ in the UNF - through capitulation. For the final time, the CPI 
opted for unity at any cost
Subsequent to its humiliating backdown over the Presidential conflict, the CPI 
sought to defend its actions from criticism from within and outside the Party, and to 
develop the implications of its actions ’theoretically’. To this end the central 
propositions of the UNF strategy, outlined earlier, were asserted with great 
vehemence, and extended to their further-most limit
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The emphasis on unity now expressly ruled out any challenge to the Congress 
leadership - "No negative opposition to the Right Wing, no attempt to create a parallel 
and alternative leadership to overthrow the present leadership...at no stage and in no 
case must the struggle degenerate into factional opposition to the Right Wing".96 The 
implications of this were now explicitely recognized and embraced. "It is not the time 
to emphasize our ideological differences with Gandhiji and his followers"^, cautioned 
the The New Age ; those committed to the UNF "had no hesitation in considering 
Gandhian leadership as inevitable for the present stage".98
This was justified by a further reassessment, and an explicitely appreciative one, 
of the Congress leadership and Gandhi. S.G. Sardesai called upon Leftists to 
recognize the progressive role played by the Gandhian leadership, and "Gandhiji’s 
unique role as the greatest unifier of nationalist ranks".99 G.A. Adhikari went so far as 
to describe the Indian bourgeoisie as "an oppressed class'*, which was a vital pan of 
the UNF.100
Given all this, the role of the Left had to be clearly understood. CPI members 
had to abandon the mistaken "notion that the Congress is merely a platform for airing 
one's own or the party's views". 101 Leftists had to cease acting as propagandists and 
seek instead to 'move' the Congress towards struggle, not by opposing or seeking to 
replace the Congress leadership, but by "forcing it to be part of the fighting anti­
imperialist front". 102 Whereas before the adoption of united front tactics the interests 
of the nationalist movement had been submerged into the needs of worker and peasant 
struggle, on the basis that no national independence was possible without the 
participation of these classes, now the opposite was urged - complete identification of 
the Left with nationalist struggle : "the task of the Left is not to work for sectional 
gains, but to strive their best for national adance, and to the extent that they do that, 
they advance their own strength and the strength of the nation". ^
Finally, an element implicit in the UNF, but seldom made explicit - the 
proposition that the struggle for national independence was not only temporally prior
to, but in some 'objective' sense more important than, class struggle - was now made 
very explicit and given theoretical justification. "The fundamental principle of Lenin's 
theory of colonial revolutions", adjudged a statement responding to criticism of the 
CPI for neglecting class struggle in pursuit of opportunistic alliances, signed by 15 
leading communists, is "that the basic class relation which determines social and 
political developments in the colonies is the conflict between Foreign imperialism on 
the one hand and the colonial people on the other". Here nationalism was elevated to 
the status of a class conflict, with reference to no less on authority than Lenin ; and it 
was declared to be prior to and more important than that 'other', and secondary, class 
conflict. The slogan of the Anti-Imperialist People's Front, the communist leaders 
declared, held good for the 'whole epoch of the colonial revolutions', and was based 
upon a recognition of the fact that the central issues and priorities in this epoch were 
determined "nol by the struggle of the rival classes within the national front but by the 
basic cleavage between Imperialism and the colonial peop le" .^
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The United National Front Undone
The CPI's frantic efforts to preserve the unity of the UNF in the aftermath of the 
Tripuri Congress, by further moderating its own position and its conception of the 
UNF, were also its final such efforts. They foundered on the rock of the Congress 
leadership's determination to subdue the Left, and then upon a transformed 
international situation.
The CPI's conciliatory attitude towards the Congress Right was not reciprocated. 
The Left was not allowed a single representative on the CWC appointed by Rajendra 
Prasad. The Bombay AICC meeting in June 1939 saw the Right press home its 
advantage, passing resolutions barring Congressmen from organising any satyagraha 
without approval from the relevant Provincial Congress Committee, and reducing the 
power of PCC's over Congress governments, including prohibiting public criticism of
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these governments. Between them, these resolutions greatly restricted extra- 
parliamentary activity by Congressmen, such as those active in the peasant or trade 
union movements. Constitutional changes were also made, preventing election to 
Congress office of anyone who had not been an INC member for three consecutive 
years, and restricting voting rights in such elections to those with at least one years 
membership. These amendments restricted the participation of not only those corrupt 
elements who had recently joined the INC, and at whom the changes were ostensibly 
directed, but also of Leftists, peasants and workers who had joined the INC 
subsequent to the inauguration of the UNF strategy.
Faced with such provocation, this time the Left respondedwith greater 
independence. The newly formed Left Consolidation Committee, bringing together the 
CPI, CSP, Royists and Bose's newly formed Forward Bloc, called for a nationwide 
'day of protest' against the AICC decisions, and then for a 'National Struggle Week' 
from August 31 - September 6. Virtually for the first time the CPI and the Left were 
taking an independent initiative not in the name of assisting and buttressing the 
Congress's position, but in protest at the actions (and inaction, in not launching civil 
disobedience) of the Congress leadership. This call was all the more significant in that 
it was undertaken in direct defiance of the Congress Right Wing's demands that it be 
called off. *05 The Congress High Command responded by removing Bose from his 
position as President of the Bengal PCC, and debarring him from Congress elective 
office for three years.
This newfound initiative and independence o? the part of the CPI did not involve 
its repudiating the UNF strategy. Its actions were undertaken in response to the 
Congress Right Wing's offensive, and were undertaken in association with all other 
important elements of the Left. Nevertheless, such actions did mark a departure from 
the hitherto prevailing conception of the UNF, and CPI statements sought to justify 
and give some shape to this new position. A National Front article with the common 
(for the UNF period) title of "In Defence of Unity and Struggle" acknowledged that
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'unity' and 'struggle' could be conflicting aims, and took the uncommon step of opting 
for the latter, adjudging, "It was better to pay the price of discipline [for calling a 'day 
of protest']...than patiently submit to Rightist disruption".*06
The CWC action against Bose for his participation in organising the 'day of 
protest' was strongly condemned in a statement under the names of senior communist 
leaders Joshi, Adhikari, Bharadwaj and Ghosh,107 and a National Front editorial 
provocatively titled "Provocateurs at Work" linked the attacks on the Left with the 
Congress leadership's desire to "appease imperialism" and "make possible a deal over 
the heads of the masses and against their will".10**
This newly critical assessment of the Congress Right Wing was systematically 
expounded in an important article by Adhikari, which sought to clarify the 'confusion' 
within CPI ranks on the meaning of 'united leadership’ :
It appears that some comrades in our ranks understand the achieving of 
united leadership mechanically. It is viewed as a task of ’pushing’ the 
present leadership to the position of struggle by merely developing partial 
struggles on a nationwide scale. There is a tendency to underestimate the 
task of carrying out political exposures of the anti-unity and anti-struggle 
acts of the present homogeneous Gandhian leadership...a sharp but well- 
balanced and concrete criticism of the present decadent phase of Gandhism 
is a part of the task of forging unity for struggle.10^
This ’clarification’, of course, was in fact a repudiation of what had earlier been 
one of the tenets of the UNF strategy. The prospect of maintaining unity by ’pushing’ 
the bourgeois or Gandhian leadership was now summarily dismissed ; the UNF 
required, instead 'exposure' of that leadership. This, and the reference to Gandhism 
entering its 'decadent' phase, were to become important new themes in the CPI press, 
and in its understanding of the UNF.
At this point, as the contradictions within the UNF hadbecome unmistakably 
apparent and impossible to reconcile, leading to CPI attempts to reinterpret and 
redefine it, the outbreak of World War II transformed the situation.
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The failure of Soviet attempts at 'collective security', and Stalin's territorial 
ambitions, had resulted in the Nazi-Soviet Pact and the subsequent carve-up of Poland 
between Germany and the USSR. Thus when the long dreaded world war was 
declared,the position of the Soviet Union was very different from its position in 1935, 
at the time of the Seventh Comintern Congress. Instead of being seen as a war against 
fascism, it was described as an 'Imperialist war'. With such a changed assessment 
went a change in strategy. The strategy of the UNF against fascism, in Dimitrov's 
words, was 'no longer thinkable' for the communist parties of Western nations, which 
were instead urged to conduct "resolute struggle against the treacherous principal 
leaders of the social-democratic parties".* *0
If such a characterisation and response to the war isolated the communist parties 
of Western countries, the same was not true in India, where the Viceroy's declaration 
that India was a party to an as yet distant war, without even a pretence at consultation 
with Indian opinion, was deeply unpopular. The CPI's description of the war as 
'imperialist', and its proclamation that "The most effective way in which the Indian 
people can serve the cause of world peace and democracy is by striking for their own 
freedom and weakening British imperialism..."111, struck a responsive chord with 
nationalist sentiment.
Such a position was, moreover, entirely consistent with the stand of the INC, 
which from 1927 onwards had repeatedly declared India's unwillingness to be party to 
any of Britain's wars. This had been reaffirmed on the eve of the war, in a statement 
by the CWC in August, which declared that India could not participate in any war as 
long as freedom was denied her.
Thus the CPI, along with an expectant nation, waited for the INC to give a call to 
action. The CWC met in September and issued a carefully worded statement on 
September 14. This reiterated that "India cannot associate herself in a war said to be for 
democratic freedom when that freedom is denied her", but made no call for resistance,
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and even left the British an opening by inviting them to declare their present and future 
plans for India.112
The Viceregal response, when it finally came a full month later, offered nothing 
new. The CWC was now forced to instruct the Congress Ministries to resign, as a 
gesture of 'non-cooperation' with the British war effort. But no further call to action 
was given. Congressmen were instructed to prepare for civil disobedience (by 
'spinning and promoting the cause of khadi' , or handspun cloth), but the form and 
timing of this was left up to Gandhi, who in November told an audience of U.P. 
Congressmen that he did not care if it took six years before civil disobedience was 
launched, as what was important was that it be undertaken by a purified Congress, 
firmly committed to non-violence and khadi ,112 This pattern - that of the INCs 
conducting its own 'phoney war' - continued down to August 1942, when it was 
abruptly shattered by the Quit India resolution and the explosive events which 
followed. The Congress remained opposed to Indian participation in the war - although 
in July 1940 the CWC offered the British cooperation in efforts for organising the 
'defence of the country' if they promised India independence upon conclusion of the 
war, and in the interim constituted a 'National Government' of Indians -but little was 
done to translate this opposition into effective action. The decision on when to launch 
civil disobedience was left up to Gandhi, who did not initiate any such action until 
August 1940, and then too over the specific issue of freedom of speech, with 
resistance to be offered by individuals courting arrest. This was a particularly 
ineffective campaign, one controlled entirely from above, and one which certainly fell 
short of resistance to the war and struggle for independence.
The other side of leaving it to Gandhi to determine when and how to fight was, 
necessarily, preventing others in or connected with the INC from taking independent 
actions. The instruction that Congressmen prepare for civil disobedience was thus 
accompanied by repeated calls for discipline and non-violence, and the October 1939 
CWC specifically warned "against any hasty action in the shape of civil disobedience,
political strikes and the like"114 - a warning addressed to the CPI (amongst others), 
which had organised a successful anti-war strike of Bombay workers on October 2, 
1939. The December CWC reformulated the traditional Independence Day Pledge to 
include the principles of the Gandhian 'constructive programme', thus further 
committing would be participants in civil disobedience to Gandhian doctrine.
In a situation where the INC was inactive, and demanding similar inaction from 
others, the CPI was confronted with a clear choice. It could either, in the name of 
'unity', acquiesce in the INC position, as the CSP eventually did ; or it could criticise 
it, and take a more independent course of action. Having already, as we have seen, 
travelled the first few steps down the latter path, the CPI opted for 'struggle' over 
unity.
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A Politbureau’s statement on 'CPI Policy and Tasks in the Period of War', while 
it reiterated the customary call for the UNF and INC unity, also accused the Congress 
leadership of seeking "compromise and not struggle", because "It knows that today to 
a far greater extent than in 1930 or 1932, the revolutionary forces have grown and are 
capable of transforming even mass satyagraha into a revolutionary movement".1 ^  
This change of tack was indicated at the Ramgarh session of the INC, in March 1940, 
where, when their amendments to the main political resolution were defeated, the 
communists voted against this resolution. At Haripura and Tripuri, even though the 
main resolutions fell well short of what the communists called for, they had voted for 
them, and put the best possible gloss on them. In 1940 they broke ranks and bitterly 
denounced the main resolution, whilst attacking the INC leadership and their former 
Left allies in publications distributed at Ramgarh.1 ^
Bose, who was calling for 'two Congresses' (i.e. for a split in the Congress) 
was also attacked117, for the CPI was not willing to renounce the UNF by calling for 
a split in the Congress. Instead, it stressed the need to "implement the UNF in a new 
way". This new conception of the UNF was required by the situation of war, where 
rising mass militancy saw an alarmed Gandhian leadership "come out as sabotageurs
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(sic) of real mass struggle, [reveal itself] as a leadership which, every time it moved, 
moved away from the forces of the people and towards a peaceful compromise with 
Imperialism for minor concessions".11** Given this, militant nationalist struggle 
required "Not the tactic of 'inducing or pushing’ the Gandhian leadership into struggle, 
but of isolating that leadership and smashing its mass influence".119
Such exposures had, however, to be carried out within the framework of the 
UNF. The CPI reaffirmed, "The national Congress is the only people's organisation 
today through which successful national struggle can be launched", and therefore 
"Struggle against Gandhism has to be carried on within the framework of national 
unity, without disrupting the basic unity of the Congress".120 Independent struggles 
had to be developed through political strikes and no-rent campaigns, mobilised around 
the new slogan of 'National Democratic Revolution', and in this way the nationalist 
movement was to be simultaneously carried forward and detached from its bourgeois 
leadership.
This new CPI analysis and strategy, whilst it was presented as a readjustment of 
the UNF strategy pursued since 1936, marked a reversion to earlier positions. For the 
emphasis on 'independent' struggles did conflict with professions of faith in the INC, 
and attacks on the INC leadership did undermine unity with the Congress, and were 
reciprocated.121 These conflicts were in no way obscured or resolved by facile calls to 
'unity through struggle'. Once workers and peasants were being mobilised, not in 
support of the Congress programme and strategy, but against (and in defiance of) 
Congress inaction, the slogan of unity became purely rhetorical.
Thus when it came to defining what the UNF now meant in practice, the CPI 
could come up with little more than a call to 'develop lower Congress committees', and 
a call to workers to observe National days fixed by the INC with political strikes.122 
A changed assessment of the Congress leadership (and thus a changed perception of 
who was and was not part of national unity) led to an overturning of all the other 
elements of the UNF strategy. The emphasis on independent class action, where the
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nationalist leadership could not give the lead for such action, led to an elevation of the 
role of the proletariat, not as an element of the UNF, but as its leading force. This, 
when combined with attacks on the INC leadership, led to an elevation of the role of 
the CPI, at the cost of the INC. Thus a major statement of the CPI position, first 
published just before the Ramgarh Congress, was titled, significantly, The Proletarian 
Path . In February 1941 an editorial in Communist announcedthat the CPI was the 
only party capable of welding the diverse struggles of different classes into one 
national struggle.
By 1940-41, the United National Front was dead ; all that remained was for the 
CPI to administer the last rites. Before this could be done, external developments 
intervened to make this irrelevant. The Nazi invasion of the USSR in July 
1941 transformed the war into a 'People's War', in the characterisation of the 
international communist movement. Communist parties everywhere were required to 
adapt to the new situation and its changed requirements.
In the Allied countries, a reversal of position was made easier by the fact that it 
allowed the communist parties to come into step with the bulk of popular opinion. In 
India, the volte face had no such compensations. Some months passed before the CPI 
adopted the new line. Under conditions of illegality and isolation from developments 
abroad, with much of its leadership having been jailed in the course of 1940, the CPI 
initially responded by declaring that continued opposition to the 'imperialist war1, and 
energetic pursuit of national independence, was "the biggest aid  we can give to the 
Soviet Union". 124 when the jailed leadership first raised the new slogans, the 
leadership outside jail repudiated them, attributing the formulation of such erroneous 
policies to the 'isolation' of those in jail.125
It was not until December 1941 that a change in line was effected, after much 
soul searching and opposition to the change within the Party. The famous Deoli thesis 
declared that implementation of the 'People's War1 line required "a united front which 
extends to the foreign bureaucratic government...the Indian people, led by the
proletariat, must apply the logic of united front to imperialism - the same logic which 
they applied to the national bourgeoisie all these days".12^
With this, the CPI entered a new chapter in its history. The united front, 
reinterpreted beyond all recognition, now included imperialism ; and although this 
slogan was soon dropped, the British Indian government responded by legalizing the 
CPI in 1942. Defence of the Soviet Union was now the overriding slogan, and it saw 
the CPI discourage strikes, urge peasants to grow more food, and remain aloof from, 
and critical of, the final and greatest phase of the nationalist struggle, the Quit India 
movement.
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Conclusion
After some initial hesitation, in the course of 1937 the CPI fully embraced a 
strategy which had been formulated by the Comintern in response to the fascist threat 
in Europe, and which had been developed for the very different conditions prevailing 
in India by R.Palme Dutt and Ben Bradley. The CPI came to accept that the paramount 
political project in India was that of achieving national independence, and that this 
independence would take a bourgeois, parliamentary form. It declared that the 
Congress was not a bourgeois organisation, but a multi-class party with a bourgeois or 
Right Wing leadership. It even accepted that the unity demanded by the UNF strategy 
encompassed this Right Wing leadership. Above all, the CPI embraced a conception of 
a united front in which, in a situation where the premier nationalist organisation was 
very strong and the CPI extremely weak, the UNF was to take the form of the INC 
incorporating all other elements into its organisational framework, rather than the form 
of an agreement between different parties.
Once accepted, this conception of the UNF was vigorously expounded and 
consistently followed by the CPI. Whether the CPI leaders actually believed that 
national independence could be achieved under the aegis of the Congress, and that too
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without splitting it and displacing its leadership - or whether they regarded this as a 
tactic to be pursued until the bourgeoisie was compelled to draw back and leave the 
field open for the CPI to 'go it alone', as some of their opponents alleged - is a moot 
point. Conversely, for the INC the UNF was something of an illusion. Nehru and the 
CSP notwithstanding, for most of the Congress leadership the programmatic and other 
changes adopted by the INC in this period were part of the normal responsiveness of a 
mass organisation to a changing political scene, rather than evidence of its 
transformation into a UNF. For this leadership, as it frequently made clear, the 
Congress had always represented all Indians, and thus there was no need for 
'collective affiliation' and a UNF. In this sense the UNF was something the CPI and 
other sections of the Left pursued, fought for and proclaimed, but not something 
which ever took formal shape or form.
The CPI's very pursuit of the UNF strategy, however, had real political effects, 
making it much more than a tactical ploy or convenient illusion. The Congress, as we 
saw, moved leftwards in this period, addressing itself more directly to questions of 
poverty and exploitation, and defining its goal of 'swaraj' unambigiously, as a demand 
for full independence. This change was in significant measure due to the development 
of peasants' and workers' struggles, and to the growth of the Left in the INC - 
developments which owed much to the United National Front.
Another, closely related effect and success of the UNF strategy was the 
development and popularisation of a 'left nationalist' ideology in this period. Not only 
the CPI, but also Nehru and the CSP were important sources for this ; but in all cases 
an attempt was made to marry nationalism to some version of Marxism, and the very 
proliferation of such attempts was indication of the growing influence and hold of this 
ideology.
The successes of the UNF strategy, as we have also seen, revealed some of its 
weaknesses. New social forces served to radicalise the Congress, but only up to a 
point. In circumstances where the INC had formed governments, and where it was
thus subject to the 'demands of administration' as well as countervailing conservative 
pressures, radical social forces came into conflict with the INC leadership. Militant 
class and national struggles and Congress unity, it soon became apparent, were not 
always compatible ; and in the dying moments of the UNF they seemed to many to be 
mutually exclusive.
Ironically, this seemed to vindicate an earlier and long-standing communist 
analysis. Beginning with Roy, Indian communists had argued that were limits to the 
INC's commitment to the pursuit of independence, limits which revealed themselves 
in the same measure as the mass struggle advanced in strength and militancy. By 1939, 
if not by 1938, this key contention of an earlier analysis (an analysis which, however, 
had itself failed to yield a viable strategy) seemed borne out.
Relatedly, 'left nationalism' proved more nationalist than left. The CPI's one­
time allies began to go in their own directions, either one of accommodation with the 
Gandhian leadership (Nehru, the CSP) or one of anti-INC but opportunist nationalism, 
as with Bose. 'Left-nationalism', which the CPI had played no small role in 
popularizing, assumed a life of its own, as was recognized by CPI leader Ranadive 
when he wrote,
Left-nationalism stands today as a programme popularized by the Socialist 
movement ; yet because of the failure of the Socialists to take 
Organizational Lead, it confronts the Socialist movement as an independent 
force.127
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Written in August 1939, before the CPI split with the CSP, the 'failure' referred 
to here was the failure of the CPI and the Left to build an organisational base of a 
strength corresponding to the strength of the left-nationalist ideology it had 
disseminated. It is indeed true that the advance of the Left and the CPI in this period, 
whilst significant, never matched the rapid advance in popularity and influence of left- 
nationalism as an ideology.
This organisational failure, however, was the product of a political failure, of a 
deep and fundamental weakness in the politics of the United National Front. For 
inasmuch as the CPI sought to build the UNF on the basis of adoption and propagation 
of a left-nationalist ideology - around slogans of a Constituent Assembly, unity with 
the bourgeoisie and so on - this ideology was always going to have an existence 
beyond the CPI (as it was, of course, intended to), but also independent of it and 
beyond its control. The compromises and ambiguities inherent in such an ideology, 
one with which Marxism accommodated itself to nationalism, contained the possibility, 
if not inevitability, of such a development. The moment the CPI began to take a more 
radical tack, even if only to more strongly assert the 'left' in left-nationalism, it was 
bound to find that its own creation stood independent of it and often hostile to it
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These observations help to 'place' the period when the CPI pursued the UNF 
strategy within the history of Marxism in India. In previous chapters we have traced 
how, faced with the problem of combining the nationalist project and the socialist one, 
and thus of effecting a relation between the nationalist and the class struggles, Marxists 
in India provided different answers at different times. If the position adopted following 
the Sixth Comintern Congress and the Tenth Plenum of the ECCI represented one 
extreme, where the nationalist project and struggle was subsumed under the socialist 
one, the UNF strategy represented the other extreme. In this latter case Marxism 
identified itself unreservedly with the nationalist project, effacing many of its own 
concerns and adapting others to nationalist requirements in order to woo the INC, and 
in order to popularise a left-nationalist ideology which could serve as the basis for the 
broadest alliance of forces.
This latter 'extreme' proved much more rewarding for the CPI than the other. 
Coming at a time when social and political circumstances were favourable to such a 
venture, the adoption of the UNF strategy facilitated the growth of the CPI. However 
this strategy was such that even its ultimate success would, arguably, have meant
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failure of another sort. For such a success would have been bought at the cost of 
abandoning or greatly tempering the central concerns of Marxism ; would have been 
bought, that is, by collapsing the Marxist project into the nationalist one.
In the event, the experiment failed even in its own terms. There were limits to the 
LNCs social radicalism and its nationalist militancy, and as these revealed themselves 
the UNF began to crumble. As it did so, the left-nationalism which had formed its 
ideological basis proved to have an existence independent, and beyond the control, of 
the CPI.
Between 1941 and 1947 the CPI's position underwent further changes. At the 
end of the war the CPI returned to a position in many ways similar to that which it had 
adopted in the period of the UNF. National independence,when it was finally achieved 
in 1947, was not the product of a united front of left and nationalist forces, nor of a 
struggle led by workers and peasants. The manner of its advent contradicted or 'put the 
lie' to many communist presuppositions and contentions. Nevertheless, in August 
1947 the CPI joined in India's independence celebrations, and declared its (qualified) 
support for India's Constituent Assembly and the provisional government headed by 
Nehru. Very soon thereafter this position was reversed. The Congress was denounced 
for having made a deal with the British. India's independence was declared to be a 
false independence, a trick which gave the illusion but not the substance of genuine 
national independence.
Thus Marxist theory's preoccupation with and engagement with the question of 
Indian nationhood and nationalism continued into the post-Independence period. The 
question of national independence, and the role of different classes in maintaining / 
extending it, continued to be central issues in communist debates in the years after 
1947. Why this should be so is one of the questions considered in the Conclusion to 
this work.
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1. According to the then Director of the British Indian Government's Intelligence 
Bureau, the Meerut prisoners smuggled at least three documents addressed to the 
Comintern out of jail, although it is not known if these ever reached their 
destination - H. Williamson, India and Communism , Calcutta, 1976, pp. 176-77.
2. "The biggest mistake made by Indian Communists consists of the fact that in reality 
they stood aside from the mass movement of the people against British 
imperialism" - "Open Letter to the Indian Communists" (by CP's of China, 
Germany and Great Britain), Inprecor , 23 : 22, 19 May, 1932, p. 437.
3. "The revolutionary people are prepared to struggle, but they have lost faith in the 
treacherous policy of the National Congress and are seeking new paths, a new 
programme, new leadership" - "Open Letter to the Indian Communists from the 
C.C. of the C.P. of China", Inprecor , 13 : 51, 24 Nov., 1933, p. 1155. The later 
(CCP) letter, however, was, relatively speaking, more 'moderate'. It called for a 
united front (albeit one excluding the INC), and suggested that communists seek to 
reunify the communist and 'reformist' trade union federations. By contrast the 
earlier '3 parties letter' had disparaged 'united front illusions'.
4. The organisational aspect was also stressed in V. Basak,"A Few Remarks on the 
Indian Communist Movement", Inprecor, 14 : 32, 1 June, 1934.
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Congress line - that is, with denunciations of 'left reformism', of the slogan of a 
Constituent Assembly, etc. A later CPI document, "Problems of the Anti- 
Imperialist Struggle in India" [Inprecor , 15 : 10, 9 March, 1935), marked a more 
significant change of position, calling for a united front which would include (local 
units of) the INC. This, however, was still a united front 'from below', with one 
of its aims being "exposing the tricksters of national reformism" (p.292).
6. Williamson, op. cit., pp. 182-83.
7. Thus on April 1, as the ferocious crackdown on the KPD was proceeding, the 
Presidium of the ECCI declared, "The establishment of an outright dictatorship,
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which destroys all democratic illusions among the masses and frees them from the 
sway of social democracy speeds Germany on its road to a proletarian revolution" - 
quoted in B.L. Gross, "The German Communists' United-Front and Popular- 
Front Ventures", in M.M. Drachkovitch and B.Lazitch (eds), The Comintern: 
Historical Highlights , Hoover Institute Publications, 1966, p. 119. The Thirteenth 
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pursued by the KPD, and lay all blame for the rise of Hitler at the feet of Social 
Democracy.
8. Developing good relations with Germany had been an important goal of Soviet 
foreign policy since the Rapallo Treaty. Thus Litvinov sought hard to limit the 
damage caused by Hitler's victory, repeatedly declaring that the internal regime of 
any nation made no difference to the USSR's relations with it. Similarly, despite 
Japanese provocations over the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria, the 
Soviet's were conciliatory, offering to sell the CER, and eventually selling it in 
1935 to the puppet state of Manchukuo for a quarter of the original asking price - 
Max Beloff, The Foreign Policy o f Soviet Russia, 1929-36 , v. 1, Oxford 
University Press, 1947, p. 173. Relations with both states, nevertheless, declined 
rapidly.
9. Speech to CPSU Central Executive Committee (28 Dec., 1933), in J. Degras (ed), 
Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, 1931-41 , v. 3, Oxford University Press, 
1953, p. 46.
10. Communique on visit of M. Laval, French Foreign Minister,to Moscow (16 May, 
1935), in ibid., p. 132.
11. An about-face which even the French Socialists found it difficult to reconcile 
themselves to - see Julius Braunthal, History o f the International, 1914-1943 , 
Nelson, 1967, pp. 431-32.
12. ibid., p. 426.
13. On 21 August the ECCI sent a letter to the PCF recommending "maximum 
development of the united front" - quoted in E.H. Cam,The Twilight o f Comintern, 
1930-1935 , MacMillan Press, 1982, pp. 129-30.
14. The initial confusion, and then the slow emergence of a new position 
(accompanied by personnel changes) in the Comintern between the Thirteenth 
ECCI and the Seventh Congress, are detailed in ibid., Chapter 7.
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15. "Resolution of Seventh Congress on Fascism, Working Class Unity, and the 
Tasks of the Comintern", (Extracts), in J. Degras (ed.), The Communist 
International, 1919-1943 : Documents , v. 3 (1929-1943), Oxford University 
Press, 1965, p. 361.
16. G. Dimitrov, The United Front , Lawrence and Wishart, 1935, pp. 35-36. A 
striking feature of Dimitrov's report was that its few references to revolution or 
proletarian dictatorship were negative ones, in that these were described (and 
decried) as 'formal demands' or 'bare appeals' in the 'current historical situation'.
17. Despite its relative frankness, reflected also in its energetic and (relatively) cliche- 
free prose, Dimitrov's report contained significant evasions and lacunae. Chief 
amongst these was an unwillingness to acknowledge that the Comintern had 
pursued an erroneous strategy in the past. Out of this omission arose an evasion. If 
the communists bore no responsibility for the successes of fascism, the entire 
blame necessarily lay with Social Democracy. This, however, was difficult to 
reconcile with proposing a united front to social-democratic parties. Ingeniously 
(but not entirely inaccurately), Dimitrov reconciled the inconsistency by claiming 
that under pressure from the masses, Social Democracy was dividing into a 
bourgeois and a revolutionary camp, the former responsible for the fascist 
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communists.
18. Dimitrov, op. cit., pp. 39-41, 70.
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Comintern Documents * v. 3, p. 367.
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against imperialism.
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ignore China, both because of the strength and importance of the CCP, and 
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Conclusion
In Marx's thought the phenomenon of nationhood occupied an ambivalent 
position, as did the non-European parts of the world. In his writings the nation 
appeared as an important feature of modem existence, one which constrained the 
'form' of the proletariat's struggle for socialism, though the 'substance' of that 
struggle, and its goal, remained universal and international. The East appeared as 
something partly outside Marxism because it was outside capitalism and world history, 
but also as a region rapidly becoming part of world history, by becoming Western. 
The two issues - nationhood and the East - remained on the whole separate ones for 
Marx, though he did at one point indicate that a consequence and symptom of the 
Westernization of the East might be the formation of independent nations there. He did 
not, however, argue this closely or convincingly.
With Lenin the 'national question’ and the 'colonial question' became closely 
linked within Marxism. The 'essence' of the national question was declared to be the 
distinction between 'progressive' and 'reactionary' nationalism, a distinction based 
upon a new analysis of capitalism as 'imperialism'. The former type of nationalism - 
found to be especially prevalent in the non-Westem, 'oppressed' countries - was 
endorsed. It was declared to be historically necessary and politically desirable.
This position, accepted and systematised by the Communist International, 
contributed greatly to the 'internationalisation' of Marxism, and particularly to its 
extension to the East. However it also contained certain dangers. Once struggles for 
national liberation were found to be 'inevitable and progressive’, the distinction 
between national ’form’ and universal class 'substance' was blurred. In the oppressed 
nations not only the form but also the substance of the struggle was declared to be
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national and nationalist. Once blurred in this way, there was always the possibility that 
this distinction - unargued in the first place - would disappear altogether.
'Internationalism' was never sufficient safeguard against this. The claim that the 
proletarian struggle was an international and internationalist one was founded upon 
two linked propositions. First, that workers had more in common with each other than 
with other members of their nation ; that is, that class was more important than 
nationality. Second, that socialism, because universal, could only take the form of an 
international brotherhood of nations, perhaps eventually dispensing with nationhood 
altogether. But in recognising that there was a national 'dimension' to the class 
struggle, and even (initially at least) to socialism, 'proletarian internationalism' 
unwittingly acknowledged the existence of a potential, at the very least, for 
contradiction. Like the distinction between 'form' and 'substance' on which it was 
based, it did not 'resolve' this in theory, much less in practice, though it was pretended 
that it did so.
The closest thing to a 'guarantee' against national form swallowing universal 
substance, once the universality of that substance had itself been compromised, was 
where polarization within the nation was heightened to the point where conflict, even if 
national, did not thereby become nationalist. Which is to say - the only guarantee was 
not the rhetoric of internationalism, or even the rhetoric of class struggle, but actual 
class struggle, raised to an acute form.
Communists in India and other colonial countries, like their European 
counterparts, sought to organise and direct such struggles. They kept within their 
sights the fact that such struggles ultimately led to socialism. They publicly proclaimed 
this to be so. But because national independence was seen to be a necessary stopping 
point on the road to socialism, they also sought to link class struggles to nationalist 
struggles and the nationalist goal. Since class struggle could, simultaneously, be the 
'motor' of national struggle, it did not serve to keep form and substance distinct
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In seeking further to make the connection a 'necessary' one - in declaring that 
national liberation could only be achieved through class struggle, and with the active 
involvement, if not under the leadership, of the working class - communists in the 
colonies only succumbed to this danger, as we shall argue in greater detail below. By 
insisting that national independence could only be achieved by the exploiting classes 
(and acting on this presumption in practice), communists in the colonies sought to 
accord themselves and the class they represented a more significant role in the 
'bourgeois-democratic' national struggle than they would otherwise have had. They 
sought also to make this struggle something 'more' than a bourgeois democratic one. 
They sought to harness class struggle to nationalist struggle, hoping that in this way 
nationalist struggle, and its outcome, would reflect the interests of the exploited, rather 
than exploiting, classes.
In the event, the communists' contention that Indian independence could not be 
achieved other than through class struggle and ultimately under the leadership of the 
working class proved to be wrong, thereby demonstrating that this was not an 
objective necessity, but a possibility. It was a task which communists set themselves, 
and one which was achieved in some countries, but not in others - not an objective and 
inescapable 'fact'. The struggle for India's independence was in fact led and won by 
its bourgeoisie and rich peasantry, although this proved to be a very tragic 'victory', 
given the truncated nations which emerged, and the communal bloodshed which 
accompanied their emergence. The peasantry - much less so the working class - did 
prove crucial to this victory, but it was mobilized primarily behind various forms of 
non-Marxist nationalism. By far the most important of these was Gandhian 
nationalism, which based itself upon a recognition of the importance of 'horizontal' 
divisions within Indian society, and appealed to pre-modem (but not always 
'traditional') values and images.
We have examined some of the different ways in which the necessity of the 
connection between class struggle and nationalist struggle was argued, and the
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different ways in which communists sought to effect such a link. We have also seen 
how this lent itself to appropriation by non-Marxist but radical and modernising 
nationalists, and was so appropriated by Nehru. What we wish to further suggest here 
is that this process did not simply result in Marxism being appropriated by others, but 
that it eventually resulted in Marxism itself becoming a form of nationalism. We 
suggest, with Eric Hobsbawm, that "Marxist movements and states have tended to 
become national not only in form but in substance, i.e., nationalist"1. We wish to 
suggest further that in the former colonial and semi-colonial countries, where this is 
perhaps especially true, this is connected to Marxism's endorsement of progressive 
nationalism in the East, and the analyses and positions subsequently adopted by 
Marxists.
Hobsbawm's is an empirical observation, as his reference to Marxist 
'movements and states' indicates. Our contention is somewhat different. While 
accepting Hobsbawm's claim, we wish to suggest that in Asia Marxism as a theory 
proved itself unable to maintain the distinction between form and substance, and in this 
sense became nationalist.
To clarify. Our contention is not that Marxists, in engaging with nationalism, 
came gradually to be seduced by it, that they succumbed to nationalist ideology . 
During the period examined in the second part of this work Indian communists did not, 
by and large, treat the interests of 'their' nation as more important than those of other 
nations. Nor did they pursue national independence as an end in itself; it was a means 
to other ends - democracy and socialism. Indeed, soon after the point at which our 
study concludes Indian communists were for a period to support the 'right to self- 
determination' of the various nationalities and religions of India; scarcely evidence of 
their having succumbed to the seductions of Indian nationalism. The international 
dimension to communist activity in India should also not be forgotten. Whether they 
were highly critical of nationalist organisations and their ideology, or supportive of 
them, the attitudes and strategies of Indian communists were approved of by an
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international communist body which was certainly not guilty of Indian nationalist 
proclivities.
Our contention that Marxism has 'become nationalist' is not, then, a reference to 
a 'corruption' of consciousness , though such corruptions have also occurred. It is to 
suggest, rather, that in the East Marxism as a body of theory came to see in the nation 
not simply a given framework within which the class struggle occurred, but the form 
and substance through which Marxist goals could be realised and in which they would 
be embodied.
Some of the reasons for this have been traced in this work. The first important 
step, in what we are suggesting was a process culminating in the 'nationalisation' of 
Marxism, was the distinction Marxists came to draw between oppressor and oppressed 
nationalisms, and their endorsement of the latter (examined in chapters 1 to 3). This in 
itself blurred the distinction between nationalist 'form' and universal socialist 
substance. It did not, however, efface this distinction.
The second and decisive step in this process was when Marxists identified the 
exploited classes in the colonies as those which most consistently sought, and were 
best able to achieve, national liberation. How this was done varied greatly, as we saw 
in chapters 4, 5 and 7. In this sense this was less a 'process' (to the extent that that 
implies an evolution over time) than a series of different answers to the same problems 
and questions, centreing around the relationship between socialism and nationalism, 
and between class struggle and nationalist struggle. Despite such differences, the 
crucial element all these analyses and strategies had in common was this : all sought to 
identify the exploited classes, and particularly the proletariat, as essential to, if not the 
leading element in, the nationalist struggle. With this step the working class, seen as 
the negation of capitalism and the 'bearer' of socialism in Marxist theory, could not 
also be seen as the negation of nationhood and nationalism. The nation was not even 
seen simply as an 'environment' which the proletariat inherited. Instead, the proletariat 
came to be identified as the bearer of socialism as well as of nationhood.
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The class struggle, which grew out of and would eventually destroy capitalism, 
was now also seen as necessary to national liberation, and indeed was seen as always 
being, at some level, simultaneously a national struggle. Nationhood was now 
something more than just a necessary 'step' on the road to socialism. The relatonship 
between socialism and nationhood had become symbiotic rather than only temporal, 
since both were embodied in the working class. That is, once the working class was 
seen as the bearer of both socialism and nationhood, then the struggles this class 
engaged in, the goals it allegedly sought, and the emancipatory interests with which it 
was identified, came to be identified with both socialism and nationalism.
Socialism was not thereby reduced to, or equated with, nationalism. Socialism 
remained something different, and something 'more'. The nation-state continued to be 
a form, and socialism the substance. But the nation-state was no longer a 'form' in 
Marx's sense - in the sense of being a ’husk’. It was rather a necessary form, the form 
which was essential to, and which corresponded to, the achievement of socialism.
This helps explain, too, why Marxism in the colonies has continued to be 
nationalist even after independence has been achieved, and that too even where the 
nation which has emerged is not socialist (as in the case of India). The exploited 
classes and the progressive possibilities they embody having been so closely identified 
with national independence within Marxism, the defence of that independence has 
come to be seen as necessary to the defence and pursuit of other, 'substantive* goals. 
In the post-Independence period, even where Indian communist parties have adopted 
'left' positions, denouncing and opposing the party in government, an important 
reason given for doing so has always been that the government in question is 
compromising the independence of the nation , and thus frustrating the pursuit of 
economic progress, social justice etc. Conversely, where communists have given 
support to non-communist governments one justification has always been that the 
government in question is a truly 'national' government, and thus pursues (or makes 
possible the pursuit of) progressive domestic and foreign policies.
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The other side of identifying national liberation and (subsequently) the 
preservation of national independence with exploited classes is, of course, the 
identification of dominant classes as 'anti-national'. These classes are held to be less 
than resolute in their defence of the nations economic and political independence, 
where they are not outrightly willing to compromise this independence in pursuit of 
their own class interests. As we have seen, in the pre-Independence period the debates 
on the Indian bourgeoisie in the ranks of the Indian communist movement were usually 
concerned less with the relation of that class with the proletariat than with its 
relationship with imperialism.
In the post-Independence era, just as the interests of the nation have continued to 
be identified with the interests of the working class, so the dominant classes (or a 
section of them) have continued to be identified as anti-national. It is the status of 
classes intermediate to these, and the relation of the ruling classes to different political 
parties, which have formed the subject of many controversies within Marxist ranks, 
and have been the occasion for changes of strategy as well as splits. The main disputes 
within the ranks of the (now divided) Indian communist movement have been over 
questions such as, for instance, whether the Congress is a party of the 'big 
bourgeoisie' and feudal landlords (and is therefore reactionary and pro-imperialist) or 
whether it is a party of the 'national bourgeoisie' (note the juxtaposition of terms) and 
rich peasantry, and is therefore relatively progressive and committed to maintaining 
India's independence from the economies and govemmentsof imperialist powers. That 
the preservation and extension of national independence is the sin qua non of 
economic, social and political advance, if not the very measure of it, is taken for 
granted.
In the course of these post-Independence debates and disputes, it has not always 
been clear whether a party is being opposed or denounced because it is seen as 
reactionary and therefore as anti-national, or whether it is seen as anti-national and 
therefore reactionary. The distinction is a subtle but important one. In the latter case the
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identification of class interest with the national interest is so complete that nationalist 
criteria have, in effect, replaced Marxism, though the former are then rationalised with 
the aid of Marxist concepts and terminology. This tendency too has been apparent in 
the theory and practice of communists in India in the post-Independence period. That 
Marxist theory has become 'national', in the sense we have suggested, seems to have 
contributed to a tendency for Marxist parties to become nationalist, in the sense that 
Hobsbawm suggests.^
Our contention that Marxism has become 'national', and displays a tendency to 
become nationalist, is not limited to India. It can, we suggest, also be seen in other 
former colonies and semi-colonies. The 'success' or 'failure' of communist 
movements did not matter to this. The statement is true in China, where Marxists 
succeeded in leading the class and nationalist struggles that established a non-capitalist 
regime. Indeed, it is especially true where communist movements have assumed 
leadership of the nation-state. The armed conflicts between the Chinese nation and the 
Vietnamese nation, and between Vietnam and Kampuchea, illustrate this all too well. 
But it is also true in India, where such attempts to harness class struggle to nationalist 
struggle, and vice versa, proved unsuccessful. Success or failure certainly made a 
great deal of difference in other ways^; but whether it succeeded in the task it set itself 
in the colonies or failed, Marxism has become nationalist.
Just as this can be seen in what communist states and movements do, so it can be 
seen in how Marxists write their history, and the history of nationalism. In those states 
where communists are in power the two histories are written as one, after past enemies 
have been eliminated from both, usually by )£ declaring that they were not truly 
nationalists. In those countries, such as India, where the nationalist struggle was not 
led by communists, and where the nationalists of yesteryear are now part of the ruling 
class, and therefore cannot be appropriated (and are in a position to resist it), 
previously hidden virtues are nevertheless discovered in nationalism. There are 
constraints on how far Party communists can travel this road, since it involves, to
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some extent at least, a repudiation of past criticisms and actions. But 'Marxists' who 
do not owe allegiance to any communist party do not operate under any such 
constraints. In India the efforts of some such Marxists to understand the efficacy of 
nationalism (an eminently desirable exercise) frequently end in adoration of it. In a 
comic reversal, whereas previously what Marxists thought desirable was also declared 
to be necessary, what 'actually happened' is now found to have been inevitable, and 
desirable. Communist parties come to be criticised for not being nationalist enough.4
Marxists have come to identify so strongly with nationalism, as a progressive 
and anti-imperialist force, that they frequently begin to safeguard its honour, and to 
legislate on it. Since nationalism is treated, almost by definition, as being 
'progressive', 'secular' and so on, those movements or individuals which do not meet 
these rigorous standards are declared to be not 'truly' nationalist. The nationalist label 
comes to be treated as an exclusive one, only to be bestowed upon those of whom 
Marxists approve.
Such exercises culminate not only in a total failure to comprehend nationalism, 
which as history amply demonstrates is frequently illiberal even where it is anti­
colonial, but in something even more serious. Marxists become party to the 
suppression of some nationalisms, either because they are adjudged to be 
'reactionary'- a verdict which may, of course, be correct - or, better still, because they 
are not nationalist at all, but simply reactionary. Eritrean nationalism, or Sikh 
nationalism, or Muslim nationalism are 'regionalism' or 'communalism' rather than 
nationalism, and / or are the products of sinister imperialist plots directed at destroying 
the 'true' and progressive nation.
In any history of ideas there is an inbuilt bias towards seeing historical 
phenomena as the outcomes of ideological and theoretical 'causes'. We do not wish to 
succumb to this by implying that the 'nationalisation' of Marxism was simply and
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solely caused by the theoretical 'errors' made by Marxists as they came to confront the 
question of nationalism.
That Marxism has become nationalist not only in Asia but also in Europe, where 
even if nationalism remained untheorised it was nevertheless not also endorsed, would 
suggest otherwise. So too would the fact that becoming nationalist is a fate Marxism 
shares with many other philosophies which couched their message, and their mission, 
in universal terms. It is a characteristic of our age that many of the values and features 
of 'modernity' - democracy, liberty, industrialisation and so on - have come to be 
things possessed by, sought by and embodied in nations. 'The nation' and 
'nationalism', n££ central categories in an Enlightenment thought which was universal, 
have come, in the post-Enlightenment age, to be seen as the repositories of 
Enlightenment ideals. Marxism, then, is only one of a number of rationalist and 
universal philosophies which has become nationalist. Socialism has joined democracy 
in being seen as a universal ideal which nonetheless is achieved through and embodied 
in nations.
Pan of the explanation as to why Marxism has become nationalist, perhaps the 
greater part, no doubt lies in the objective weight and strength of the nation-state as a 
historical phenomenon, and in the power of nationalism. An understanding of 
Marxism's failure re nationalism - not simply in failing to theorise it adequately, but in 
succumbing to it - requires, then, Marxist studies of nationalism. Such studies must 
break with the tradition which has dominated Marxism from the outset; they must 
study nationalism historically, disregarding or at least bracketing the question of which 
nationalisms are progressive and which reactionary.
Some recent studies along these lines - notably Tom Naim's The Break-Up of 
Britain (especially the essay, "The Modem Janus"), Eric Hobsbawm's reflections on 
this, and Benedict Anderson's thoughtful and stimulating book, Imagined  
Communities - all attest to the power of nationalism, though they explain it in different 
ways. Naim takes the Marxist bull by the horns and suggests that nationhood and
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nationalism are 'inescapable' aspects of capitalist development, more deeply rooted and 
stronger than class, and therefore that Marxism's failure to understand nationalism and 
its helplessness in the face of it were 'inevitable'.^
One need not accept Naim's sketchy explanation of nationalism in order to 
acknowledge the possibility that nationalism is so deeply rooted (whether in the logic 
of 'uneven development’, as Naim suggests, or in something else) that the failure of 
Marxism in this regard was historically inevitable ; to accept that, in Naim's words, 
"Socialism was a premature birth".6 But socialism and Marxism are not the same 
thing, and it does not follow that an intellectual and theoretical failure were equally 
inevitable. If socialism were a premature birth, it would imply rather that Marxists 
were confronted with a choice between intellectual depth (developing an understanding 
and also a critique of nationalism) bought at the price of political impotence, or with 
sacrificing some of the intellectual power and emancipatory possibilities of Marxism in 
seeking to be politically efficacious. The latter, one could then reasonably conclude, 
was the choice which was made - without it being realised that such choices were 
involved.
If all this is true, it is necessary to acknowledge it, and confront it. It need not 
lead to political paralysis. For example, there may cogent reasons why the 'integrity' 
of the Indian nation should be valued by Marxists, and resolutely defended. But if this 
at the same time obstructs, compromises or defers other aspects of the Marxist project, 
it is best to acknowledge this. It is only when this is done, when the chariot of 
historical necessity is unharnessed from what are political choices , that conscious and 
considered choices can be made.
It mav be, then, that nationalism is so powerful that the communist movement 
was 'bound' to succumb to it ; but this is by no means established, and indeed it is 
difficult to see how it could be. The conclusion that socialism is a premature birth in a 
world of nations and nationalisms is itself premature. Marxists have too often 
legitimated political choices by declaring them to be historically 'necessary and
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inevitable'. It is doubtful that attributing what are now seen as Marxism's 'failures' to 
history is an improvement. Certainly, it should not function as an excuse for not 
studying these failures, and the judgements and choices which led to failure. As this 
study has sought to demonstrate, Marxism's engagement with nationalism in the East 
consisted of so many analyses and theoretical and political judgements. To treat the 
colonial question as a national question was not inevitable. Nor was treating the 
distinction between oppressor and oppressed nations as the 'essence' of the national 
question , or identifying the working class as the leader of the national revolution in the 
colonies, and so on.
The matter has been too little studied to arrive at any conclusions, let alone firm 
ones. We need, not only more studies of nationalism, but also further studies of 
Marxism's encounters with nationalism.
Nor can the latter type of studies be confined, as this one has largely been, to 
Marxism's relationship to nationalism alone.
Marxism began as at once intellectual inheritor of the Enlightenment and critique 
of i t ; socialism was conceived of as the 'fulfilment' of the possibilities opened up by 
capitalism, but also as a radical negation of it. In the history of Marxism after Marx, 
this latter, 'critical' side of Marx's thought has been left undeveloped, even 
downplayed or forgotten. Marxism has presented itself as, and has largely become, the 
'outermost limit' of Enlightenment thought - its most consistent and advanced form. 
Socialism has similarly come to be seen as the 'realisation' of the emancipatory 
possibilities first opened by capitalism and its associated forms of technical reason, 
technology and so on.7 We have seen that this was certainly true in India where 
Marxists, whether playing pedagogue to the nationalist movement or seeking to 
establish their claim to lead it, presented their theory as a 'scientific' appreciation of 
historical 'laws', and as the culminating point of historical progress. We have also 
seen that it was this, combined with Marxism's endorsement of nationalism, which
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made it not only attractive to non-Marxists like Nehru, but liable to appropriation by 
them.
We would like to conclude by suggesting that Marxism's having become 
nationalist may be closely connected to its failure to develop and realise itself as a 
critique of Enlightenment thought and of capitalism. We suggest that it is partly 
because Marxism failed to fulfil its promise to become something 'more' than 
Enlightenment thought that it has, like other post-Enlightenment intellectual systems, 
ended up becoming something less, its universality and its radicalism compromised by 
its having become national in form and substance.
We can do no more than put this forward as a possibility here, since it is an issue 
which has been raised in this work, but not closely studied or argued. It is a possibility 
worth investigating however. Marxism is a theory of great ambition and extraordinary 
intellectual richness. When a theory such as this - and moreover one so self­
consciously a product of 'modernity' - 'fails' in the face of something so eminently 
modem and important as nationalism, the roots of this failure are likely to be found in 
the theory itself, and not only in the particular positions it has adopted on nationalism.
It is only by continuing to engage with the question of nationalism, except now 
in different ways, that we might begin to alter the unhappy outcome of previous such 
engagements ; that we might begin as Marxists both to better understand nationalism, 
and to make Marxism less susceptible to it. The results of such studies may be 
disturbing, of course, and may force a fundamental reassessment of Marxism as a 
theory, and of its place in history. But that should not deter us. It is only by critically 
examining what Marxism has become that we can take the first hesitant steps to making 
it what it can, perhaps, still be.
Notes
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1. Eric Hobsbawm, "Some Reflections on 'The Break-up of Britain"', New Left 
Review , No. 105 (Sept.-Oct. 1977), p. 13.
2. Thus it is that 'left' breakaways from 'orthodox' or 'official' communism are 
almost invariably anti-nationalist. The Naxalite movement in India, for example, 
raised the slogan, "China's Chairman is our Chairman". But although not 
nationalist, the Marxism of the Naxalites was still national; one of their charges 
against the Indian ruling classes was precisely that they had subordinated the 
interests of the nation to foreign, imperialist interests.
3. Lest there be any misunderstanding, let us clarify. Whether a nationalism closely 
wedded to the interests of workers and peasants triumphed, as under Mao, or 
whether one serving the interests of the colonial elite triumphed, as with Gandhi 
and Nehru, has made a world of difference to the people of these two nations, and 
not only them. Even if Marxism is a species of nationalism, there are nationalisms 
and nationalisms, and we do not wish to efface the differences between these, or 
suggest that they are in some way unimportant. We do wish to suggest that, 
whether it succeeded in the task it defined itself in the colonies or whether it failed, 
Marxism has become nationalist.
4. This is especially evident in the work (and particularly the more recent work) of 
Bipan Chandra and the informal 'school' around him. See, for instance, the essays 
by Chandra, Sashi Joshi, Bhagwan Josh and Aditya Mukheijee in B. Chandra (ed), 
The Indian Left: Critical Appraisals, Vikas Publishing House, 1983.
5. Tom Naim, "The Modem Janus", in his The Break-up of Britain , Verso, 1981 
(expanded edition), p. 329, pp. 350-52.
6. ibid., p. 352.
7. It is a testimony to the richness of the Marxist tradition that there have always been 
counter-trends, rooted in or drawing upon Marx’s thought. The early Lukacs, Karl 
Korsch and in a very different way Antonio Gramsci sought to develop a non- 
scientistic Marxism. Some of the theorists of the Frankfurt School embarked upon a 
critique of Enlightenment categories long before it became fashionable, as it is
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today. Jurgen Habermas continues to be engaged in an ambitious project which 
aims, amongst other things, to take into account the criticisms levelled at 
Enlightenment thought, without abandoning Enlightenment categories altogether.
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